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1. Linguistic analysis is a revelatory philosophical strategy on
the conditions of (i) a presumption of interdependence among the
uses of a term being substituted for the usual presumption of
the dependence on some single 'paradigmatic' use of all other
uses, (ii) recognition of the adaptability of important terms to
denominational and individual points of view, and (iii) treating
usages, and the habits of thought embodied in them, as open to
crWic!ism (1.1). Applied to 'education' and cognates, the reformed
strategy reveals a complex unitary concept of education and a
manifold of uses structured on three key correlativities: between
'(formal) education' and 'education (in the widest sense)' - which
underwrites the educational aspiration to a coherent view of life
as a whole; and between descriptive and normative uses, and
open and loaded uses - which, together, foreshadow the complex
logic of educational theory and debate (1.2 - 1.4).
2. The new paradigm of educational theory as emergent in
practice provokes an overdue analysis of the distinctive profile
of this practice which reveals it to be (inter alia) 'philosophical'
by virtue of its integral quest for a coherent view of life (2.1).
A theory that is adequate to this practice will be a 'cluster' of
four 'discourses', utopian, deliberative, evaluative and scientific(each already in use within mature practice itself) (2.2). The
inclusion of science can be defended on the basis of the dialectic
between detachment and human interest that is characteristic of
proper human science considering its basis in communication
between researcher and researched (2.3). In the discourses
generally a tough objectivity, properly construed, accommodates a
sensitivity to the circumstantial1 a ]arge freedom, a decent
humility and scepticism, an acknowedgement of the role of vision
in paradigm choice, and an acknowledgement that disagreement is
inevitable over important values (2.4).
3. The manifold connections between ordinary curriculum
practices do not necessarily amount to a true curriculum
coherence in which the elements would combine into a quest for a
general view of life. This latter is an ideal whose feasibility is
not to be presumed in our fragmented culture, and for which the
idea of 'the academic' is an insnff9nt substitute (3.1).
However, we can work towards it, first, by an ordering of
general educational values, and, second, by an analysis, broadly
related to that ordering, of our cultural capitaL (i) We may
identify 'possessive', 'experiential', 'ethical', and 'ecstatic' values.
While acknowledging the real claims of the first three of these
categories, and the services to them of philosophers like Dewey
and Peters, the fourth category - which is encapsulated in the
idea of 'love of the world' - can be argued to be primordial and
presumed by the other categories (3.2). (ii) In analysing cultural
2aims, levels of being, and aspects of personality, preserves the
link with the previous value-ordering, and is to be preferred to
attempts - among which Hirst's is particularly worth engaging
with philosophically - to enoompass everything of significance on
a single map (3.3).
4. The proposed substanUve 'scheme of things' needs to be
articulated and tested in the ntext, also, of particular
curriculum areas recx)gnzed as having an importance in their
own iight The current upgrading of technology education may
be understood, defended, and pointed in terms of the earlier
value-distinctions and value-ordering (4.1). Debates on literacy
education often turn on whether literacy is a set of highly useful
techniques or, as may be argued, is better oonstrued as a form
of mental development in which fundamental goals (relating
esperlly to experiential values) are themselves transformed(4.2). Finally, a strong case may be made for a broad-minded
'piety', a love of past human beings and worlds, as the most
fundamental of the reasons for historical education. This case
paraflels the earlier more general arguments about human science
and about love of the world.
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The practice of education nsidered precisely as education is
the broad focus of this thesis. Teachers teach their particular
subjects and age-groups, and parents and others do a great
range of things for young psople, under the haunting aegis of
the educational ideaL It requires inter alia - and this provides
the more specific focus of the thesis - relating one's teaching
tasks of the moment and of one's particular role to some
overarching scheme of things (however defined), or to the quest
for such a scheme. it is this relation that makes the practice of
education a philosophical practice.
The thesis is in four parts, of which the the first two are
'formal', and the third and fourth 'substantive', in character.
Part 1 is an extended linguistic analysis of the uses of
'education' and its cxgnates, preceded by a redefinition of the
goals and strategy of linguistic analysis. I had been one of the
many who thought the linguistic-analytic traditinn in philosophy
was played out. The surprise awaiting me was that it seemed
never to have been adequately p1nitd - it had been diverted
to shallow waters by a methodological straitjacket. Removing this
straitjacket allowed a new strategy of analysis to emerge, one
which required attention to the inter-relationship of uses,
( 2)
respect for the virtuosity of language in articulating
denominational and individual points of view, and willingness to
criticise language usage. Applied to the uses of 'education', this
strategy reveals the 'geometry' of the concept of education, a
three-dimensional geometry based on key correlativities among
the uses. As aspects of this structure there emerges both the
outline structure of developed educational discx)urse and that
involvement of education with the ideal of a coherent view of life
which is the central concern of the thesis.
Part 2 takes these two formal points much further. It is an
analysis of the main requirements of a proper educational theory,
that is, of a theory which aspires to be adequate to the good
educational practice in which it is 'emergent' and, in particular,
to the ideal that is integral to such practice of seeking a view of
life as a whole. One of its two principal arguments is for a view
of educational theory as comprising a cluster of symbiotically
related discourses which include the 'utopian' and 'scientific' as
well as the more immediately practical - and equally essential -
discourses of deliberation and evaluation. The other is a
sustained defence of the ideal of objectivity in enquiry which
takes the form, primarily, of carefully distinguishing it from a
series of 'fundamenFR1ims'.
In part 3 the thesis switches to a substantive mode. First
remarking the difficulty of the ideal of coherence in our
fragmented culture - and noting that it involves more than
( 3)
piecemeal cross-curricular initiatives - it goes on to develop
substantLve points of view on two of the main requfrements of an
educational vision. It proposes, first, a particular cilassification
of educational values and an ordering of them that acoords
primacy to love of the world, and, secx)nd, a particular pluralist
approach to the analysis or mapping of cxgnitLve and cultural
capital for educational purposes which it relates to the previous
ordering of values.
Part 4 recognizes the importance of the 'sub-practices' of
education and develops analogues of the argument of Parts 2 and
3 in the context of philosophical case-studies of some particular
curriculum concerns.
I am obliged by the requirements of a doctoral thesis to indicate
what parts of the work can lay claim to be original contributions
to the fi11. One such is the strategy proposed for linguistic
analysis together with the identification which it makes possible
of the structure of the concept of education. Thougth the three
distinctions on which this structure are argued to rest are none
of them new, both the conceptualization of them as
'corre]ativi1-i' and the analysis of the way in which they work
together to give the concept its 'geometry' are new, I believe.
This contribution also has a wider application in philosophy
inasmuch as other important concepts have analogous structures.
Another orisinal feature is the argument in Part 2 that
educational theory, including that part of it that is concomitant
( 4)
with, and emergent in, practice, must extend to four symbiotically
related discourses. The relationship of theory to practice is an
academic, institutional and public issue of the moment, and this
argument engages with the academic and institutional debates and
may contribute to the public debate. A third original feature is
the form taken by the sustained defence of the ideal of a tough
objectLvity in enquiry - which is to put particular emphasis on
the 'human face' of this ideal. This argument, too, has a wider
application than just to educational enquiry. A fourth original
feature is Part 3's identification and ordering - possessive,
experiential and ethical values shown to rest ultimately on the
'ecstatic' or love of the world - of kinds of educational value,
together with the uses made of these ideas in relation to
technology and, again, to history in Part 4. A fifth orLginal
feature is the case made for the importance of three cross-
cutting 'elementary' divisions or maps of knowledge - which,
indeed, revives and draws upon earlier work by Schwab but both
adds to his ideas and puts the borrowed ideas to some novel
uses. In addition to these five there are perhaps further
features that are orginal to a lesser degree. As to the overall
theme of the thesis, the central assertion of education's stake in
the idea of a coherent view of life as a whole is not original in
the least - though it is, I believe, timely - but its particular
articulation in and through the analyses and arguments just
mentioned can claim to reflect their measures of originality.
( 5)
Philosophy of education in Britain, in some disarray from an
early point in the work for this thesis, remains nervous about its
future. Undoubtedly, factors beyond its control are partly
responsible for its downturn, in particular the hard-nosed
insouciance of government policy in education. But can it
absolve itself of all blame for being seen as a luxury dispensable
in hard times? Most philosophers of education are now prepared
to entertain that question. I believe there is a case in principle
for theoretic and institutional development in each of three
directions (which are quite often acknowledged singly but need
to be taken together). First, it should see itself as in integral
relationship with educational practice, such that practice is a
source and not just a target of philosophy, and philosophy is
already a significant - but not isolated - element within the
discourses and deliberations of practice. Second, it should see
itself as much more than an outpost of general philosophy to
which independently achieved arguments and positions can be
'applied'. In the recent past it has been quick to admit a duty
to keep pace with developments in general philosophy but slow to
see how veil-placed it is to contribute to such developments.
Third, it should see itself as firmly located within the general
discipline of education. This would imply less sensitivity about
its boundaries (which are inherently fuzzy anyway) and a
positive, as opposed to a primarily critical, orientation towards
the other sub-disciplines of education and the forms of research
employed by them. Dewey, we might ruefully note, believed in all
three of these outreaches. This thesis will include arguments for
( 6)
them, but its attempts to actua]ly practise them remain a deal
less assured than were his at the start of the century!
It is consonant with the third of these outreaches that this
thesis should be proferred as a contribution to education theory
generally. I see it as primarily that, indeed, though a
contribution that is philosophical in character. In personal terms
it cx)mp]etes a process of cxnversion from 'philosopher' to
'educationist' as my primary working identity. But, as should be
clear from the above, I do not see this as having moved me away
from philosophy of education - rather as having moved me to
where philosophy of education properly stands. Nor, indeed, do
I see myself as abandoning philosophy, but as defining the
vantage point from which increasingly I address philosophical
questions.
Now many of the dfFki1tis that earlier assailed philosophy of
education (and other 'foundation' disciplines of education) have
spread to education theory generally. More than seemed possible
when I was setting out, that theory now finds itself in some kind
of crisis - at least in Britain. Whatever its own contribution to
its problems, this seems a politic'afly engineered thing,
fundamentally. There are the extrardinarily ignorant, and well-
publicized, comments of some pundits of the Right There is the
dismal narrowing of the terms of pc1itiral debate about education.
A greater involvement of education with the technological and the
vocational is defended at some length in this book. But it is
( 7)
another matter to regard that involvement as education's primary
obligation and then to take that view as read. There is, finally,
the questioning in high places of a continued role for the
university and the academy in teacher education. This goes
beyond a sensible enlargement of the role of schools in teacher
education to threaten the academic dimension - and, one might
say, the very idea - of teacher education. Of course what is
ultimately threatened by this tide is the idea of education itself.
This thesis is addressed to the teachers, educationists, and
others who continue - and who will continue whatever happens -
to be moved by the idealism implicit in that idea.
It has grown slowly and often rather painfully. One or two of
its main ideas (e.g. the love of the world as an educational ideal)
were there roughcut from the beginning; most declared
themselves only in the process of writing and rewriting; and the
idea which is the work's main focus grew into that role almost
retrospectively.
I am deeply thankful to those who have helped me along the way.
These include: Richard Peters, Ray Elliott and John White who
have at different times contributed to the supervision of this
thesis; my colleagues and students, past and present, of the
Curriculum Studies Department of the London University Institute
of Education; colleagues and students, also, of the Institute's
Philosophy Department; audiences in the U.K., Ireland, Australia
and Spain, and the editors of several Journals, who gave a fair
( 8)
wind to versions and drafts of various sections; and the ESRC
who awarded me a two-year studentship that: first got me going
on many of these reIections. In more personal terms I thank
Denis Lawton for his quiet and patient support, Ruth Jonathan
for reading a draft of most of the text at a crucial time and for
her thoroughly encx)uraging cx)mments, Ray Elliot (again) for his
critical assurance at key points on matters that I did not always
think of as parts of the thesis but which now are, and Paul
Hirst, Margaret Meek, Peter Lee, Peter Mort±nore, Makx1m
Skilbeck, Lynne Chishoim and Hazel Francis who read and
commented on individual chapters. Most of a]], I thank Pat Walsh
who - often at a cost to her own studies in philosophy - read
draft after draft of section after section and forced countless
c]ariflcations of both substance and style. I thank, too, Canal
Walsh who sometimes disguised his disbelief in the thing ever
being finished, and Aoife Walsh who does not remember a time
when I was not engaged on it.
Papers relating to various parts of this thesis have been
published previously in the Journal of Philosophy of Education
(2), the Journal of Further and Higher Education, and Irish
Educational Studies (2).
Paddy Walsh
Easter sunday, 1992.
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Every cx,ncept that can ever be needed, will be expressed
by exactly one word, with its meaning zigidly defined and
all its subcithrny meanings rubbed out and forgotten.
Every year, fewer and fewer words and the range of
c.vnscdousness always a 1itt7 smaller. George OrweU
The wmpleidty.....is not finally in the word but in the
problems which its variations of use significantly indicate.
Raymond Wi11ims, Keywords (on the word 'culture')
21,.. 1 LINGLJIFIc ANAYSI AND THE JSE OF
• ED&JCAUION • : A NEW TIATEG'Y
What can we hope to gain from occupying ourselves, as we shall
in Part 1, with the word 'education' and cognates like
'educational', 'educated', and 'educator'?
Some reflexive attention to words is an everyday matter of
course. An ordinary conversation might pause over 'education' -
a word with many senses, and some that verge on the technical -
to identify the particular meaning being used and to distinguish
it from some others. In the same clarifying spirit a book on
education might start with a systematic glossary of uses, and
even reproduce the Oxford English Dictionary's entire entry on
'education'. But clarity and easy reference are not specifically
philosophical ambitions. What makes the analyses that follow
philosophical., I suggest, is that they seek a kind of self-
knowledge, knowledge of our shared 'social self' to start with,
and some knowledge of our personal selves as welL
At some very general level1
 our language tends to shape the
contours of our thoughts and to give directions, though not
detailed destinations, to our enquiries. We can speak even of a
'knowledge' that is embedded in language, for there is no
knowing our language that is not also a tacit knowing, or
3thinking we know, an enormous amount beyond language. 'If
language is to be a means of cx)mmunication', Wi±±genstein
famously remarked, 'there must be agreement not only in
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements' - a
sharing, he went on to say, not so much of 'opinions' as of 'a
form of life'. l
 For agreement on definitions or word-meanings
itself depends upon some degree of consensus and some ]imit to
dissension over particular applications of those words in
judgements. (How, otherwise, could we learn the meanings of
words in the first place? How could we break in?) The sense of
queerness arises here because we can ordinarily distinguish
between disagreements over matters of fact and disagreements
over the meaning of words. Factual disagreement is perfectly
compatible with sharing a language, presupposes it indeed if it is
ever to become a defined disagreement. But in the limit this
distinction falters and fails. Thus, beyond everyday
disagreement, beyond even 'radical' or 'pervasive' disagreement,
there is a Kafkaesque hypothesis: an inability to agree so total
as to suggest that linguistic communication is not actually taking
place and that this common-sounding language is not, after all,
common. It is only the obverse of this very creepy hypothesis
that really sharing a language involves sharing assumptions and
knowledge as welL
If language makes assumptions and sets directions and contexts,
then, by attending reflexively to the relevant parts of it, we can
hope to make explicit for ourselves the ones that bear on our
4enquiry of the moment - in our case those which frame the form
of our educational life. Revealing ourselves to ourselves in this
way should have some intrinsic fascination. Beyond that, it may
nourish our substantive enquiries about education - and that at
two levels. First, among the things to be articulated and
displayed are certain questions which live in the very grain of
the usage of 'education'. So they are 'always with us', if
elusively, and when we dig them out we 'recognise' them. By the
same token they are likely to strike us as 'fundamental', as
having shadowed a multitude of our everyday deliberations in
this f91i. At a fairly cxnventional level, then, linguistic analyses
can contribute to the general cxherence and satisfaction of our
substantive enquiries. But, more subversively, they may also put
us in a position to cast a cold eye over the habits of thought
they reveal, not excluding our sense that certain questions are
the right and fundamental ones. Sometimes it is claimed that
analyses of this kind 'leave everything as it is'. Of themselves,
they do perhaps. But they enable, and may incline, us to go on
to challenge and change, or (pace Orwell) to defend more
discriminatingly, what they reveal - including the very linguistic
usages themselves. 2 This is not to assume that we can somehow
stand right outside language and from there reconstruct our
whole thought and language. It assumes only what is obvious,
that language is sufFirntly many-layered, reflexive and
adaptable for us to employ it even in its own development or
reform - as is attested, for example, by the eloquent
effectiveness of feminist critiques of sexist usages.
5There has been recently some marked reaction against linguistic
analysis, for decades the domineering technique in Anglo-Saxon
philosophy. The critique that is the smaller cx)mponent of this
reaction (ennui being the larger cxmponent) seems well-judged to
me as directed at standard practices of the recent past. 3
 I shall
give my own acoount of it as I go along. But linguistic analysis
is ancient in philosophy (as one technique among many) and
should not lightly be abandoned. The current need is rather, I
suggest, some redefinition of its goals and strategies - the
process on which we are already embarked. Thus, that we are to
place some emphasis on the reformability of language and its
associated mind-sets will already distinguish our analyses from
the run of previous analyses. An equally significant departure,
to which we now turn, will be an insistence on the full range of
the meanings of 'education', and on the mutual bearings and
relationships of those meanings.
A Miiltiplir*y of Uses It is not difficu]t to evoke this range of
meanings. For example, such questions about education as
is it necessarily a good thing?
can we have too much of it?
can we ever be done with it?
each invite the reply that it depends on which sense of
'education' is intended. Sometimes the word functions, like
'virtue', as a term of oommendation, as naming something worth
having by definiiion (if it is not worth having it isn't
6'education'); but at other times it quite lacks this implication.
Again, we may be as ardent as WilliAm Morris in believing that
'we learn to live and live to learn', yet still admit a sense of
'education' in which it does typically come to an end - one
graduates or drops-out finally. In this sense the process may
eventually yield a product,, the educated adult - as car-assembly
yields the car - but that need not inhibit us from insisting in
other contexts that education is a lifelong process with an
internal point of its own and no finished product.
The uses of 'uneducated' can be rehearsed to the same effect.
Most commonly it is applied to one who has not been to school
(or has learnt nothing there) and who has not otherwise learnt
the kinds of things that schools teach: to read, write and
calculate, a smattering of literature, history, science etc. The
peasant Platon Karatayev in War and Peace is certainly
uneducated in that sense. But now note that Tolstoy can
credibly depict him as one who by upbringing, experience and
grace has been rendered uncommonly resourceful and
marveBously wise. When the chips are down and he and Prince
Pierre Bezuhov are POWs together, struggling as much for their
souls as their lives, it is the cultivated Pierre who feels himself
exposed as (could we not well say?) the 'uneducated' one. 'No,
you just can't understand what I learned from that illitcrate man
- that simple creature' he later exclaims to Natasha. In still
more studied paradox, schooling has sometimes been contrasted
with education and rejected in the name of education: education
7is what begins when schooling is over; school is an interruption
in a child's education; worse - it is positively miseducative. Put
plausibIlity to one side here. That we even understand such
quips turns at least partly on our grasp of a use of 'education'
that embraces kinds of learning not associated, nor ever likely to
be associated, with schooLs And to these two uses of
'uneducated' we can add a third. Whole societies have been, and
are, uneducated in the sense of being unschooled in literacy and
its products. Yet anthropologists may discuss the educational
ways and systems of these societies, alongside their kinship,
economic and political ones. The sense of 'education' they then
imply is un:Iike the immediately previous one in not conveying
any endorsement of what it describes. And, unlike either of the
previous senses, only children could be described as
'uneducated' in this sense - by which would be meant 'not-yet-
educated'.
These various uses of 'education', 'uneducated', etc, are not
generally in competition with each other - to employ one does not
usually commit us to eschew others. Our language invites us,
rather, to avail of all of them as they suit our changing
purposes and contexts. We could even find ourselves switching
about among them within a single discussion. Suppose two
parents (perhaps middle-class, perhaps not) who are deliberating
on the choice of a school for their children. Let us say their
relevant interests include: what the schools in question have to
offer in the way of academic, but also of social, development -
8this in relation to what they can provide at home themselves and
get other agencies to provide, and in relation to what higher
education and the job market expect, as well as to their own
values and ideals in life; the present as well as the future
happiness and wellbeing of their children; what might best suit
the particular temperament and aptitudes of this or that
individual child; and what might be best for their children - or,
more narrowly, for their children's advancement - as against
what might best express their own wider social cxmmitxnents.
Now, as the parents discuss this angle and that1
 we can easily
fun agine them employing 'education', 'educative', 'educator' etc.
first in one sense and then in another, matching the oomp]ex
crisscross of avibth]e senses to the clash and interplay of their
interests. 'John's education' may at one moment refer to what
some lucky schools will provide him with in the way, especially,
of formal and publicly endorsed curriculum; and at another time
to his 'education in the widest sense', a more general enterprise
which will include much that is elusive and much that is highly
personal and which will be serviced by a whole array of agencies
(John's family itself not the least of them). Again, they may use
'education' in a)nnection with what a school is actually providing
('a lively education', 'a rather traditional educational diet'), and
then in cxnnection with what the parents think it ideally should
provide ('education in the true sense, dear'). Yet again, they
may employ it at one time in an open-ended, heuristic way - like
'X' as the still uncertain quantity - as a marker of something
they are as still trying to get clear about,, and then at a later
9thne in some more loaded way to encapsulate a set of pretty
definite ideals, perhaps as a shorthand for 'a liberal education'.
We are in the main remarkably surefooted in negotiating
transitions among these uses of 'education'. (Our practical ski]].
here, our tacit knowledge, ordinarily far outstrips our ability to
give it articulate definition - in the same way that long
familiarity with a place ensures we will rarely lose our way in it,
but not that we can draw good maps of it.) Suppose, however,
that the parents do now and then find themselves at cross-
purposes. That might be thought to suggest some practical
advantage in an agreement to limit themselves to just one of
these uses. But then, if they were not as drastically to curtail
the range of their perspectives on the choice of a school., they
would have to cast around for either synonyms or paraphrases
for the excluded uses, and these might be, respectively, hard to
come by and prohibitively prolix. This remedy might prove a
greater strain than the original problem! In any case, the
parents have a more natural remedy to hand in those qualifying
expressions, like 'true', 'so-called', 'in the widest sense', by
which particular uses of 'education' can quite adequately be
identified when the cxntext does not do this already.
It is not really a matter, however, of the parents being able to
'cope' despite the 'limitations' of language. In deliberations like
their's the versatility of 'education', we may go on to surmise, is
a positive asset. Somewhat intuitively and sketchily, and for
10
elaboration throughout this first part of the thesis: it cx,ntributes
notably, and may even be indispensable, to that njuring and
marshRlling of manifr1d considerations which is typical of
educational deliberations. Parents' tacit knowledge of the uses of
'education' enables and inclines them, does it not, to approach
the choice of school as the complex matter that it really can be?
For their general sense of the ramifying connections of these
uses braces them for a wide trawl for relevant factors. Specific
uses and combinations of uses prime them with many of those
particular perspectives on the choice of a school which we found
it natural to ascribe to them. And at the same time as they
multiply their deliberations the uses start them on a marshalling
and ordering process. What they provoke in the parents are
semi-organized clusters of ideas and aspirations: a sense of
arguments to be joined, of balances to be st:ruck, of
recon cidiations to be effected - between home and school,
academic and social, individual and common, present and future,
ideal and actuaL Finally, none of this bracing and priming,
multiplying and ordering is particular to the business of
choosing a schooL The themes just mentioned are ones that
recur, and concur, quite generally in educational discussion.6
To suggest in this way that the various uses of 'education' have
some power to structure that considerable manifold on which
cxllectively they draw is to raise the questions of what kinds of
relationship they have with each other, and what kind of whole,
if any, they add up to. Let us begin to address those questions.
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SimcIRriH and Differences One way in which the uses hold
together is by virtue of similari±ies between them - they are not
straight homonyms. As common threads:
(i) learning is implied in them all, indeed it would seem both
(ii) rather a lot of learning (education is a protracted
business) and
(iii) unlike training, learning of many kinds.
Thus when 'educational' and 'educative' are applied to single
learning episodes, they invoke a wider and variegated whole of
which these episodes are parts. Going on, all uses might further
be said to make some kind (we have to be vague to cover all the
cases) of implicit reference
(iv) to the learning being of value (the uncx)ntroversially
trivial or evil, as such, would not qualify) and, indeed,
(v) of a value that promised to be not just short-term, but
lasting.
Most uses imply a learning, further,
(vi) that is more a (possibly creative) catching up on, than
a forging ahead of, a tradition or a culture considered as a
social deposit of knowledge and skill
and, finally, most uses also make some more or less substantial
reference
(vii) to tradition as a process, i.e. to some kind of
instruction or handing on.7
But note: our purpose here was only to display one way in which
the uses of 'education' hang together. The light shed on
12
individual uses by this exercise is a pale and uneven one, and,
were we now to 'total' these common elements, they would yield
only an unnuanced abstraction. They would emphatically not
yield, though there is some temptation to suppose they might,
anything that could happily be called either 'the concept' or 'the
definition' of education. For, whatever else, concepts and
definitions should include all that is essentiaL And we could not
be happy to regard as just inessenlial what we had to omit from
the account above. Let us be sure of this. First, those
conditirns (ii arid in) of volume and variety would have to be
construed in such a way that they were satisfipd by the learning
of any normal adult in any society, because all such may be
deemed 'educated' for anthropological purposes. The most this
'definition' could entail is that amount of learning which one
could hardly help acquiring through childhood, and that variety
(some values and practical skills as well as some factual
knowledge, some knowledge of the social as well as of the natural
world, etc.) which this learning could hardly fail to exhibit So,
more stringent requirements, conveyed by time-honoured phrases
like 'depth and breadth of knowledge', 'a balanced curriculum'
and 'education of the whole person' would be incidental,
extraconceptual - despite being centrally intended in some uses
of 'education'! Sinilarly, the reference in this 'concept' to
tradition, whether as deposit (vi) or as process (vii), could
certainly not be of the strong kind that summons up a picture of
curricula, teachers and schools, still less any particular
conception of the business of these. For such invocations, too,
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are cx)nfined to some among our uses of 'education'. Third,, our
uses of 'education' divide into cxmmitted or normative uses,
which carry value-judgements, and 'cool' or descriptive uses,
which, so to speak, merely note valne-judgements. These
opposed stances are not really reducible to some broader
category or definition that can span both. Hence the vagueness
(approaching vacuity) acknowledged above in the pair (iv y) and
(v).
In sum, the various uses of 'education' are not mere homonyms
but their differences are as much a part of the life of the term
as their similarities. So, if it is definitions we seek then each
category of use will require its own. Now, however, we may
suspect that such multiple definitions would then fit together in
some way to make a larger whole. Indeed, if we are to speak at
all of a unitary concept of education it will have to be as of
something revealed and articulated in the main uses of
'education' cxllec±ively, differences included. And if this concept
is to have much coherence then the uses must diverge more
systematically than randomly, must complement each other and,
we might say, constitute together some approximation of an
ordered set. Those marshalling and binding roles, which we
earlier inclined to ascribe to these uses, would then be greatly
fac!ilitated. The hunch we shall pursue is that there is such a
non-definitionally unitary and coherent concept of education.
F AJ
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Corr]aU.vii-i s The first. step is to notice more formally that we
are not here faced with endlessly many distinctions but with just
a few which, by cutting across and compounding each other,
generate all the main uses of 'education' and its cxgnates. There
are, I suggest1 three such seminal distinctions. First, 'education'
as a formal enterprise (F) is to be distinguished from 'education'
in the much wider sense (W). Second, in the case of each of
these senses a further distinction may be drawn between
normative (N) and merely descrptive (D) modes of it. Third,
there then further applies to all four of the resultant categories
a scale which runs from (0) the very open (nominal,, general) at
one end, to (L) the very loaded (substantive, specific) at the
other. In the process this scale passes from standard usage,
through semi-standard perhaps, to the stipulative and theoretical
and, by the same token, from the wiLiely-assumed to the hotly
contested - to the point, indeed, at which there are numbers of
competing uses, about equally bu differently loaded.
So, each concrete use of 'education' is either formal or wiile in
sense, and either normative or descriptive, and is loaded in one
of many possible degrees and ways. Some examples may help
here. The use of 'education' to mean 'initiation into the best
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that has been thought and written', or the cxmpeting 'promotion
of interest-based ]earning', would be at once formal, (usually)
normative, and ]oaded beyond standard levels. On the other
hand, the anthropologist facing into some previously unstudied
society may stand ready with both the formal and the wide
senses of 'education', each to be employed in a non-commita],,
descriptive way and each heuristically kept as skeletal as
possible. Again: in deeming the illiterate peasant to be
'uneducated' we invoke something formal.; we usually mean to
cxnvey, normatively, that she has 'missed out' on this; and in
specifying literacy and suchlike we load it, more indeed than
when we play the anthropologist, but still lightly, standardly,
and much less than when we are working up our personal
statements about education.
[ Other multi-use words may exhibit part or all of this triple
pattern. There will be normative and descriptive uses of the
names of all practices and products in regard to which there is a
serious question of cx)ming up to a standard; there will be a
contrast between nominal and loaded uses of the names of
practices to the ext.ent that their constitutive standards are
differently conceived and theorized; and there wIll be
institutionalized and wider senses of the names of those practices
for which there are institutions which formalize (and heighten
the profile of) of the practice but without exhausting it. All
three distinctions appear, for example, in the uses of 'justice',
and again of '-f'.8]
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There is a further distinction to mention, between 'education' as
a practice and 'education' as the second-order study of that
practice. It does not, however, have the cxmpounding effect of
the first three distinctions. 'Education' as the name of a
practice breaks down in the three criss-crossing ways we have
noticed, but 'education' as the name of a branch of study does
not - its orgamzation into sub-branches fcil]ows different
distinctions. (This fourth distinction has its own suggestiveness,
however, as we shall mention in Part 2.)
Our multiple uses of 'education' begin to look like a network.
What would now considerably enhance this impression is if we
could go on to show, in respect of each of the three contro]ling
distinctions, that its two or more members were not only each
useful in its own right, but complementary, and even necessary,
to each other i.e. that they were logically correlative (akin to
'northerner/southerner' rather than to 'Sooth/English). Do the
formal and the wide senses, the normative and descriptive uses,
and the different levels of' openness and loadedness, co-exist
symbiotically in three such equilibria of meaning in which each
member refers impliritly to its partner or partners? It seems
likely that they do and this is a hunch that we will attempt
progressively to confirm.
Before that, however, there is a comparison to be made with a
different approach to analysis.
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A Question of Strategy We are engaged, recall,, on the linguistic
analysis of 'education' (and cx)gnates) with a view to laying bare
the most general cxntours of our thought and enquiry in this
area. We seem now to have developed a definite strategy for
this. it is one which inhibits us from letting some uses of
'education' drop prematurely from consideration, and which
commits us to giving them all a good run. Beyond that, it
inclines us to look for relationships between them which are not
just common threads or similarities, but are ways in which they
complement and feed off each other by virtue of their
differences. What we are to suppose is that it is precisely in
these relationships that the concept of education lives - and
empowers and structures our thinking.
This strategy has not been widely adopted by analytic
philosophers. Faced with a multi-meaning term like 'education',
the tendency has been rather to anticipate that one among the
meanings would turn out to be 'the' meaning, presupposed by all
the others while itself standing by itself. They would hope to
then concentrate pretty exclusively on this 'primary'
('paradigmatic', 'central') meaning in their analyses and to
consign to footnotes the 'secondary' ('extended', 'derivative',
'parasitic') ones. The model which helps to explain this, and
which I think they often have in mind9, is the relationship
between literal and figurative uses of a word at its most
straightforward. 'Sunny' said of a smile or a disposition,
'punishment' to describe what boxers hand out in the ring, 'law'
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in 'law of the jungle', 'deep' as a measure of trouble - these are
all extended uses of terms. To understand them, at any rate
fully, one needs to know the original literal uses of these terms
(as well as some of those other terms that could provide a literal
translation) - but not1
 it would seem, vice-versa. 'Sunny
disposition' is elucidated by reference to sunny skies and
climates (as wan as to ideas like cheerfulness and optimism), but
skies and climates do not in turn require a reference to
dispositions. The uses of 'education', it was hoped, would also
break down in this way, leaving just one aboriginal category of
use for the analyst's focus.
This approach shares with our own strategy an expectation of
some order and relationship among the uses. But where it would
anticipate an order based on the primacy of one use, we
anticipate one based on the equilibrium of many uses. It would
be content with dependence; we look out for interdependence.
This is to make it clear, however, that our strategy is the more
open in its sweep: it is better designed to catch also any one-
way dependencies that happen to be around, than is the other to
notice two-way ones. That would seem a good reason for
preferring it. [ We should mention, however, what could count
as a third possibility. Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy,
likens our language as a whole to 'an ancient city: a maze of
1ii-I-1t streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses
with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a
mulHtude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and
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uniform houses' lO. He sees the variation in the uses of individual
terms, such as 'game', as usually a similarly unsystematic
business - like (a famous image) the patterns of family
resemblance in a large family." (That this view runs clean
contrary to the idea of a single 'primary' use grounding all the
other uses of a term is ironic, considering the respect for
Wittgenstein in the analytic tradition.) My first hunch regarding
the uses of 'education' was in line with this, in fact. I thought
they would be so subtle in their variations as always to exceed
the philosopher's ability to map them adequately - so that the
mature language-user's 'tacit knowledge' here could never be
made fully exp1icit It therefore came as a surprise to find the
evidence stacking up, as we shall progressively see it does, for a
'geometry' (albeit a complex one) of those variations!12]
Certainly we should not be seduced by any proposed analogy
with the logic of metaphor. In the first place - and to digress a
little - metaphor is not as simple a matter as was suggested
above. In particular, its dependence on the literal is not its
whole story. Consider the series 'deep lake', 'deep voice', 'deep
remark', 'deep troub]e'.' The first alone is fully literaL The
rest are metaphorical uses, and to my ear progressively more so.
But note that these metaphors are all of the well-established
(though still faintly alive) variety as opposed to once-off poetic
contrivances. Like thousands of other metaphors they are bits
of english usage. As such each of these 'extensions' has a
certain unfrilly so]klity of its own! Note, further, that not all
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metaphors can be 'cashed in'. In our series 'deep voice' has no
equivalent which is more literal, and perpendicular metaphors
generally - such as high, low, soaring, etc.- are quite
indispensable to our descriptions a! sound and music, and indeed
to our way of perceiving these.' Such necessary metaphors are
not to be dismissed as epiphenomena! Note, finally, that the
metaphors in our series may well have some backwash effect on
the literal original, such that the echoes between metaphors and
original reverberate in both directions. In general 'the deep'
easily impresses (moves, troubles, unnerves) - both literal depths
(weBs, seas, holes, valleys etc.) and metaphorical depths (notes,
truths, sorrows, attachments etc.). It seems reasonable to
suppose that the aesthetic impact of literal uses receives a
cx)nfirmation and a reinforcement from the well-established co-
existence of the metaphorical uses. 15
 All in all., then, the
undoubted extendedness of metaphorical uses would seem an
insnfFieipnt reason for generally ignoring them in linguistic
analysis.
But in the second place, none of those uses of 'education' of
which we have been reminding ourselves actually is metaphorical,
daring or otherwise fanciful. They are all equally literal. Thus
they all cx)ntrast with some uses that are fanciful, with 'well-
educated Virginia creeper' for instance, or 'educated left foot',
or, perhaps, 'educated palate'. Again, to speak of a romance as
'an education' is (often rueful) hyperbole. However remarkable,
it could hardly constitute a whole education. By contrast, the
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more modest claim that it was (in the wide sense) 'educational',
or 'a part of one's education', can be understood as quite
literal
There would seem to be no ground, then, for a presumption that
some one use of 'education' will, emerge as 'the' use and, so,
every reason for us to prefer our own more open strategy. [
The bunkering effect of that presumption has, in fact, gone
beyond a failure to look out for balances and cx,rrelatLviti
among avi1h]e uses. In their impatience to get to their
favoured 'primary' use analysts have skimped even their
preliminary listings of 'secondary' uses.'6 Gnera]ly, they have
tended rather to overlook or misconceive the wide sense of
'education', to be perfunctory in their acknowledgement (or, in
some cases, denial) of the normative/descriptive distinction, and,
at any rate until pressure from critics of analysis forced it upon
them, to neglect the phenomonon of different degrees of loading.
One paradoxical result of this has been some lack of definition in
the favoured use. But there has been enough definition for some
competition to emerge for the title of 'primary use', (in particular
between normative and descriptive claimants), which from our
broader point of view is just what we should have expected!]
Three Madins for Linguistic Analysts 	 We set out from the
observation that the purpose of linguistic analysis is to discover
embedded patterns in our own thought and enquiry regarding a
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matter like education. We can nclude with three maxims that
should increase the scxpe and the power of our discxveries.
These can be our antidotes to tendencies that have enfeeb]ed the
analytic tradition (from which, however, we shall be salvaging
what we can).
1. Treat different uses of a term as equal in status unless they
are r1n-1y shown to be unequal This is an expression of the
point of strategy that we have just discussed. Its fruitfulness
remains to be seen in the analyses of the following chapters.
2. Respect the virtuosity of language in the adaptability of many
terms to denominational and individual paints of view. The term
education' is a case in point - hence, among our three seminal
distinctions, there is the one based on a use's degree of
openness/loadedness. The meaning as well as the value of this
maxim will becxme dearer in the urse of the fci]lowing analyses,
and in particular in our main discussion of that distinction in
section 1.4.
3. Treat usages, and the hh* of thought and enquiry they
embody, as subject to criHrism; as subject, that is, not only to
change - though many analysts have in practice ignored even
that much - but to deliberately pursued change, as to deliberate
endorsement. A language may embody the wisdom of a culture,
but the language, the wisdom, and the culture are none of them
beyond crithism, nor again, as Orwell reminds us, beyond the
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need of critical protection. So, for example, we shall soon me
upon a challenge to the whole business of 'education-speak', and,
with it, of education-mindedness and education.
NOTE S
Philosophical Investigations para. 242
2	 A more aggressive statement of this point:
• Language Is not a neutral mcdi urn that passes freely and easily into the
private property of the speakers Intentions; It is populated - overpopulated
- with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to subelt to
oness own intentions and accents, is a difficult and canplicated process.
(Bakhtin M. (1981) The dialogic imagination, Austin: Univ. of Texas Press
p.249; cited In Giroux, H. (1986)
But note that this anits to mention that the process In question will also be one of
self-criticism!
3	 See, for instance, Rajchman, J. and West, C (eds.) (1985)
4	 p.1324 of the Penguin translation
5	 It may - and in some of these cases does - also turn on our capacity to envisage
radically alternative kinds of formal education e.g. Illich's 'learning-webs'.
6	 Corrpare Raymond Williams, In his justly regarded Keywords, on the different meanings
of 'culture:
Faced by this conplex and still active history of the word, it Is easy to
react by selecting one 'true or 'proper' or 'scientific' sense and dismissing
other senses as loose or confused... .It Is clear that, within a discipline,
conceptual usage has to be clarified. But In general It Is the range and
overlap of meanings that is significant. The conplex of senses indicates a
coirplex argument about the relations between general human development and a
particular way of life, and between both and the works and practices of art
and intelligence. Within this corrplex argument there are fundamentally
opposed as well as effectively overlapping positions; there are also,
understandably, many unresolved questions and confused answers. But these
arguments and questions cannot be resolved by reducing the coepl cxi ty of
actual usage.....The carpi exi ty. .is not finally in the word but in the
problems which its variations of use significantly indicate. (Williams, R.
1976 pp 80-1)
7 Actually, figurative uses aside there is one maverick In relation to most of these
conditions viz, the use of 'education' to name a particular branch of study - that
education which Is a shorthand for 'the study of education'.
8	 These examples, and the general point of this paragraph, emerged in discussions with
Pat Walsh.
9	 It Is explicitly invoked In J. Wilson (1981) pp.8-9
10	 Philosophical Investigations para. 18
11	 ibId. para. 66ff.
12	 I do not suppose, however, that all nultl-meanlng terms are similarly geometric In
their deep structures. Thus 'culture' In Williams account of It (see note 6) seems
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nuch as Williams particular Interests, mey suggest his ore historical approach to
analysis in this ce. (Williams is rightly conscious, though, of the distinction
between historical precursors of, and historical residues in, a meaning.)
13	 To borrow and edapt an exanile from Wittgenstein s B7ue and Brown Books
14	 They are indispensable at least in the sense that they are the Only tools for the Job
that we have actually developed.	 Whether we might have developed different
linguistic conventions (e.g. a colour-coding of pitch) is another cjestion.
15 similarly sunny smile (tecrper, mood etc.) reverberates back on sunny day , I
suspect. Note, too, that there can be reciprocity between metaphors e.g. sunny
smile, smiling heavens.
16 Thus J. Wilson (1979), in a whole book devoted to the analysis of education , takes
two very hurried pages (17-18) to select his primary sense and, inadequately, to
list the others. R.S. Peters is another for whom the range of uses has been an
invitation to spot the primary or the interesting' one, e.g. Peters (1966) ch.1.
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1_2	 TI-IE COftIELATIVITV OF	 (FOFP.iAL.)
EDLJCAlION • AND • Ec)UCA -rIOl1 (IN THE WIDESr
EI1SE) • AND THE &CDE OF EDUCATION
Of the word 'culture', Raymond Wi11ims remarks in Keywords 'The
complexity.. is not eina:Ily in the word but in the problems which
its variations of use significantly indicate.' The complexity of
education, too, is finally in its 'real-life' great issues. But, as
Wi11ims also intimates, the complexity in the word 'education' may
be a significant way into these issues. In this section, some
persevering donkey-work on the pair of uses '(formal) education'
and 'education (in the widest sense)' will indeed expose some of
education's deep structures - and possible fanitlines
The Formal sense of Education. We encounter this sense widely:
in everyday conversations about 'the state of education' and 'the
educational system'; in references to certain professions and
offices like 'educator', 'educationist', 'the Ministry of education';
when in a curriculum vitae we find it written that the subject
'received his education at schools x and y, and university z'; in
assumptions about graduates being 'highly educated' and
illiterate people being 'uneducated', and so on. All these cases
involve our practice of unqualifiedly representing as 'education'
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that which, at other thnes, we qualify as 'formal education' and
think of as but a part of education.
At its most cxnventional and common this '(formal) education' use
is to be elucidated, as a 1iFF1t reflection on examples like the
above would confirm, by reference to two familiar sets of
institutions:
-	 schools and like establishments
- the disciplines 'of the book', history, literature,
science, mathematics, design, etc. - in general those
areas of study for which literacy is a more or less
indispensable condition of progress.'
These two are themselves related. At any rate, it is obvious that
schools are to be identified in some reference to book-learning.
That is how we would distinguish them from some other
institutions that are also concerned with teaching and learning,
like drthring-schools, or that are also especially for the young,
like play-groups and youth-clubs. True, we sometimes throw
open the question of curriculum, while continuing to take schools
as given. What, we ask, should schools really be teaching? But,
usually, we mean only what else should they teach besides letters
(manual skills, political education, personal and social
development, etc.) When the attack becomes more radical than
this it tends quickly to engulf the idea of school as welL
The reference to 'letters' seems indispensable then. It might
seem, however, that 'school' could be bypassed as a non-essential.
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middleman. For don't we deem to be educated in this formal
sense those who have acquired enough knowledge in these
disciplines otherwise than at schoo], from parents perhaps, or by
their own efforts? In fact, however, this would simplify
excessively. First, in regard even to those cases this use of
'education' implies more than a ]earning-cxntent. By the very
nature of that cx)ntent it also implies a more or less structured
learning-process. Thus parents deemed to be educating their
children at home are assumed to be replicating in their home-
lives some of the typical features of a schooL Do they not
guide, monitor, even plan, their children's learning, engage in
deliberate teaching, set times aside for study, accumulate
appropriate books and other learning-aids - or, at any rate, do
some of these and similar things? Even the 'self-educated' are
thought of as having had to 'school' or discipline themselves to
it in these kinds of way. So when not school itself, at any rate
a schcoling that resembles the learning process of school in some
significant respscts (while, of course, differing in others)!
Second, to be deemed 'educated' in this formal sense is to be
judged to have come up to some standards in one's learning. By
what standards, then, do we judge the self-educated and the
home-educated? Is it not probable that here too a sidelong
glance is being cast at school? Schools are too prominent in our
consciousness, then, to be omitted from an elnaidation of our
conventional '(formal) education'. A biped it remains, identified
by reference both to a certain content (letters etc.) and to a
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certain agency and process (school), for even when it stands on
just one leg the cther is cx)ntributing to its balance.
The foregoing analysis, like the examples from which we set out,
was of '(formal) education' at one level of loading. There are
also both more open and more loaded uses of it. On the one
hand, we sometimes wire into the word extra conditions, for
example, an exclusion of indoctrination or (more controversi11y) a
limitation to interest-based learning. This we are particularly
liable to do in discussing educational aims and values. On the
other hand, there is a thin and open use of it to mean something
like 'any kind of more or less sustained and systematic induction
into some substantial proportion of whatever it is that is, or that
is deemed to be, essential to know'. We may fall back on this in
anthropological contexts, e.g. so as to include the organized oral
transmission of the Koran and its world-view in tratiitinnal Muslim
societies, and again, when it is a question with reference to our
own kind of society of accomodating proposals, like Ivan Illich's
'learning-webs' 2, that run counter to the norm of 'schooling in
letters'. We shall not forget these other variants of '(formal)
education'. But it is right to pay special heed to the most
conventional one, just because it is the most conventional - much
the most frequently employed by us, best befitting everyday
purposes in our kind of society, and expressing just about the
extent of public consensus in this area i.e. of what most of us
take for granted most of the time.
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Educ,n-dn-the-widest-sense. The cx)ntrasUng 'education (in
the widest sense)' we have already met in cxnnection with the
wisdom of Tolstoy's peasant, in the claim (intelligible, even if
thought extravagant) that school is an interruption in a child's
education, and in the idea that education should be life-long (the
point of which is not, or not principally, that people should still
be taking degrees in their eighties). It is also to be found
cx)nsortng with travel that broadens the mind, relationships that
promote maturity, and experiences that involve significant
discxvery in respect of one's powers or one's limitations. Again,
it is the sense invoked in the familiar assertion that parents are
the first and the chief educators of their children - for usually
something wider and deeper is intended by this than that they
instruct in the alphabet and help with homework!
'Development', 'upbringing' and 'socialization' are close relatives
of this 'education (in the widest sense)'. At any rate some uses
of these terms are. 'Growing-up' is another member of the
family, especially that use of it which occurs in 'he never really
grew up' as remarked of a well-formed adult of the species. And
of oourse 'learning' relates as intimately to this as to other uses
of 'education'. None of these is actually synonomous with
'education (in the widest sense)'. ['Socialisation' picks out either
one aspect only of 'education (in the widest sense)' or else one
particular and cx)ntroversiRlly anti-individualist view of it.
'Rearing' includes too much (feeding, clothing, etc.) and 'bringing
up' is often too emphatically behavioural, while both are more
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exclusively terms of nurture than this 'education', of which we
ourselves and the impersonal are among the agents. On the
other hand 'development' and 'growing-up' are a degree or two
looser than uses of 'education' generally in their connection with
agency of whatever kind (thus 'develop' is assymmetrical with
'educate' in having an intransitive as wefl. as a transitive use),
as well as being broader than them in their inc.lusion of the
biological with the cultural 'Development' qulificd as 'physical',
'emotional', 'moral', or 'mental' retains, if in diminishing strength,
this biological dimension while being, from another point of view,
now narrower in each case than any use of 'education'. Finally,
'learning', as we have seen, has particularly close connections
with 'education' in all its senses but could approximate synonmy
with any of them only after complex qualiFirations in respect of
volume, variety and significance.] But we can play around with
combinations of these terms and come up with quite reasonable
definitions of it, e.g.:
'the whole sum of that learning of a person, and what
promotes or has promoted it, which makes for (or,
which is considered to make for) his becoming, or
being, a developed human being';
or more briefly:
'the sum of that learning that contributes to
development'.
But now we have to note that in this case there is something not
altogether appropriate about a definition - at any rate an
unaccompanied, bare definition. For education in the widest:
sense, though it includes formal education where it exists, is
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precisely not focussed and landscaped as regards that in which
it greatly exceeds formal education. Thus it does not have
points of reference as cxnvenient as the two kinds of institution
by which we earlier pinned down '(formal) education'. To convey
its flavour we should expect to have to resort to some more
jagged and discursive accxunt. So we might append to our
earlier definition some lengthy gloss like the following:
'it embraces much of what is learnt outside and in no
reference to classroom and school - as well as of what
is learnt inside these or in some reference to them;
much of what is "picked up" as well as of what is
formally studied; a great deal of what is "caught" as
well as of what is taught; much that is only very
broadly cognitive as well as much that is more
narrowly so; a lot that is specialized and idiosyncratic
as well as a lot that is common; and so on.'
Interdependence ct the two senses It is significant that this
gloss proceeds in constant reference to fonnal education, that it
structures itself on its 'rival's' characteristic features: the
classroom, study, teaching, the cognitive, the standardized. It
comes quite naturally to us thus to describe education in the
widest sense in its rela don to formal education, as formal
education along with its hinterland or - perhaps better - the
iceberg of which formal education is only the most visible tip.
This association accords with many, if not most, of those contexts
in which we might put 'education (in the wide sense)' to work,
e.g.: when challenging the commitments of our own kind of
society to schooling and to letters (do these help or hinder an
education for life?); when issuing correctives to these
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commitments (there is more to maturity and competence - and so
to education - than can be learnt from books or measured in
examinations); and in bridging the gap between them and our
concern with processes marked by wiiler and more primitive
terms like 'growing up' (thus, in proposing to conceive of formal
education itself in developmental or 'growth' terms and, on the
other hand, when we scrutinize child-rearing practices for their
effects on school-performance).
It should now be getting dearer that these distinct uses of
'education' reinforce each other. Let us view the matter from
each side in turn.
(1) Our formal use is at least significantly coloured by our
possession of the widest-sense use. The effect of that
possession, stated broadly, is to inhibit a tendency to see formal
education as standing on its own and to provoke or confirm in
us a view of it as having to tit in with, and to leaven, more
general processes of nurture and development But since to
conceive what we are about with schools and curricula as a
leaven seems already implicit in caning it '(formal) education' we
can say that 'education (in the widest sense)', by acting as a
bridge here, fati7ittes the sense of '(formal) education'.
This, of course, is still less than to say that it is essential to
that sense. Might we not have managed to make the required
connections directly - without this 'bridge'? Perhaps so, but it
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is at any rate difFiru]t to imagine ourselves not devising this
means of smoothing our way. Suppose a society which has
hitherto employed formal instruction only in regard to very
specific skIlls like cooking, weaving and spearmanship. Suppose
it to be just now re-orientating its training institutions towards
much more general 'life-goals' - creating thus for the first time a
system of formal education for itself (or for some elite part of
itself). Suppose, further, that it decides to mark the new
purpose of these institutions by a new term (or a new use of an
old term) 'x'. Isn't it diff9u]t now not to suppose that it will
soon be observed, if indeed it is not at once observed, that if
that is what 'x' means then a great deal of 'x' and x-ing' goes
on, and always has gone on, outside these new-fang]ed
institutions?
At bottom the point is this: to conceive of a system of instruction
in the arts of living in general is correlatively to conceive of a
learning for life, a concept which is inherently applicable beyond
the confines of formal teaching institutions, and one which it is
cliffiruk to envisage not being so applied once it has been
conceived. Furthermore, anything that could be inhibiting this
wider application of the learning-for-life concept would also be
endangering at its birth the other new concept of an instruction-
for-life. The formal use of 'education' stsnds in some need, then,
of the 'widest sense' use. At the least it would seem to require
the adntissibility of that use.
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(2) Contrariwise, we may doubt that the 'widest sense' use would
arise at all without the sthnukis of the formal use. How is it to
emerge from the crowd of related cxncepts like 'development',
'nurture', upbringing', knowledge', and so forth? It is a
reasonable speculation that the high visibility of schooling, or
something like schooling, is a normal cxndition of this. But
wouldn't education in the widest sense be going on, in its
informal way, in a society which lacked formal instruction on a
front broad enough to count as formal education? We perhaps
could say this of it, but the issue of course is what its members
could say of themselves. And it is not implausible to suggest
that they could not so describe themselves - that they would
lack terms in their language that we could comfortably translate
as 'education' (just as we might legitimately wonder if the 'cave-
artists' thought of themselves precisely as artists and of their
paintings as works of art7 assuming them to have lacked the
institutional trappings with which we surround those concepts).4
But what, it might then be asked, would entitle us to describe
their activities in a term they could not use of themselves? This
challenge may seem strange but is in fact perfectly fair. Much
as the literary interpreter must start from the text itself, so the
proper description of human activities must lean on the agents'
own view of what they are doing - aerobics as opposed to
waving, say - since this at least partly constitutes what they are
doing. However, we can stay the tight side of this principle (an
important one, which we shall meet again) and still defend a
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c1ifFient use of our term in regard to a people who were not
education-minded, on the basis that they would surely have all
the ingredients of a concept of education, though without
bringing them together. For on the one hand they would have
concepts of development and maturity, of upbringing and
nurture, and on the other hand concepts of knowledge, ski]],
teaching, and learning. To deny them a concept of education is
only to deny that they entertain certain interplays between those
two groups of cxncepts (such as the one we lately retraced in
defining education-in-the-widest-sense in terms of learning and
development combined). They reserve 'knowledge', 'ski]].',
'teaching', and 'learning' for highly specific achievements and
processes, and they are not led to make our sharpish
discriminations between biological and cultural development and
between physical, emotional and cogniti.ve types of nurture. It
remains, however, that they do have all the concepts from the
interplay of which we derive our concept and our uses of
'education'. This basic simi]arity of their way of life to ours
might excuse our temerity in extending this one use of our term
to them; we would, after all, be starting out from their own
perceptions of what they were about. So the inclination to
believe that pretty well any human society can be said to engage
in education, that education is a transcultural universal, seems
just about compatible with the claim that 'education (in the
widest sense)' needs '(formal) education' to call it forth
originally.
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Questions It is caned forth, we have argued, to be the brkige
between '(formal) education' and more primitive and general
notions like 'maturing' and 'rearing'. In the commerce that it
faci1itRtes we can now more deliberately notice two basic lines of
challenge and enquiry, each of which comes in different weights
corresponding to differently loaded levels of '(formal) education'.
One - the relevance question - addresses the value and role of
book-learning in general human development (and may proceed in
part through some enlargement of this latter notion). If we
assume that it has some substantial. role, as the conventional
level of '(formal) education' encourages us to assume, then the
challenge is limited to seeking some more just and precise view
of what that role is and what it entails for how we go about
initiating pupils into this knowledge. It might entail 1 perhaps,
more integration of the curriculum, or a more practical approach
to literacy and numeracy, or - as was at one stage proposed for
the UK'S new National Curriculum - 'profile components' in
science in action and in the communication of science. But,
standing back from the commitments expressed in that
conventional version of '(formal) education', we might more
aggressively enquire whether book-learning has any role in a
proper human development that is significant enough to warrant
its usual central place in formal education, and whether there
might not be a very different kind of curriculum with a much
better claim to relevance.
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Secx)ndly, and related to the first, there is the school question,
i.e. enquiry and query regarding the importance and role of the
school among nurturing agencies generally - what can or should
be expected of the school in relation to what can or should be
expected of the family, the peer-group, the workplace, the media
etc. (One is tempted to speak here of the rational division and
coordination of educational labour. But this would mislead by
suggesting that the educational functions of agencies other than
school would lend themselves to precise definition and
prescription - which would be at odds with their essentially
informal character.) This issue too has its more aggressive
formulations, as the deschoolers in particular have shown us. We
might want to ask whether schools make, or could make, any
contribution to growing-up that is at all commensurate with their
protractedly compulsory monopoly of the young person's time,
and what radicalLy alternative arrangements for formal education
might better exploit and cohere with the educational possibi1itics
of more informal agencies.
Some of our later enquiries will relate to these questions -
though full answers to them are beyond our scope because of the
amount and variety of evidence that they involve. The point
here, however, is that our notion of education-in-the-widest-
sense boosts their legitimacy as fundamental lines of enquiry.
That our arrangements for schooling the young in their letters
(or any alternatives we might come up with) have to be
'relevant', have 'life' in view, be jushfiRhle by reference to some
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'wide scheme of things' - this is already iinp1iei1-1 indeed, in their
claim to cx)nstitute a formal education. But it is a deal more
exp1icit in a claim to cxntrIbute seriously to education in its
widest sense.6
[ Of urse, notions like 'relevance' and 'for life' need careful
handling. Three clarifications: (1) Everything depends on the
view of human development and the 'wider scheme of things' that
is favoured. Only on a rather special view of these (which we
shall consider in Part 3) could 'relevance' be interpreted in
purely, or even primarily, ecxnomc and job-related terms. A
broader viewpoint - a reaction, perhaps, to that one - would
propose the ideal that all should be rendered fully able to
participate politically, culturally, and interpersonally, as well as
ecx)nom ally. But now this might be thought to miss out rather
on the individual, and to over-identify 'the person' with 'the
participant'. One might want to appeal to the Socratic, Stoic and
Christian ideal of the care of the souL And so on. The point is
that though (both) our uses of 'education' imply relevance to a
wider scheme of things they do not, except in more loaded cases,
imply any particular scheme. (2) The insistence on relevance
does not mean that formal education has to be viewed as social
'reproduction', training people to 'fit in'. it is dearly just as
open to the 'reconstructionist' ideal of a critical, creative and
ameliorative kind of participation, or - for that matter - to some
more revolutionary ideaL (3) 'Relevant to' does not mean the
same as 'instrumental to'. So the idea that intrinsically
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worthwhile activities are pecu1ir1y apt candidates for curriculum
is not exc±ided. These might be thought of as basic, perhaps
transforming, wnsli±uents of the good life - as such more
directly 'relevant' than any mere means towards this life!]
There is a yet more radical line of enquiry that is also kept open
by 'education (in the widest sense)'. Just now, that notion
provoked our historical and anthropological imagination into
envisaging a society that did not think at all in educational
terms but stopped at various more logically elemental concepts.
From there it is a short step to asking whether our own
'educMinn-mindedness' is benef or bane to us, whether we
should not recross the bridge of education-in-the-widest-sense to
our more elemental concepts and blow the bridge up as we go.
This challenge, laid down in particular by the second wave of the
deschoo]ing literature, is to the assumption, shared by all sides
in the usual debates, that there is at any rate some form under
which education is worth pursuing as a matter of conscious,
deliberate policy. it is a fundamental philosophical challenge that
we shall take up at the beginning of Part 3.
NOTES
1	 The point here, of course, is neither to defend nor to criticise this centrality of
'letters ,but to note our coiirn assuTiption of It.
2	 Illich (1971)
3 It Is Important to remember that It Is with our present uses of education' that we
are concerned. Peters (1977b), chapter 1, remarks that prior to the 19th century
'education was used synonoiously with 'rearing' or bringing-up and was employed in
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have preceded any use of it in reference to schooling, to which the term may first
have been applied as to just one of the agencies of child-rearing. But that use is
rvt our present widest sense use, which is not synorxxlous with rearing or
bringing-up (cf. note 3), a fact to which Peters does not seem to edvert.
4
	
	 I am borrowing ideas here from J. Wilson (1979) pp.32-38 (though putting them to
different use).
people can do things for which they have no clearly differentiated
linguistic markers - Just as works of art can be created by men who see them
primarily as religious rather than aesthetic objects, or who at least do not
have the concept we mark by a work of art . There are.....good reasons for
supposing that virtually every society niist take seriously the question of
what its children are to learn. But not every society has to distinguish
this, in overt terms, from a sore general question about what its children
need to be able to do and to be (whether or not as a result of learning);
just as, though every society uses and marks some concepts of what it is
important to do and believe, not every society distinguishes sharply between
(say) rrorality, law, etiquette and religious caiinandment. p.32.
5 to say that these societies did not have our concept of education is not
to say that they did not have what we may call the constituents of the
concept. They had available, as it were, all the constituent criteria - human
learning, deliberate enterprises, the making of a general policy, and so on;
but they did not put them together into a single range of meaning marked by a
single term. ibid. pp.32-33.
6 So the prominence awarded to this notion in a philosopher a preliminary analyses and
definitions is a likely index of the extent to which, and the level at which, he will
take up these challenges. Cf. K. Wain (1984), for a pertinent discussion.
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3... -ri-i caRntArIFIrv OF NOnP4ArIf AND
DCFIFIVE LJSE OF • EDUCA-rIoN
In discussing the two remaining distinctions among uses of
'education' we shall cxntinue our policy of attending to the
connectedness of what is distinguished, to bring out the
fundamental ways in which the distinctions structure our
thinking. Broadly, what we shall find is that, as the dialectic
between the formal and the wide senses of 'education'
foreshadows the scope of educational enquiry, so these two
dialectics foreshadow its complexity. In this section we shall
tackle the norm ative/descriptive pair.
The distinction between uses that carry a positive valne charge
and those that do not, the committed or normative and the non-
corn mithil or purely descriptive, is not unique to 'education' and
its cognates. Indeed the name of any well-marked practice or
product in which there is question of coming up to recognized
standards has its normative, as well as its merely descriptive,
uses. Thus: 'Now that is what I call an omelette (darning, a
high-jump, a stamp-collection, etc.)'. Or Dan Maske]] 1 commenting
at a Wimbledon final, when the match is levelled at the end of
the second set: 'We have a flna]i' But such normative usage
seems to be an especially established feature of the life of some
terms - probably because of a combination of importance and
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difficulty reckoned to attach to the practices or products they
name. Thus it is vezy often the case that to call something 'a
work of ait' is to praise it (though it remains that sometimes it
is only to identify the kind of thing it purports to be).
'Literature', 'democracy' - and 'education' - are further examples
of terms often and very naturally normative.
This modest distinction is not to be confused with that wholesale
and drastic fact/value distinction that Hume and Moore, between
them, bequeathed to analytic philosophy. For one thing, it
envisages not two kinds of word but two kinds of use of the
same word. More significantly, it envisages, not a gulf and two
'universes' of discourse, but - as we shall presently see - a
strict logical symbiosis within a single 'universe' of discourse.
Not least, it is clear and undeniable, where the fact/value
distinction is unclear and eminently deniable. [ A properly
nuanced critique of the conventional distinction will not deny
that there are some distinctions in this general area. Rather, it
will criticize the usual conflation of different distinctions and the
usual assumption that distinction implies the absence of logical
connection. 1J
The Descriptive use and Eviliiition. In their purely descriptive
uses 'education', 'educated', 'educational' etc, pick out certain
systems, practices, institutions, persons, objects - also aims,
ideals and theories, but without endorsing them. There is no
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implication that what they pick out is good, right, effective, or
otherwise commendable, though there remains the presumption
that it is, or was, valued by someone. Thus we can neutrally
refer to something as 'a system of education', implying not that
it actually delivers 'a true education', but only that it purports
to deliver this, and is valued as delivering this by some of those
involved with it. Similarly, we can introduce someone as an
educator, catalogue a toy as educational,, and address a letter to
- College of Further Education', and thereby cast them in
worthy roles but not commit ourselves on how well they fill those
roles. Note, also, that our identifications here usually derive
from the ways in which the things in question identify
themselves. The system, college, toy, or person, advertises itself
as educational,, and we follow suit. We accept the self-
identification while declining any self-endorsement In general,,
then, the point of view which the descriptive use mainly
expresses and fai1iftes is that of the detached observer of what
already exists and already identifies itself as eduronaL2
So far, so fairly commonplace. But we must not underestimate
the range and power of this point of view. Usually its sustained
presence in the human sciences (to be discussed in Part 2) and
its much more casual employment in everyday referencing -
making introductions, giving directions etc. - will be noted. But
its indispensability for the particularly basic business of
ewi1iition has been rather overlooked. Yet this is really quite
clear. Even if we speak frankly and definitely of 'good
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education' or 'bad education', it is the adjectives that carry the
evaluation while 'education' identifies its sub jec± quite non-
corn mitI-.11y - otherwise 'good' would be redundant and 'bad'
contradictory. Though this 'education' has evaluation in mind, it
is itself non-corn mitta]ly second-hand. It marks the spot, as it
were, where the evaluated may speak and the evidence be
considered before judgement is passed, and where the
professional evaluator could file the report that seeks to make
judgement easier for others while making none itse]f.3
We should distinguish here two levels of detachment and, so, of
ewil'ition according as to whether what one is being for the
moment non-corn mitthl about is only the fficry of instruments,
the success of systems, practices, institutions, persons, objects
and proposals at realizing the educational conception that fires
them, or, on the other hand, extends also to the wiliri*y of the
conception. Societies in which detachment of the second degree
was never practised would be ones with a thoroughgoing
consensus on educational values. It is likely that this would be
uncritical,, and that they would be largely unaware of alternative
conceptions of education and have 1itI1 contact with dissimilar
societies. But even in such dosed societies there would be room
for doubt and debate in regard to the effectiveness of particular
institutions, practices, teachers, etc, and hence employment for a
neutral use of 'education' and cognates in regard to these
instruments, whether in their evaluation or in referring casually
to them. In pluralist and open societies, however, the more
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radical descdpti.vism will be forced upon thoughtful people.
They will resort to it in referring to other and different societies
(in whose views and practices they will tend to be interested)
and to rival or alternative views in their own societies. They
will use it for an 'objectification' of the views to which they
themselves incline or are committed, a oonditinn of keeping these
inclinations and commitments critical Even where the immediate
reference is to some instrument of education, their detachment
may embrace its aims as we]]. as its fF'acy. Unawed and
casually, for example, they will identify X as a place of education
without committing themselves to its conception of education
(which they may not even know). And the evaluation of
instruments in this open society will have a way of expanding to
encompass aims. A school inspection or self-evaluation exercise,
for example, will typically include some objectification and
appraisal of the school's 'philosophy' and not simply take this as
read. In sum, the merely descriptive uses of 'education',
'educational', 'educator', etc. in open societies can nobly serve
that critical temper in which values as weU as instruments, and
the relationships between values and instruments, are laid open
to regular scrutiny.
The Norma.ve use. Two cxrntexts Used descriptively 'education'
leaves it open whether the education referred to is any good.
Used normatively, however, 'education' might be said to mean
'good education'. We reach for the former, we have seen, mostly
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in reference to what already both exists and identifies itself as
educationaL The two contexts in which we tend rather towards
the latter are those in which one or other of those cxnditions is
missing. The first of these is where we wish to commend
something (like romance or travel) which does not already
identify itself as educational by relating it to education-in-the-
widest-sense. 'Travel can be an education' is rather more
natural than 'travel can be a good education' 4. By contrast,
where travel is institutionalized as education, as in the
education-tour, we quite naturally make adjectives like 'good' and
'bad' do the evaluative work. 'A good education-tour' sounds
fine.
The second, and very significant, kind of context is where one
thinks and speaks, no longer as an observer or evaluator, but as
in some way an agent of education. Used as a term of practical
reason, a tool for the shaping and focussing of effort: and
enterprise, the name of something-to-be-done, 'education' is
naturally a charged word. It is enough for the school
prospectus to proclaim as its overriiing aim 'the education' -
unnecessary to say 'the good education' - of its pupils.
Parents select from the range of outside agencies 'a good
education' for their children, but as educators themselves they
promote (simply) 'the education' of their children. And consider
the important case of the utopian dream-plan. In evaluating
educational instruments and pronouncing them 'good', 'bad', etc,
one is employing some set cit norms. If one moves to reflection
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on these norms, precisely as norms Le. as what practice must
measure up to, one speaks of education as it ought to be,
implying a possible cx)ntrast with education as it is. But that
ccntrast fades from the mind if one now goes on to think of the
norms rather as aims, to see or to imagine oneself as plotting the
broad outlines of the enterprise de nouveau. Then one will
speak naturally rather of what ('real') education is and involves.
Thus phi]osophers express their deliberated 'visions' of education
in the indicative mood: education 'is "consdentization", 'is the
development in depth and breadth of a caring understanding', 'is
interest-based learning', 'is .....'.
Interdependence (1) It seems clear that 'education' (x)nsidered
as something valuable is in some way prior to 'education' as
neutraL To apply it neutrally is still to invoke the idea of
something worthwhile: to imply that this thing identifies itself as
worthwhile, is believed or is supposed to be worthwhile, occupies
the social space reserved for a particular worthwhile thing,
offers, if not the reality, at least the illusion, of this worthwhile
thing, and so forth. In the light of the oonnection with agency
and practical reason just noticed, the point might be made in the
following way. 'Education' names an enterprise. Where
enterprises are cx)ncerned the involvement of language is twofold,
once in cx)nce ng, planning and executing them, then again in
describing them as oonceived, planned and executed. But the
purely descriptive involvement has to presuppose the practical
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one, because without it there is siiply nothing to describe.
'Education' as something to be accx)mplished logically precedes
'education' as something being accxmplished.
Now this does not mean that one must oneself use the term
normatively (and value education) in order to qualify to use it
descriptively. The point so far is only that unless some people
sea a point in education, and so set about it, there will be
nothing for any of us to be non-cxmmil-tRl about So also with
'astrology' and 'safe-cracking'. Our ordinary descriptive uses of
these terms imply that there are circles in which normative uses
of them wouid be admissible and natural1 or that there were once
such circles - but it does not commit us to membership. And
education, we shall see later, has its own conscientious and
vigorous detractors.
On the other hand, this last is more startling than dissociation
from the ranks of astrologers and safe-crackers. Why is this?
And why is the normative use of 'education' so particularly
ingrained and natural? Now the social standing of education is
quite high - nearer to science's than to astrology's. It also
seems relevant that, unlike safe-breaking, astrology, or science
for that matter, it is an enterprise which casts a great many of
us in the role of agents. As well as teachers, parents and
sundry others regularly find themselves drawing a bead on it -
hence locked into that practical, responsible perspective to
which, as we said, normative uses naturally belong. Education,
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then, is both generally esteemed and wi1ely engaged in. But it
has a further involvement with value that is perhaps unique to
it. As well as being an actLvely valued business it is, or it
notably includes, the business of oommunicating values. In
cxnnecon with much of what the pupil has to ]earn - at the
least in the moral sphere, but on most acoounts of education in
other spheres as well - the aim is not only that she master it
but that she oome to care about it. It is this, I think, that is
fundamental., and that gives to the antL-educational position its
air of paradox. What can it mean, we ask, this dec]aration in
principle against education - assuming it is not just misanthropy
or cynicism? How could one have some care for young people,
believe certain things to be important in life, and not then want
the young to be brought to care for those things? Perhaps one
places the freedom to choose one's values above any particular
value. Then would one not have to be favourably disposed to
the dissemination of at least that al±itude? And how, in genera]1
can it be supposed that people will be damaged by being helped
to cherish what is worth cherishing? Now when we consider the
deschoo]ing challenge in Part 3 we shall find that the objection
is not, in fact, to the communicathn of values as such, but to a
manner of communication that they (too hastily) assume
'education' also implies, viz, with overbearing systematicity and
an overwhelming future-orientation. But it remains that here is
exposed a root of the idea of education, this connection with
value-communication, which goes some way to explaining its hold
50
on us and the corresponding strength of the term's normative
use.
(2) The separate functions and the necessity of the descriptive
use remain, however. Consider such basic facts about education
as that it is pursued under conflicting conceptions of what it
involves, that it can be botched, that it. throws up screens
against those not directly involved (like the famously
impenetrable classroom walls), that it has to be institutionalized,
indeed, to the point that even its agents find themselves
constrained by 'the System'. The need for a neutral form of
reference to it, for both evaluative and more casual purposes,
now becomes very clear.
Furthermore, we can go on to derive this need, insofar as it
relates to evaluation, from the same practical logic as underlies
the normative use. We may say that the felt importance of
education dictates both uses. For precisely to the extent that a
continuing or recurring enterprise is important, so is it
important to monitor it, to observe, describe and evaluate what is
going on in its name. Just as to will the end is to will also the
means, so really to will to achieve something ongoing and
recurrent is to will this check on how well we are going at it.
And that requires, as we saw, a purely descriptive use of the
relevant term. This, then, completes our demonstration of the
tie-up between these two kinds of use. The descriptive use
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presupposes the normative and is in turn needed as its
complement.
Epilogue B. Williams, following Geach, has tracked the special
behaviour of the adjective 'good'. 5	Our argument above
accommodates, and allows us to extend, his observations.
(a) A black cncketer is a black person but a good cricketer is
not necessarily a good person. That is, the meaning of
'good' varies with the meaning of the noun it qulifis to an
extent that the meaning of 'black' does not. 'Good
cricketer' means 'good as a a cricketer' - the phrase has to
be taken as a whole. WiThaIIIS speaks of 'good' as an
adjective that is logically glued to its substantive - 'real'
being another such. (Geach had earlier called these
adjectives 'attributive' and ones like 'black' 'predicative').
(b) Furthermore, the difference between 'good' and 'black' is
not simply down to the comparative overtones of 'good'.
True, a comparative adjective like ']arge' is similar to what
we have so far seen of 'good'. A black mouse is a black
animal while a large mouse is not a large animaL But a
large mouse is a larger animal than most mice (an animal
large as mice go) while a good cricketer is not necessarily a
better person than most cricketers (a person good as
cricketers go). 'Good', Wi1lims concludes, is more context-
bound, more intimately 'glued' to its substantive, than are
comparative adjectives.
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(c) On the other hand, it has to be said that the 'good' in
'good cricketer' (like the 'good' in 'good education') is
genuinely additive or non-redundant. There are, after a]],.
bad and mediocre cricketers. So what in the end, we may
ask, does the connection metaphorically called ']ogical
glueing' amount to? This, I suggest: the 'good' in 'good
cricketer' is bound to its noun by an implicit reference in
both to a normative use of 'cricketer'. Their dose link is,
as it were, an echo of the situation in which they were
fused. Thus we come again to the conclusion that the use
of descriptive language in evaluation embodies, not the
actual use, but an invocation of a corresponding normative
language for what is being evaluated.
NOTES
For a critique of the fact/value distinction see, for exanple, Mary Midgeley (1979)
ch.9 and Hilary Putnam (1981) ch.6. Putnam specifically exents our
normative/descriptive distinction from his general broadside against a dichotomy he
regards as having the status of a cultural institution:
Consider the terms we use every day in describing what other people are like,
e.g. considerate or inconsiderate. Considerate and inconsiderate may of
course be used to praise or blame; and one of the many distinctions which have
gotten confused together under the general heading fact-value distinction is
the distinction between using a linguistic expression to describe and using
that linguistic expression to praise or blame. But this distinction is not a
distinction which can be drawn on the basis of vocabulary. The judgement that
someone is inconsiderate may indeed be used to blame; but it may be used
si nl y to describe, and it may also be used to explain or to predict .....And
both the prediction and the explanation may be perfectly correct...... The use
of the word 'inconsiderate seems to me a very fine exajiple of the way in
which the fact/value distinction Is hopelessly fuzzy in the real world and In
the real language.
2 Of course, such formal self-advertisement goes only with (formal) education' - to
which alone, therefore, this part of the analysis relates. But there would seem to
be few, or no, purely descriptive uses of 'education (in the widest sense)' outside
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comittal In this wider area we speak rather of e.g. formatwe than educational
Influences or experiences.
3 Thus It is misleading to refer to the normative (comiitted) kind of use of
'education as the evaluative' or apprais1ve use, for this is not the kind of use
that is employed In formulating evaluations or appraisals of education.
4	 This is again to suggest (see noteL) that education (In the widest sense) Is
normally and naturally normative.
5	 Williams, B. (1972) p.52ff, Geach, P. (1956)
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14. FH COl	 LAIIIV OF OFN AND LOADD
LJ	 OF • EDLJCAFIOI4 • : CONNLJ AND
CON F ET
At least in open societies, uses of 'education' and its cognates
may be distinguished according to their place on a scale that
runs from the very open (nominal, general) to the very loaded
(substanthre, sperifir). This applies to all the kinds of use we
have been considering. Thus in dealing with '(formal) edueon',
we have seen that its most conventional version, 'schooling in
letters', is intermediate in specificity. On one side of it there is
the much more open '(formal) education' to mean 'the sustained,
systematic induction of pple into some substantial proportion of
whatever is deemed to be essential to ' ow'. This can
comprehend, say, the organized oral transmission of the Koran in
traditional Islamic societies. On the other, i.e. the loaded, side,
there is that use of '(formal) education' which carries a built-in
contrast with 'indoctrination'. Further out on that side are those
fuller and now competing uses (about equally but differently
loaded) which we recognize as summing-up particular educational
traditions and philosophies - as meaning, for instance, 'the
systematic promotion of interest-based learning', or 'the
systematic initiation into the best that has been thought and
taught', or 'conscientization'. Clearly 'educon (in the widest
sense)' also comes in ]ess and in more loaded forms, from the
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heuristically skeletal in anthropology to uses that incorporate
quite particular views of the meaning of life e.g. 'all teaching
and learning as it anticipates and prepares for the Beatific
Vision'. Considering uses as either descriptive or normative,
each category again yields its more and its less loaded forms. A
detached account of education in Mao's China may begin with an
outline of what it was essentially taken to be - and thereafter
use 'education' sometimes as a shorthand for just that outline,
and sometimes, perhaps in the author's factual corn parLsons with
other times and places, in a much more global way. And
normative uses can be as loaded as to require, say, 'interest-
based learning', or pretty well as open as to leave it at 'valuable
learning'.'
Let us start out to explore the logic of the open-loaded
continuum from an obvious question about loaded uses. As uses
become more loaded so do they become less standard, passing
through semi-standard to non-standard. More exactly, as uses
are perceived as loaded and in serious competition with other
loaded uses, so do they cease to be standard. But linguistic
communication requires standardness of use. There is, I think,
no gainsaying this simple intuition. A private language,
supposing there to be such a thing, would not do for
communication.
How then is corn munication pos-ch1 in the medium of loaded
uses?
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It must be possible, for it actually occurs. Loadedness of use
may sometimes get in the way of communication, but certainly not
always and insuperably. We understand many uses of 'education'
from which, because they encapsulate points of view we iiislike,
we would ourselves refrain; we quickly get the hang of
unfamiliar ones; and we find that our own tendentious uses are
usually understood. But how are these things possible? In
particular, how do rivals know of each other that each is
speaking differently of the same thing and not, cross-purpose-
wise, of some quite different thing?
A useful preliminary is to remind ourselves that standardness of
use is no absolute notion. Usages, like whole languages, have
histories and geographies. They become standard, 'struggle' to
become or to stay standard, cease to be standard, are semi-
standard, are standard only within a particular area, or social
class, or age-group - and so on. Thus there is already plenty
of relativity - if nothing else the creativity of language,
embodiment and instrument of our own creativity, would require
it - in the world in which we must now situate the phenomenon
of loadedness. Initially this merely generalises our problem.
How can there be communication across variations in usage? But
it also suggests the obvious direction of a solution. We are, in
general, able to cope with difference and impermanence of usage
because of a much larger measure of agreement and stability, and
because our learning of language does not stop in childhood. A
stock of already shared usages and an ability to pick up new
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ones would seem to be the two conditions for, say, reading
Chaucer, or eavesdropping on cx)mputer freaks.
Applying this to the particular case of loadedness: First 1 in
regard to cxntentious terms like 'education'
competing uses vii]. have some features in common
Users tacitly know this inasmuch as they can articulate these
common features in other shared (open) uses of the same term.
So differences, however serious, will be assumed to begin only
above or beyond some point of specificity. Any two competing
uses will be seen as like different superstructures built on
similar foundations, or paths that diverge only beyond a certain
point Second,
this gaing above or beyond is itself a standard linguistic
process,
though its products are not standard products. it is one of
language's built-in aids to development and learning, and a
powerful one. (We shall enlarge on it first, below.)
To these two points we shall eventually add two more, in
explaining the intelligibility of loaded uses, viz.:
- uses ordinarily carry the imprint of some competing uses;
and
- aU uses share the intention of truth
(1) A Standard Practice One may wish to say with Richard
Peters that true education is the development in depth and
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breadth of a carthig understanding, or with Paulo Freire that it
is 'conscientisation', or, perhaps, that it is the process of
incorporating the individual into the life of the cdflect:ive. A
society might be so wedded to one of these ideals that the use of
'education' to stand for it was a standard use in their language.
But in our pluralist societies each of these definitions and uses,
and in general any use loaded above some rather minimal level, is
liable to be controversial and to face competition from other
loaded uses. This is to say that such uses win not be standard
for us considered individually. Yet something about them is
standard, and that is the general practice they each exemplify of
let±ing 'education' stand for one's preferred ideals in this area
whatever they are. The ideals may not be widely accepted, but
using the term 'education' to cover them is. Our language itself
invites this tendentiousness.
Not that our loaded uses must: therefore go unchallenged. But
challenges should be of a particular kind. A disagrees radically
with B on education. She may indeed express this by saying
that what B favours would not deserve to be called 'education',
that 'education' would be a misnomer for it, that to call it
'education' would be a misuse of the term. This is to challenge a
use as part and parcel of challenging a view. It is a feature of
this kind of challenge that A can acknowledge that, from the
point of view that B takes, B's use is fine and it is her own use
that becomes suspect. Contrast this with the situation where
somebody whose command of English is weak is confusing
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'education' with 'emigration'. His misuses are of a quite different
order: he does not succeed in saying what he himse]f means. To
correct him is not to challenge his views but to allow him
properly to express them.
This nuance could be missed. A, let us suppose, goes further
than she did above. Now she claims that B's use of 'education'
is wrong quite apazt from the issue of substance between them.
B ought to call the pn1iics he advocates by another name,
'indoctrination' let us say, whether or not they are defensible -
clarity demands as much. But to this a quick-thinking B could
object: 'To express myself as for indoctrination instead of
education (i.e. in one fairly common sense of "education") is
indeed an option for me - and with the merit of extra shock-
value! But to present my proposals as a view of education itself,
and thus to claim for them the cachet of this term, is also
legitimate. it is backed by the open use of 'education' which
implies nothing as definite as your sharp distinction from
indoctrination and is avaibthle to a wide range of positions, mine
included.' And indeed the only way for A to discredit B's usage
is to discredit his view. (That, however, would do the trick - as
it may be politically important to insist)
Yet A's mistake is an interesting one. We might guess from it
that she finds B's view extreme and repugnant. We might
wonder, too, how much experience she has had of the range of
views on education. This brings us back to the point that it is
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pluralism that forces on us the distinction and the continuum
between open and loaded uses. Granted just two conceptions of
education, we would need two loaded uses to express them and
an open use to subtend the debate between them. Granted many
cx)nceptons, overlapping and diverging in a variety of ways and
degrees, and different debates of varying intensity and degrees
of generality, we need an extended cx)ntinuum of uses between
open and loaded. Then exposure to these debates will lead to
familiarity with many of these particular uses. More
significantly, it will lead to a tacit understanding of how they
operate in relation to each other, of the logic of the open-loaded
continuum. That understanding (which is what we are seeking
here to make explicit) is a main condition of coherent
participation in the debates. And it includes some agreement to
disagree and some expectation of the unexpected - an implicit
awareness of the paradox that here the non-standard is
standard.
(2) Common Ground But only within certain limits! We shall
focus now on the understanding that competing users have that
there is common ground between them, expressible in shared,
open uses of 'education'. It seems clear that they must have
this. Without it they could have no assurance that they are
speaking of the same thing differently and not of quite different
things - like education and emigration. Of course the amount of
common ground will vary from one set of disputants to another.
Such and such a group see themselves as sharing, say, the ideal
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of a liberal education. (They all tend to use 'education' as
shorthand for 'liberal education'.) If forced to a definition they
could agree that it involves the following three strands: cognitive
and curriculum breadth, the pursuit of knowledge and cultural
activities 'for their own sake', and antipathy to indoctrination
and authoritarianism. 2 But they disagree on the relative
importance of these three strands. This emerges as they discuss
such matters as the scheduling of specialisation in secx)ndary
schools, or the Technical and Vocational Educational Initiative, or
the kinds of choice that students should be allowed to make for
themselves. Perhaps they also find that they identify with
different heroes of the liberal traditirn - some with Socrates,
some with Plato, some with Newman. Among themselves, then,
uses of 'education' that rank-ordered the three conditions
mentioned, e.g. 'education' as the promotion of autonomy above all
else, would be contentious, while one that implied them but in no
particular order would be open. But let them then be joined by
Mancists, progressives, and New Right pundits and po1iticiaris (all
groups with their own internal divisions), and then by a number
of the uncommitted and of those who want to rethink education
from the bot±om up. Now only something very much more general
will. count as an open use - one that begs no questions,
identifies the object of their competing claims and so confirms
they are competing, and permits their (perhaps limited)
communication.
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What cx)ntent survives in this limit case, 'education' at s most
open? We shou:ld remind ourselves that there will be one variant
for 'education (in the widest sense)' and another for '(formal)
education', and that each of these will have both normative and
descriptive modes. With that caution, and harking back to an
earlier discussion, we might say that at its most open 'education
(in the widest sense)' must mean something like 'some snff9rintly
large, varied and cx)herent set of "catching-up" (as opposed to
"forging-ahead") learnings that are (thought to be) of some
lasting value'. And for '(formal) education' one would add some
reference to systematicity and its institutions.
There is a more dynamic way of depicting this minimal general
cx)mmonalty. The various loaded definitions, each with its
complement of energy and fuss, are so many specific responses
to one basic and enduring human situation, whose universality is
guaranteed by the truistic nature of the facts that compose it.
H.L.A. Hart once famously argued that legal systems in all their
diversity were alike in being responses to a combination of the
following broad and unavoidable facts: that human beings are
vulnerable, that even the strong among them must acknowledge
their vulnerability (that1
 as Hobbes charmingly put it, they can
be killed in their sleep by a child), that they are to at least
some degree altruistic, that they are limited in both
understanding and determination, and that their environmental
resources are limited.
	 Legal systems are precisely those
institutions and practices, or those aspects of larger institutions
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and practices (e.g. custom, relig:ion), by which people express
and accommodate these undeniable facts in their social existence.
What truisms might similarly found educational institutions,
practices and concepts in all their diversity? Some that we have
already met, pins some others:
- that we are born ignorant;
- that some forms of ignorance are known to be
dangerous or otherwise disadvantageous to ourselves
and to others;
- that many things can be learnt more quickly and
securely from those that already know them than by
independent discovery;
- that many things can be more quickly and securely
taught than caught;
- that our capacity for learning is immense;
- that we care for our young;
- that we can, and indeed cannot help but, think to the
future;
- that we can, and sometimes should, think to the long-
term future;
- that we can, self-reflexLvely, conceive of our lives as
wholes;
and perhaps some others. Education, then, is either that set of
ideas, practices and institutions by which a society identifies and
lives just this set of basic truths, or those aspects of other sets
(nurture and development, teaching and learning) by which it
lives them without isolating them. 4 This roots the minimal unity
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of our cxmpeting uses of 'education' in human nature and the
human cxndition.
(3) Uses as Po1emiri1 Our picture is as yet ahistorical and,
therefore, too polite. We need now to remind ourselves that
positions on education are almost always reactions, of some kind
and in some degree, to other positions. They are protestant, or
counter-reformative, or ecumenical. Understanding them more or
less depends on understanding their enemies, ancient or modern
- at any rate, their view of their enemies. So, 'cx)nsdentisation'
takes much of its shine from the contrast with 'education-as-
banking'5 The 'process' model of curriculum 6
 is almost
unintel1iible save as a reaction against a 'behavioural objectives'
model1 itself a product of impatience with traditional 'content'.
Progresvism, from Rousseau to Plowden, indignantly promotes
the child who was suppressed in classical humanism - while that
tradition hits back with reactionary reassertions of the primacy
of 'standards' in Black Papers and White Papers, or irenically
counters by affirming at once the learner, the 'Holy Ground' of
knowledge, and a subtle interplay between respect for one and
respect for the other - as in the work of a Richard Peters7.
And so on. Perhaps there could be such a thing as a view that
develops independently and is then surpdsed to find other views
trying to occupy the same ground. But the common situation,
one wants to say, is that views grow up fighting for that ground
and have the scars to prove it.
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Perhaps this last overdoes the 'battle' metaphor. Certainly it fits
many cases, to the point somethes of almost ceasing to be a
metaphor: there may be an antagonism between viewpoints that is
undeceived and undeceiving; or, the views and practices of
opponents are misrepresented, their diff9cn1tics magnified, their
moti.ves doubted - whether in prejudiced good faith, or cynically
and for political or other advantage8. But often the
(overlapping) metaphor of 'debate' - again scarcely a metaphor in
some situations - is the more applicable one. Views can interact
and shape each other in the manner of the cxflaborative
development of ideas among friends, or of a movement towards
corn promise or synthesis among those of different inclination, or,
more bruisingly but still respectfully, of an argument in which
we learn principally to reformulate our positions so as better to
challenge and to block those of opponents. But from open
warfare to conversation, the same phenomenon repeats itself of
views imprinthig themselves on each other. And this point needs
to be added to our two earlier ones when we consider how users
of differently loaded versions of 'education' can acknowledge
each other. As well as sharing open uses of the term and
accepting loading as a practice, there is the reference to some
specific other views that is almost sure to be part of each one's
own specific view.
(4) Truth - a Common Intentionality These conditinns themselves
imply a fourth. All users of 'education' are further united, and
tirit1y aware of themselves as united, in some kind and degree of
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acknowledgement of the ideal of truth (righthess,
appropriateness). As well as starting out from a shared open
use, they share, or make some pretence of shanng, this
destination.
Open uses, loaded uses, and the logic that relates open to loaded
uses, all refer forward to this. They all - as we might put it in
despite of our tendency to become fidgety with solemn talk about
'truth', our suspicion that it can serve as a cloak for intolerance
- legitimate the notion of the true meaning of 'education'. Open
uses do so by their very openness. They suggest - hence their
heuristic value - a question in brackets 9: 'Whatever learnings,
(and what may they be?) meet such and such conditions'. So
they look to answers, but of course to true (right, good) answers
and to the true meanings that would embody such answers.
Loaded uses in turn represent so many answers to that
bracketed question. And each of them impliril-ly claims that it,
rather than any conflicting one, represents the true answer and
the true (best, right) meaning of education. 'Perhaps none of
these claims is justified; certainly not all of them are' - which
is to invoke the notions of falsity and contradiction and hence,
again, of truth.
'Debate' and 'contest' also point firmly in this direction. In
practice, debates may be as much occasions for bullying,
obduracy and rhetorical display as for pursuing truth - thus the
ambiguity of 'winning the argument'. But where there is not so
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much as a pretence of objectivity, not even that backhanded
cx)mp]ment to truth, we no longer think of them as 'debates' at
all Humphrey Bogart is not 'arguing' when he tells the crew of
the Caine that things aboard will be done, neither the right way,
nor the wrong way, but his way! Likewise, 'a contest', by
contrast with 'a brawl', imports some order and coherence, some
agreed ground-rules and concept of victory. The runners start
from the same gun, race on the same track and in the same
direction, and acknowledge the first to the tape as the winner.
Even where the contest is looser than this, as in the big-city
marathons with their several grades of victor and their many
less formal triumphs, there remain acknowledged rules and goals
- different and overlapping sets of them for the different and
overlapping sub-contests. With 'education', the ground-rules of
the contests are contained in its agreed open uses and contain
the intention of truth. So it happens that there is no 'victory'
for a loaded view that does not involve the acknowledgement -
whether sincere or not - that after all there is, or could be,
some truth in it.
To sum up our findings: In the open-loaded continuum there is
a dialectical interplay between openness and loadedness. Each
occurence of 'education' in discourse has its own point on the
scale but also refers implir!Wly to other points. Uses as open
look to ('intend') more loaded uses. Uses as loaded presume both
more open uses and other loaded uses. This dialectic is strongly
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objectivist in its anticipations - it is crucially energized by the
notion of the right or true use.
Essentially Contested Concept? Many philosophers now suppose
there is a class of concepts that are 'essentially contested', and
that 'education' belongs to it - along with, for example, 'art',
'democracy', 'the christian religion' and 'the British Labour Party
(battle for the soul of)'. These are concepts of social life (and
social science), of things that are unlike sticks and stones in
being actually part-constituted by beliefs and intentions
regarding what they are. Perhaps this reflexivity already makes
for some instability in them. (Not that all such concepts could
be thought contested, not e.g. 'a £5' or 'a cheque', though
perhaps 'the economy'!) In any case while physical concepts,
like 'space', 'time' and 'oxygen', are prone to dispute and
revision, many of the most important social concepts seem prone
to never resolved dispute and never agreed revision. More
formally, there are concepts which have the following
interconnecting features:
- they are normative - or, better, they have significant
normative uses;
- they are complex;
- there is disagreement on some of their elements and/or
on the order of priority among their elements;
- such disagreement is endemic in their history; and
- their variants are shaped or adapted for offense and
defence against each other.
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Such concepts, it is claimed, should be deemed essentially
contested • 10
Clearly there are affinities here with our own account These
concepts seem very much the ones in which we would be
unsurprised to find an open-loaded dialectic. But we should be
cautious about 'essentially contested'. In its reaction to an
earlier autocracy, this label carries two excessively anarchic
tendencies - which our earlier account had the merit of
overcoming. To explain:
The autocracy was that of 'standard usage' in anglo-saxon
phIlosophy. Indeed it was a greatly reduced image of 'standard
usage' that did the tyrannising. In Part 1.1 we criticized an
effective reduction of the different non -competing senses of
terms to single 'primary' senses. Immediately relevant here is
another reduction, that of the competing uses of some terms to
single 'correct' uses, the others - if they were even noticed -
being presumed 'aberrant'. The true claim about linguistic
communication that it presupposes common usages in a common
language was narrowed, it seems, to its presupposing that all
(successfully communicating) uses would be common in all
respects - leaving no room for the idea of legitimately,
intelligibly, competing uses. From this it was expected that
analyses of the terms of a philosophical issue in their 'correct'
meanings would provide a usefully neutral clarification of it.
What actually happened, of course, was that favoured loadings of
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terms like 'education' were proferred as neutral and insisted
upon (the blunder we earlier noticed A make with B), and the
relevant philosophical differences caine to intrude -
uncx)mfortably - upon these 'neutral preliminaries'. Perhaps it
was from this that some came by the even more cramping idea
that philosophical problems were linguistic, and actually soluble
by linguistic analysis - as though false philosophical doctrines
were at bottom mistakes of the same order as the unskilled
english-user's confusion of 'education' and 'emigration'!
In this context the doctrine af essentially contested concepts
came as a liberating event. It reaffirmed a broader conception of
philosophy as concerned with ideological as well as linguistic
matters, re-legitimated a pluralism of schools and doctrines, and
suggested a more comparative, less sectarian, approach to
issues. But, first, its exponents were understandably impatient
with 'the standard' and tended to affirm 'contestedness' simply at
its expense." They were long on contest-legitimacy but short on
inter-contestant intelligibility. What they missed was the
dialectical interplay that we sketched above ('expecting the
unexpected use', and 'agreeing to the disagreeable use'), between
co-existing standard and contested uses. Yet on this absolutely
depend both the tolerance and the heuristic power of language.
Without it there could only be either fixed unanimity in meaning,
or Babel That is one doubt regarding the description
'essentially contested concepts' and one reason for preferring
'open-loaded dialectical concepts'.
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A second reason is the subjectiLvist leanings of the doctrine.
Why was the cx)ntestedness said to be essential? ActualLy there
was some ambiguity about this. (1) At times the reference
seemed only to what we have called 'imprinting' and the resu]tant
network of internal relationships between competing views, to the
historical and ongoing debates as essential to the concept as we
have it. (2) But at other times the reference was rather to the
interminability of the debates, cxupled with an implied explanation
of this from somewhere in the range:
i there is, in principle, no way of demonstrating that a
particular view of, 'education', say, is the right one;
ii there are no irresistible demonstrations of even the
wrongness of views;
iii there are, ultimately, no rational grounds for preferring
some views to others.
Fairly obviously (1) and (2) are different Less obviously i and
ii do not entail iii., as we shall see. Only (2)iii is
properly subjecti.vist and incxmpatib]e with the objectivist
anticipations of debate. But by fudging these distinctions the
'essentially contested' position gravitated towards a soft
subjectivism, and a project to legitimate a wiLier debate
threatened to undermine debate a]together' 2. [ A proper defence
of objectLvism is, of course, another matter - and one of the
tasks to be addressed in Part 2.]
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NOTES
1	 Art , democracy and marriage are likely to be anong other terms that have uses
that are variously, and to varying degrees, loeded, as well as having open uses.
2	 As plausibly argued in Ambiguities in liberal education and the problem of its
content in R S.Peters 1977.
3	 H.L.A. Hart (1961) PP . 189-95. I was reminded of it in re&Jing N.S. Care (1973).
4 So the unavoidability of these facts is consistent with the possibility of a society
and a language that uld have no concept of education. But it suggests that the
p racti ces of this society would be such as to all ow us to desc ri be them as
educational - what we supposed in chapter 2.
5	 P. Freire (1970).
6	 See L. Stenhouse (1975)
7	 e.g. R. S. Peters (1966). Similarly, though using different philosophical tools, J.
Maritain (1943)
8	 Some would think here of the present Press campaign In Britain against schools,
teachers, Local Educational Authorities and educationsts.
9 More or less bracketed depending on the context. Where the common ground is being
emphasised the question is in abeyance - noted but held over; where debate is joined
it governs everything.
10	 A definition distilled from a number of accounts: See Gallie, who first proposed
this idea, (1955/6) arid (1964) ch.8; 	 Geliner (1967) - a review of the former;
Maclntyre (1973) and Care (1973) - a symposium;	 and Naish (1984) - a recent,
critically open, account.
11	 So, too, they saw themselves as breaking with the tradition of conceptual analysis in
philosophy, though in fact they were making a broadening new nove within it.
12 At least one of Its proponents realized the danger. Was not a kind of 'essentialist
illusion', the mistaken supposition that one unambiguous fully determinate notion or
norm is 'there if only we could locate it,...necessary to keep going that ever-open
and fruitful debate..? Geilner (1967) p.55. (For further referencing of the
essentially contested position and a longer discussion of the relationship to it of
the 'open-loaded' view, see Walsh (1988))
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CONCLUSION F0 FAF 1
In 1.1 we sensed the cx)mplex power that accrues to the word
'education' from its multiple uses arid we outlined a new strategy
for analysing it. Now at the end of Part 1 we can see more
clearly that this word-power is a matter of a frip iil'cticity.
The ideas of formal education and education in the widest sense
emerge together, from nurture-type ideas on the one hand and
training-type ideas on the other, in the measure that a society
espouses the ideal of a reElec±ive view of life as a whole, and the
dialectic between these ideas is what underwrites that idea].. The
dialectic between normative and descriptive uses of 'education'
contains the seeds of the divkling and recombining discourses of
educational studies. It also aThes itself with a third dialectic
between open and loaded uses to underwrite, on the one hand
the development of conflicting substantive theories of education,
and on the other hand both mutual comprehension across theories
and the drive for better and truer theory.
Further to their intrinsic interest, these linguistic analyses have
had the broad purposes of, first, failitting a critical scrutiny
of the structural features of our educational thinking that they
expose, and, second, of allowing us to take some direction from
what survives that scrutiny. Those purposes remain to be
fulfilled. By way of scrutiny, we have yet to test the
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assumptions that the descriptivism of educational science can,
like that of evaluation, retain a symbiotic link with the normative
(2.3), that objectivity in educational enquiry is possible in any
real tough sense (2.4), and that a desirable form of the pursuit
of a coherent view of life is possible for us (3.1). By way of
direct:ion, we shall presently (and while still assuming the ideal
of a coherent view of life) exploit all three of the exposed
dialectics in a more systematic analysis of the idea of an
adequate educational th&ry (2.1 and 2.2), and we shall later
address, as our single largest task, the development of some key
elements of a substantive educational response to the ideal of a
coherent view of life (3.2 and 3.3).
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For merely lwking at an object cannot be of any use to us. AU
Jwldng goes
over into an observing, alZ observing into a reflec±ing, all
reflecting into
a cvnnecting, and & one can say with every attentive Jr.ok we
cast into the
world we are already theorzsing. Goethe. [Quoted in M. Armstrong
'Thinking about Children's Learning' in Forum 29.1 Autumn 1986]
The most penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given
is, then, that it is the thary of education in its most general
phases.' John Dewey, Demcxracy and Education.
If humanistic scienoe may be said to have any goals beyond
sheer fascination with the human mystery and enjoyment of it,
these would be to release the person from external a)ntrol and to
make him less predictable to the observer... Abraham MaS]OW The
psychology of Science [Quoted in B. McDonald (1977).]
76
a..] FFACTI	 I1ITQ UHOFW ?
	 A ICIAL
IFAC -r
 I C
Geology might have been called 'rocks', biology 'life', and
sociology 'society'. The study of education is called 'education',
as the study of history is called 'history' and of law 'law'.
Might not these have been called instead, say, 'educo]ogy',
'historonomy', and 'legal studies'? This particular ambiguity in
'education ' does seem more accidental than the three we
cx)nsidered in Part 1. But it is at the least a happy accident for
it can suggest the ammunicM-ive nthiuity between the pracce
and the theory of education. It may even reflect some common
perception of this continuity, underlying that quite separate
institutionalization of educational studies in higher education
which we are only now beginning to think seriously about In
any case (and we shall not rely further on the linguistic point)
this continuity - its manifestations, implications, and limits - will
be a constant refrain in this chapter.
A parallel with 'history'. History studies history, that is to say,
lives and events that were already imbued with historical sense.
First, and grounding everything else, there is the ordinary
temporality of daily life: people in their own immediate circles
mundanely act and suffer out of their past and towards their
future, pervasively conscious - in relation to bodies, spiritual
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lives, friendships, careers - of change and stability, gathering
and dispersal1 disappointment and fnlfillment, decline and
progress. But then within that workaday temporality, there
occur moments of wi1er historical consdousness: liturgies of
remembrance, re-enactment, launching; awareness of 'history
being made', or of oneself as 'making history' (which we all may
do as members of movements and communities); and vainglorious
attempts to catch the eye of the future historian. Next, there is
the more or less formal study of history, a concomitant awareness
of a tradition and a community of scholarship, and some striking
the pose of 'the historian'. Finally, this pose and quite specific
historical knowledge complete the circle by feeding back into
both mundane and historic living, into shopping for antiques and
watching period TV, and into breaking world records and making
wars or treaties. The point is the curve that underlies the
(real) discontinuities between the temporality of ordinary human
life, the historical sensibility of some of life and the study of
history, between Man the temporal being, Man the sustainer and
maker of history, and Man the historian.
In the same slightly grandiose vein: the subject education
theorises about education, a practice already imbued with at least
intimations of theory, and this duet has education-in-the-widest-
sense for background chorus. So we may distinguish Man as
educational being, as participant in educational systems, and as
educationist. As educational being, she has her immense appetite
for learning, showing and informing, and these saturate her
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ordinary living. Much here is idle or pretends to only immediate
importance. But some takes the ]ong and the wide view and the
learning duly gathers into competence, expenence, world-view
and wisdom. As system-participant, she is a student and/or a
teacher. We saw, in 1.2 above, how this dimension of her life
interacts with the first. Broadly: if, and only if, there is formal
education in her environment, will the educational dimension of
her usual life become self-conscious and intensificd as
'education-mindedness'. As educationist, she studies the system,
and cxmp]ains, makes plans, and generally philosophizes about
education. 'She' may be a professional educationist but is much
more commonly a reflective teacher or student, or an interested
bystander. For knowledge of education cannot be the preserve
of the expert. Some understanding of it is actually intrinsic to
educating and being educated.' Hence that democracy of
educational comment, as we might call it, part-reality and part-
idea],, which is an integral aspect of the larger democracy of
education generally along with education-in-the-widest sense, the
acceptance of universal educability and universal formal
education.
Overcxming mystique There are two mysti.ques which limit this
freedom of comment One surrounds teachers and their 'book-
learning' and keeps students and the lay-public at a distance.
The other attaches to educational theory and educationists and
keeps teachers at a distance. Both inhibit education itself, as
well as educational, comment The stand-off from children's minds
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results in many of those minds remaining untouched. The stand-
off from parents and other adults limits and disorients their
contributions to the educational process. The stand-off from
teachers inhibits grass-roots innovation and development These
mysti.ques are connected historically with the class and
educational differences between teachers and their pupils, and
between teacher-educators and teachers. So they have been
diminishing as those differences diminished, and many notable
developments in educational thery have it in common that they
may be seen as intellectual expressions of this demystification.
In broad brushstrokes:
(1) There is progressLvism. Put aside its radical form of an
insistence on nothing but what interests the child. In its milder
and more pervasive forms it still requires the teacher to be
'with' the child, on his side, to respect his language and allow
him to work with it, to cx)nsider his experience in all things, and
so on.2
(2) The sociology of knowledge, though from a different
intellectual. stable, complements this by its aggressive
interrogation and deconstruction of traditional learning and its
disciplines.3 As actually organized and institutionalized and as
then translated into curriculum courses and materials, these
disciplines might be governed rather less by objectivity and
logic than by powerful vested interests - professional,,
bureaucratic, race, gender and (particularly) class, interests.
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This line has proved less apt for rex)nstruction, indeed left
itself no base for recx)nstruction in some of its more relativistic
early statements, and it is not without its own mystifying
tendencies. But many who are alert to these drawbacks and
ciisiriclined to this relativism are, nonetheless, induced to be
sceptical where they might once have been deferentiaL For
example, the attractive Bruner.ian proposal of a series of
'courtsous translations' of the key ideas in each discipline,
'spirally' arranged for revisiting at successive ages, has oome to
seem perhaps too trusting - the key-ideas might be distorted by
class, or other, interests. Real oourtesy to students might entail
deliberate rudeness to the discipline-establishmenti A critical
programme of deccnstruction and (somehow) reoonstruction may
rather be the way forward. And this thought gets added to the
progressive idea of negotiation with the student
(3) A still embryonic, and ambivalent, idea, associated particularly
with the New Right, is that of a free (i.e. de-regu]ated) market of
ideas, disrip1ines, curricu]a and schools, with students and their
families cast in the role of 'oonsumers' exercising their right of
choice on the basis of accurate information about options. 4
 It,
too, advertises itself as demystifying. Now we may wish to
remind ourselves here of the usual distance between ccnsumers
and manufacturers. Consumer-choice is in fact heavily
oonstrained choice, and oonsumer-power, though it indirectly
affects production, falls far short of oo-production or any kind
of partnership. This extended metaphor is then disturbingly
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hospitable to 'pre-packaging' in education, and inhospitable to
participation. That is in addition to serious doubts about the
reality, as opposed to the rhetoric, of choice and deregulation at
a time when governments seem bent on both decreasing their
spending and increasing their cxntroL It remains that this
philosophy, though deliberately reactionary in many other ways,
is another to ride the demystification bandwagon.
(4) The mystique that separates educationists from teachers has
also diminished. Thus, in the area of curriculum development,
the aspiration to 'teacher-proof' packages gives way to a fashion
for associating specific in-service courses with curriculum
projects (courteous translations for teachers!), which, in its turn,
yields to the perception that reflective practice and reflecti.ve
practitioners are the main thing, the centrepisce of curriculum
development.5
(5) In educational research, too, the role ascribed to
communication between the expert or the theorist, and the
practitioner, progressively increases. Thus the popularity of
case-study, a research form which is particular about allowing
subjects (usually practitioners) to speak for them selves6, and of
action-research, which is the natural correlative of ref]ecti.ve
practice, indeed a form of research in which researcher and
teacher might be said to meet half-way7.
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Needless to say these subversive ideas attract resistance, and
overcxmng this resistance is is one reason why it is :iznportant
not to overstate the ideas. They are broadly cx)mpatib]e with
accxrding a measure of authority, and even of mystique, to
professionals and disciplines. The good teacher can still be
esteemed, the practices and traditions of an academic subject or
a craft still provide inspiration and solid guidance, the
independence of the outside researcher still be jealously valued,
knowledge still be thought of, even, as 'holy ground' between
teacher and taught. We may reasonably be quite oonfident of
these points, at the same time as we reoognize the democratizing
trends that are forcing reinterpretations of the traditional
distinctions and relationships.8
The OrganizaUon of Educational Studies We might now remind
ourselves that the study of education is not a monolith. It is
oommonly institutionalized as an assemblage of sub-disciplines,
suggestive at least as much of looseness as of unity, and
changing over time in its members and in the power-relations
among its members. These changes offer another perspective on
the evolving theory-practice relationship. Let us first briefly
review the recent institutional history of the subject, particularly
in Britain and oountries influenced by Britain, before evaluating
the sense of the theory-practice logic that imbues present
arrangements. Simplifying again, four phases may be
distinguished in this history.
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(1) Up to the nineteen sixties, and despite the earlier
establishment of history and of psychology of education, a quite
holistic view of the subject prevailed, though with growing
doubts as to its vigour and its rigour. This phase is sometimes
lampooned as 'tips for teachers and thoughts of great educators'.
(2) It yielded, during the sixties, to a mulfi-discñp]inary view.
Educational philosophy, sociology and comparative study joined
psychology and history, and for a time these 'foundation' sub-
disciplines attracted au. the interest and resources. Education
was, in effect, being colonized and fragmented by other -
stronger - disciplines, seen as its sources (as though it could
not generate ideas and theories of its own and had to be content
to be a i1ti for the application of theirs), and by scholars
whose original a:Uegiance was to those disciplines. The previous
period was now perceived, in the words of Richard Peters, as one
of 'undifferentiated mush' relieved only by those early inputs
from psychology and history. But, on the other hand, Peters
himself was quickly aware of the disadvantages of straight
multidiscipiinarity.9 The differentiated sub-disciplines were
increasingly losing touch with each other, their intercourse
largely confined to mutual critique - often based on semi-
informed stereotyping. Sociologists of education swiped at
philosophers and philosophers at sociologists, and everyone
swiped at psychologists. Students were often initiated separately
into each sub-discipline and left to make their own integrations.
Partly because of the fragmentation, the concrete problems of
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educational policy and practice tended to go unheeded by
educationists. Or else they received an attention that was after
the event and, again, mainly criticaL What was missing was a
sense of thecry as a positive guide, a creative and realistic
instrument in the recxnstruction of practice. Instead of
addressing practice these sub-disciplines were functioning more
as entrees to the fascinations of the parent 'pure' disciplines.iO
(3) From the late sixties onwards, these discx)ntents have led to
the establishment of practice-orientated ficlrls of study in such
areas as curriculum, policy and administration, multiculturalism
and gender, alongside the existing sub-disciplines. But the
logical status of these new ficHs was for a while ambiguous.
Was the assumption still that educational thsory was to be
imported from philosophy, history and the human sciences, only
now the network that would carry it all the way to practice was
more developed and cordinated than before? This interpretation
of the new fiis, as principally for proviiing a cxmp]ementary
interdiscip]inarity to the previous straight multk3isciplinarity, was
dominant at first ll It is still quite ammon among those who
work in the older sub-discip]ines. 12
 But in the new fii1s
themselves interd.isdplinarity now represents to most a largely
outgrown phase in their institutionalization rather than anything
ultimate in their logic. (Properly dialogical relationships with
other major disciplines are a different matter, however, and
forever crucial.)
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(4) It was as these studies became implicated with practice,
actively participating in policy and evaluation, actually
deve]oping curriculum and promoting practitioner reflectiveness,
employing and developing action-research and case-study, that
another interpretation of them rapifly gained ground l3 -
involving, it might even be said, a whole new paradigm of
educational theory. This interpretation turns on the perception
that deliberated, thoughthil, practice is nct just the target, but
is itself a major source (perhaps the specifying source) of
eductiona1 theory. There is now a growing confidence within
these newer fiHs that their kind of theorizing, relating closely
and 3iR1cticafly with practice, is actually the core of educational
studies, and not just the endpoint of a system for adapting and
delivering outside theories. And in this reconceptualiv'tion the
erstwhile 'foundation' sub-disciplines get recast as 'contextual'
(where they are not altogether marginalized). They are seen as
relating to the wider context of educational practice and enquiry,
and as provicing channels of communication between education
proper and other branches of human knowledge. It may seem as
though the wheel has come full circle then: from the holistic, to
the multiply differentiated, to the multiple accompanied and aset
by the integrated, to the reaffirmation of a central holism of
theory. But, by comparison with the first, this ]ast phase is
hugely developed on the empirical side and it remains bet±er
equipped for dialogue with history, philosophy, and the human
sciences. Maybe, too, the practice with which it interacts is more
alive and self-criticaL
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Two theorists Starting out from two of its leading British
theorists, let us try to evaluate this new balancing of educational
studies. The question to face ]S whether the leading ro]e being
ascribed to deliberated practice puts the depth and breadth of
theory at risk. Our eventual answer will be that the risk is
mirii.mized if we keep in mind that the practice in question is
education, and we are careful to take the full measure of that
practice. Expressed another way: if the question is what do
'reflectLve practitioners' need to know, it makes a great
difference of scope that it is educators whom we have in mind.
John Elliott, out of a long experience of action research in
curriculum and teacher development, describes what he takes to
be properly educational research.' 4
 It stays within the
framework of the researcher's commitment to educational values
and is essentialLy a more sustained, methodical and wide-ranging
form of the practicil deliberation that is embodied in intlligent
practice. It will, occur as a di1ogue with practitioners, and a
dialogue as between people engaged on a shared task. It may be
conducted with more or with less objectivity, of which it has its
own canons e.g. to steadily distinguish the wish from the fact
and to check statements against behavioural evidence and the
statements of others. Its outcxme is not value-free knowledge
but practical knowledge about what teachers and other actors in
education ought to do. Elliott sometimes contrasts this attractive
conception with a misbegotten, and rather easily dismissed, form
of research. This, in the name of a poorly understood scientific
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objectivity, would bypass the practitioner arid concentrate on
'techniques', which it would cx)nceive as measurable inputs to be
correlated with measurable learning outcomes.'5
What is understressed in Elliott's account, however, is the
variety of legitimate kinds of discourse and research in
education. To anticipate an identification of four mutually
supporting kinds of discourse in the next section: there is
deliberation in the strict sense of weighing alternatives and
prescribing action in some concrete here and now; there is
ev i1ii tion, also concrete, and at once closely related to
deliberation and semi-independent of it; there are then two
further discourses that involve a methodical abstraction from the
particularities of situations, one being science which has a much
less direct relationship to practice, and the other, which I shall
call utopian, being that form of discourse in which ideal visions
and abstract principles are formulated and argued over. Now it
is unlikely that Elliott would really wish to deny the title
'properly educational' to all but the first of these. He might be
interpreted, rather, as setting general conditions for them all,
but with the result that their differences are rather g]ossed
over.'6 Thus dialogue with practitioners may be an important
desideratum in all four (I shall argue indeed that it is) - but
they will be different kinds of dialogue, we should im mediately
add, and they may be co11horative in different degrees.'7 Again,
we shall see that even educational science properly involves a
resonance with educational values, but if this is 'commitment' of a
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kind it is different both from what we owe to our cxnsi1ered
ideals and from the determination we owe to the job in hand.
Paul Hirst is another recently to emphasise the intelligence that
is acquired and exercised in educational practice, and the
cx)nnuty with this of wefl-anceived educational theory.' 8
 His
accxunt is sensitive to the range of specialisms in educational
studies but misleading, I shall argue, in the particular
cxordination of these that it proposes.
Much earlier Hirst had already argued that educational theory
was primarily practical1
 and that its different sub-disciplines
wou]1 find unity only in their cmmon bearing on the task of
achieving a set of principles for the guidance of practice. But
at that time he had :x)nceived these sub-disciplines as adequate
for justifying, and perhaps even for generating, such
princip]es.'9
 Now he sees that as quite mistaken. They are
rather to be generated from, and tested in, practice. How? I
offer a fairly free interpretation of Hirst's accxunt of this.
The accxunt stresses that the great bulk of the knowledge and
belief with which practice is instinct is unarticulated, tacit. The
practice is not necessarily any the worse for this, premeditation
being no universally necessary a)ndition of rational action. But
p1icitiiess can help the critique and development of practice,
and also the initiation into practice. The first task of theory,
then, is to make some of the body of fidt 'theory' explicit,
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perhaps in association with case-studies of particular
practitioners in action. (However, since any explicit account will
be partial and will connect with stuff that is still tacit, these
accx)unts will have to be composed, and will be best understood,
by those who share the tacit knowledge Le. by those with an
inside knowledge of practice. It remains a family affair!) As the
explicit accounts come in, the rriHgue-stage of theory-biiThiing
can get going. Several jumping-off points may be envisaged.
One is the crifit'ism that is part of practice itself, also often thrit
but now made (more) explicit in the accounts: the teacher's own
doubts and self-judgements - perhaps stimulated by student
feedback or peer comment1 the concomitant and formative course
evaluations and mid-course corrections, the sum mative judgements
implicit in disappointment, frustration, satisfaction, and so on.
Another starter is the comparison of the different operational
thsories exposed in case-studies of different practices. A third
is the formulation of alternative practices and the deliberate
testing of these in action-research. Over thne such exercises
should throw up principles, formulated in 'operationally effective
practical discourse', that have stood up well to practical test.
Hirst adds that these should come to constitute 'a consistent set'.
On the one hand, then, thecry is to be a critical guide for
practice, while on the other hand it is methodologically and
epistemologicafly dependent on practice! 20 Hirst offsets an
impression of incest and the dosed shop in this, however, with
the role he goes on to ascribe to philosophy and the human
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sciences. Beliefs and values that are the business of these
disciplines are incorporated in the concepts and principles of
practice and of the descriptive and critical discourses arising
from practice. Engagement with them is therefore necessary to
the rationality of practical principles (though not snfficicnt - the
principles must also be shown to work in practice). These
disciplines may also suggest forms of practice, he says, though
such suggestions would have to be filtered through the
experience of practitioners to stand any chance of yielding
defensible principles. Now these points would have permitted us
to regard philosophy and the human sciences as further sours,
operating in tandem with practice, of educational theory (which
would not preclude their drawing in their turn on educational
theory). Hirst rather shies away from this conclusion, however.
He tends to play down their role by presenting it as 'indirect'
and related to 'context'. This seems grudging in re]ation to
items such as philosophical enquiry into aims of education, or the
inspirational power of a Plato's or a Rousseau's educational
vision. Anyway, the line between a practice and its context can
be no absolute one, and this is likely to be particularly true in
the case of education, a practice we might think in some way
unbounded.
Actually, these disciplines are more than sources. Where they
bear on education they may be thought of as also mponents of
educational theory in their own right The reason, one which
Hirst should appreciate, is that they are exercised already in well
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developed educational practice. It is not a matter only that they
influence that practice ab extra in many overt and covert ways,
but that some of their argument is carried on within practice and
the internal discourses of practice, and even within teacher-pupil
dialogue. So they do not merely influence the rules, they are
players in the game. This in turn bears on the way in which
they are to be present to those descriptive and prescriptive
stages of theory-bnThling isIentified by Hirst. There are also
implications for the conduct of the disciplines themselves on the
one hand, and for teacher-education on the other. All this Hirst
leaves unanalysed. In the end, and for all its considerable
interest, his account of the theory-practice logic is a rather
general one which neglects special features of this practice that
add up to a highly distinctive profile as compared with law,
social work, medicine etc.
This neglect is indeed a striking feature of the better-known
literature generally in the 'emergent theory' paradigm. Thus, as
well as EllioL± and Hirst, Carr and Kemmis 2 ' are also guilty of it.
They actually promise to address educational practice and then
proceed to emphasise 'practice' rather than 'educatlonal'. 22 There
is irony here: the paradigm enjoins attention to the particular
nature of the practice - which is then overlooked! One immediate
cause of this is that most of the concepts central to the new
paradigm ('action research', 'extended professionalism', 'reflective
practitioner', and 'practice' itself) are of quite general
application, and the more seminal discussions of them 23
 not
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focussed on education specifically. Another factor may be the
inadequacies that we have discussed in the legacy of analytic
philosophy: endless replays of 'the ooncept of education' in
single keys have perhaps tired us of it. A third and deeper
cause may be certain cultural obstacles to squaring up to what
we shall see is the main challenge of the cxncept Le. to seek a
view of life as a whole. These include the fragmented state of
our Intellectual culture as well. as our more obvious ideological
pluralism.
But whatever made us forget 'education' it is now time to
remember it again. We are for one thing threatened with a
reconceptualization of teacher education as teacher training (the
Secretary of State's 1992 address to the North of England
Conference mentioned 'teacher education' once and that was to
translate the acronym CATE; at all other times he spoke of
'teacher training') and if that domino is allowed to fall the idea
of a general education itself may be nexU Of more immediate
relevance here is the fact that the neglect of educational
practice's special features is the root of the tendency in
academic literature to oversimplify and to narrow the ooncept of
educational theory.
A special prtice - a phi]csopbic,al praice
	 The special
features of education as practice include its talkativeness,
extraordinary time-intensiveness, usual orientation to children
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and young people, balance between self-possession and public
interest arid participation, variability to context, complicity with
other practices, and the aspiration it harbours to a view of life
as a whole. Perhaps none of this is entirely specific to
education, unless in degree. But in combination they compose a
highly distinctive profile. Let us cx)nsider their implications for
a theory that would be adequate to practice.
On any account the practice of education is among the most
relentlessly articulate of practices, a fact not to be obscured by
our new awareness of its tacit underside. By nature it is
passionate about making things clear and distinct, devoted to
explanation and justification, cx)mmii±ed to the language
development of its clients, and at pains to provide them also with
a taste of the theoretical impulse in, for example, science
education. Secx)nd, on most accounts education is also committed
to self-possession. The professional ideal of teachers 'owning'
their own practice, individually and communally, is acknowledged
and seen as a measure of a system's maturity. Also prized is the
development of a critical self-knowledge and autonomy in
students - of which one aspect would be their progressive
assumption of control over their own education. (Hence e.g. the
tolerance of children's groans at unpopular topics and exercises
in junior school, the gradually increased space for guided
student choice, the requirement of theory of knowledge in the
International Baccalaureate, experiments in student participation
in school government as a dimension of moral education, and so
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on.) So far, and taking these two features together, we have an
outline case for locating a deal of theoretical reflection on
education within the practice of education itself. Education is a
particularly sweet examp]e, indeed, of the valiility of the more
general 'emergent theory' paradigm - but this can be a
consequence drawn from the nature of the practice rather than
something assumed a pzioii
Next, this practice is as puh1ir as any, and more so than most.
It is responsive, more or less depending on the particular
account of it, to the ideal picture of a truly education-minded
society generated by teachers, students, parents, local
corn munii-ics, and government, via mechanisms of joint deliberation
and action and of mutual accountability. All are educated in this
society. Many besides teachers, themselves a numerous lot, are
recognized as educators. All have an intelligent interest in
education founded, first, on having participated in it over long
years at the receiving end (just about everyone has some of
what it takes to be 'an educationist') and, second, on that
particular feeling we have both for our children and for our own
childhood. The ideal of a democracy of educational comment is
actua]ly practised in this society, then, and public opinion counts
in the development of theory as well as practice. This public
quality of education quilifis (but does not contradict) its
commitment to self-possession. For example, it suggests as a
conditicn of schools fulfilling a partnership role with higher
education that they need to be open and culturally alert places.
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So far, then, we have a practice that shoulxl be cvncvmi±antzy
and pub.Zically interested and actLve in its own theory. We move
on now to features of the practice that particularly affect the
shape and cxmposiiion of this concxmitant theonsing.
As a function of its scope, education is a practice of great
vrihi1*y to context. Think of the differences between nursery
and further education, mathematics and art teaching, a class of
twenty-five nine-year olds in the UK and one of a hundred in
Malawi,, the teacher conceived as an agent of a predetermined
curriculum and the teacher conceived as a professionaL It is not
unnatural., indeed, to think of these plurally, as different
practices, and there has to be a corresponding plurality in the
theory of education.24 Of course, basic questions recur from
context to context who is to be educated? to what ends? in
what? for how long and to what standard? against what odds
and with what resources? in what sequences and at what ages?
But answers obviously have to be many and diverse to the extent
that they address the specificity of situations and types of
situation - the infant school,, the mathematics class, the
developing country, the UK post-ERA, etc. A plethora of
practice-orientated theories relating to particular ages,
curriculum areas, evolutionary stages, and national and historical
contexts is the result. Though by no means insulated from each
other, these constitute something altogether more sprawling than
'a consistent set of principles' - a simplicity also missing from,
say, medical and legal theory. (Note, too, that even single
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situations will call for simultaneous enquiries that resist
theoretical combination e.g. how to make the best of existing
resources in some interim, and how to acquire better resources -
reduce class-sizes, get new materials, and so on - and thus
change the goalposts for the first enquiry. This indeed is
typical of deliberative enquiry.25)
It is obvious that some level of this specific kind of theorizing
occurs wi.thin the corresponding area of practice. And it is
obvious that at some level such theorizing begins to engage with
philosophy, history and the human sciences. What we have still
to clarify is how much these two levels overlap. How much
philosophy of mathematics does the mathematics teacher use, or
how up-to-date does the infant teacher's grasp of child
development theory have to be? Again, it is obvious that a more
abstract address of questions like those listed above - that is to
say, a theory of education in general - involves a fairly
immediate recourse to these disciplines. How otherwise could one
begin to consider matters like the general aims of education, the
shape of the whole curriculum, or the avMbihility of education
across classes, genders and races? But the question remains of
whether, and how much, the practitioner in his particular context
would need to attend to such more general theory?
Now it is tempting to suppose that theory becomes 'external' to
practice and disconnected from the tacit knowledge and
concomitant theorizing of practice in the measure that it
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addresses either the more u]timate or the more general and veers
towards its utopian or scientic modes. In different ways this is
tempting for both thsorist and practitioner. But both should
resist it. For it would overlook another feature of this practice
viz, that unity which allows us to regard the multiple practices
referred to earlier as so many manifestations of a single practice,
education, and which is at least as integral to the will to educate
as anything we have noticed so far. This unity has a particular
character over which we need to pause.
First, it is no mere abstraction based on the similarities among
diverse practices, but a task to be fu1fiThd. Second, this task
involves not only planning and coordination from on high but a
common consciousness among practitioners. We might say that
the whole soul of education is present in every good educational
practice, in the way the souls of persons are present in every
part of their bodies. The primary teacher keeps in view the
whole school career, and beyond, of her children. Teachers
adapting to particular children of particular cultures see in each
of them the universal human child. The science teacher stirs her
consciousness of her subject's relationships with other
curriculum areas and of the distinctive ways in which it realizes
general educational values. To undertake a particular practice as
education is precisely to inform it with something of this holistic
spirit. Third, the unity sought is not self-contained within
education, but is in some integral way related to the ideal (a
difficult one for our culture) of a coherent view of life as a
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whole - in which education bears some similarity with religion.
So the consciousness needed within practice is a philosophical
consciousness. To quote Louis Arnold Reid: 'if we are to educate
sensibly...we must above all things do it with a sense of direction
and proportion, and to have this is to have a philosophy'.26
Another route to this conclusion starts from education being
complic'it, indeed foundationafly complic'it, with a great range of
other practices: scholarship and the arts, working-life,
c'ftenship and politic's, personal relationships and reaching for
maturity, and the life of the spirit This requires breadth of it,
and indeed many of the quAlitiPs of those other practices. But
education has, furthermore, some responsibility to get those
practices into coherent relationship with each other, and thus to
support the overarching practice of 'the good life'. And, again,
this requires it to embody and communicate a philosophy, as a
context for the other things it embodies and communicates.
The commitments mentioned earlier will keep this concomitant
philosophy open to discussion among teachers and students. If
educational practice is to be its articulate, self-possessed and
democratic self it will be a matter as much of philosophising as
of an agreed philosophy. In pluralist societies, in particular, it
is likely to be something between an agreed compromise, an
invitation to a communal quest, and a space for a personal
choice. Again, its sophistication should not be underestimated,
considering e.g. that older and abler students are to be included
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in the discussion, and that 'practice' includes the processes of
review and development (Thus, in making his persuasive case
for a pivotal role for schools in curriculum review and
development, Malcolm Skilbeck acknowledges that it would oblige
the school-community, including even its students, to develop a
high degree of cultural alertness and inforinedness. 27 This may
seem a lot to ask of schools, but can 'education' hold out any
lesser ideal?)
This is 'philosophy' in a broad and generous sense. Unlike
current academic philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon world, it is not
ruthlessly distinguished from theology, history and human
science. So a school's, or a teacher's, or a project's 'philosophy'
may well be informed by some religious principles and discussion,
and/or pictures of human development that draw deeply on
contemporary psychology, and/or a sharp historical and
sociological sense of 'the challenges of our times' (e.g. to be girl-
friendly, to begin to be environmentally conscious, and to
conceive and develop a curricular expression of a proper
egalitarianism).
There are at least three vital consequences for non-concom.itant
educational theory and for that part of teacher-education, jniti1
or continuing, that is more than just learning on the job. First,
'philosophising', and the kinds of knowledge and awareness it
feeds on, should be no less integral to them. So far from being
'clutter', this kind of deep and unparochial reflection is
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absolutely necessary within, and across, the study of particular
phases and areas of practice, if such study is to serve a
practice that as truly educationaL Thus it is not obviously
paranoiac to read some current attacks on educational theory as
directed towards the eventual narrowing of what goes in
classrooms, and, via them, of social life.28
Second, the point of the non-concomitant approach to both theory
and teacher-education must include the achievement of higher
levels of explir*ness, rigour and reflectiveness, and though this
is likely to include some differentiation of the cxnttibutions of
different disciplines, it is a more fundamental observation that it
provides an opportunity to explore cx)nnections between the
disciplines. While respecting real differences of logic and
conceptual. framework, educational theory needs to engage
siinultirieously with these several disciplines, hold their relevant
outcomes together in the mind in order to bring them all to bear
on this or that issue, and this undoubtedly has the effect of
testing, often rather easy, assumptions regarding the inviralahility
of disciplinary frontiers. (I would esthuate that the current
climate is sceptical of frontiers - the writings of Habermas and
Foucault1
 for example, continually challenge those between social
philosophy, social theory, psychology and history - and that
educational studies has contributed to this scepticism.)
Third, that philosophy and human science are in some part
intrinsic to educational theory, as in the first place to
j-o1
educational practice, suggests that these disciplines may get as
good as they give in the way of ideas and inspiration from their
engagement with education. If educational theory needs to be
responsive to developments in them, it can also be cz-iticaZ of
these, and it may indeed generate developments of its own in
them. Dewey argued both these points strongly for philosophy.
He saw education as a laboratory for testing the human, as
opposed to the merely technical,, significance of philosophical
theories and dizt:inctions, and also as a privileged vantage point
from which to engage in philosophizing. Indeed, he suggested
rather controversially that European philosophy owed its very
origins to the direct pressure of Athenian educational questions,
and he continued
• . .the fact that the stream of European philosophical thought arose as a
theory of educational procedure remains an eloquent witness to the intimate
connection of philosophy and education. Philosophy of education is not
an external application of ready-made Ideas to a system of practice having
a radically different origin and purpose: it is only an explicit
formulation of the problems of the formation of right mental and moral
habitudes in respect to the difficulties of contemporary social life. The
most penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is, then, that
It is the theory of education In Its most general phases. 29
Even if this overstates philosophy's debt to education, it remains
that education's central concerns are one profound stimulus to
basic questions in philosophy. And analogous claims can be made
about education's contribution to the human sciences. 3° In sum,
education's proper relationship with philosophy and the human
sciences is not a client relationship, but a seriously mutual
affar.
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1	 Or at least the ingredients of this understanding are necessary, we should say, if
we are to include the pre-educational society. See pp 2 - above.
2	 Dewey (1916,1938), Barnes (1976), etc.
3	 Young (ed.) (1971), Young and Whitty (eds.) (1976,1977), Apple (1982), G,roux (1983),
etc. Whitty (1985) is a good survey. But critiques of culture, education arid
particular disciplines in relation to the interests they serve were pursued earlier,
and from different philosophical standpoints, by e.g. Husserl, Ileidegger and Weil.
Thus Simone Weil used a mainly Platonic epistemology and ethic for her very radical
critiques - Well (1949 [tr.1952],1968) - especially 1. Classical Science and After
4 Polemical pieces include Dennis 0 Keefe a article in the Times Educational Supplement
of 18.9.1987, Stuart Sexton s No nationalized curriculum , Times 9.5.1988, arid the
Centre for Policy Studies panhlet Correct Core: Simple Curricula for English, Maths
and Science, March 1988. Bosanquet (1983) and Ball (1990) are critical discussions.
This free market emphasis represents the neo-liberal' strand In New Right
philosophy, and it is in some tension with its neo-conservative strand emphasising
the need for a strong State above all else, which is associated especially with the
Hillgate group of Roger Scruton et al. Quicke, J. (1988) and Chitty, C. (1989) ch.
8, discuss this tension.
5	 Stenhouse (1975), Elliott, J. (1980), Schon (1983) - who coined the phrase
reflective practitioner, Skilbeck (1984), Van Manen (1991) - a beautifully nuanced
analysis.	 It Is a perception, however, that seems not to be entirely shared by
govermients.
6	 SirTons (1987)
7	 Elliott, J. (1985), Carr and Kmmiis (1986)
8 Pring (1976) is a philosophical work that blends, critically and persuasively,
borrowings from progressivism and the sociology of knowledge with a regard for a wide
range of disciplines as curricular resources.
9 A 1972 paper, republished in Peters (1977) ch.9. It refers to most of the following
disadvantages. Jonathan (1985) picks out some of these failings In the particular
case of philosophy of education.
10 Giving teachers the opportunity, in some cases, to move on to lecturing jobs In a
higher education that was then expanding! One should not overstate this, however.
Many ceme through these disciplines to view their practice In a broader light, though
they may have had to make the connections for themselves.
11 Peters, in advocating the new forms of study, used Freudian imagery to express this
view. Educationists would still have their centres of gravity, their egos, in the
educational aspect of their specialized discipline - in philosophy of education, say.
They would in addition be careful to keep In touch with the voice of the father-
discipline, their 'super-ego. But the new factor would be involvement with the
'id, a venturing forth to explore problems with alien others in 'a world simering
with repressed aggression and with the anxieties of an unstructured situation. From
this would come a collective identity as workers in educational theory, and even - In
time - somewhat less bounded and ci rcumscrl bed individual • egos. He goes on to
imply, in fact, that properly educational theory emerges only from such venturing.
But he does not here envisage or recomend, what has since happened, that there might
be workers whose individual egos would be primarily identified with these fields as
parts, simply, of the discipline education ibid.
12	 Wilson (1989) is a recent restatement of this view by a phlosopher of education.
13	 In the UK most quickly, and influentially, at the Centre for Applied Research in
Education (CARE), East Anglia University. This was connected with the Centres close
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14	 In many of his papers. See in particular (1975,1980,1988a,1989)
15	 Elliott ares that it misconceives both education and teacher-development as forms
of instrumental, rather than of comnunicative, action.
	 This contrast may not,
however, be sufficiently exact. 	 It leads Elliott into a paradoxical distinction
between causal and other effectivity. (1980, p 314)
16 I came across Elliott (1989) only after writing this section. It does have
persuasive and quite developed things to say about the (subordinate) relationship of
the disciplines (philosophy, psychology, sociology and history of education) to
educational theory. I remain convinced, however, that it is mre illuminating to
analyse this theory in terms of discourses.
17	 Thus scientific discourse requires (at least indirect) comnunication between
researcher and subjects who are often teachers. But in many instances this
coninunication will be taken as, in Elliott's words, between people engaged on a
shared task only if the task is being conceived in very general terms e.g. to make
some contribution to the pronotlon of good education.
18	 Hirst (1983)
19	 Hirst (1966)
20 . .only principles generated in relation to practical experience and that are
operationally tested can begin to do justice to the necessarily conplex tacit
elements within practice. (1983, pp.18-9)
21	 Carr and Kerriis (1986)
22	 ibid. p.lO6ff
23	 Lewin (1952), Schon (1983), Maclntyre (1981)
24	 I am indebted to Malcolm Skilbeck for this reminder.
25	 On this, and other aspects of practical reasoning and theory in education, Schwab's
papers on The PracticaP (1970,1971,1973,1983) were seminal.
26	 Reid (1962) - quoted in Carr and Kemnis (1986)
27	 Skilbeck (1984)
28	 See Elliott J. (1988b)
29	 Dewey (1916) p.329
30	 Walkerdine (1984) exetrlifies one perspective on the two-way relationship between
psychology and education.
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2.2 D(JCAFIP1AL rHEonv AS A C srR DF
FDLrn DI SCOLJISES
We have seen that the view of educational theory in recent
decades has swung from the multi-disciplinary - in which its
unity was not apparent other than in the eventual 'applicability'
of the disciplines to practice' - to regarding theory as emergent
in practice and forming a single oomplex with practice. Case-
study workers and action researchers now meet reflective
practitioners on their own ground (if they are not actually the
same people) and work together with them at making the
operative theories of particular practices exp1icit, subjecting them
to critique, and experimenting with modified and novel practices.
The new partnership is reflected also in the much larger role of
schools and teacher-mentors in forward-looking teacher
education. While expressing a general agreement with this
paradigm, I have criticised a tendency in the supporting
literature to oversimplify and to narrow the ooncept of
educational theory. A theory that is adequate to this practice is
required to be seriously 'philosophical' - notably broad and
notably ooherent - as well as practicaL In this section I will
attempt to articulate that requirement quite formally.
A cluster of disoourses This attempt will involve distinguishing
and relating different voices in the theory that is emergent in
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good practice and insisting on their equal necessity. 2
 These
voices, however, are not those of established disciplines. It is
rare for a discipline to be i±lily univocal in a logical sense.
Usually, it will be home to several logical forms, some of which
will recur in other disciplines (the appropriate explanation of
which may be historical in many cases, for example, an insulation
from other disciplines that has forced a discipline to maintain or
deve]op its own surrogates of logical forms avMlah]e elsewhere).
Therefore, a return to a multi-disciplinary models
 even if we were
to emphasize the links of each discipline severally with practice
in a way that was not done formerly, would only serve to
obscure the logical structure, and the complex logical coherence,
of educational thecry. I propose the notion of 'a discourse' as a
more refined and exact unit of analysis.
I define a discourse, in straightforward terms, as
'a sustained and disciplined form of enquiry, discussion
and exposition that is logically unique in some
significant way'.
Logically unique is not the same as logically isolated, however,
and I next define a cluster of discourses as
'a group of discourses that are logically symbiotic'.
In their 'surface grammars' chister discourses will be largely
autonomous so that when they borrow ideas from each other they
will tend to 'adapt' them in the process. But in their 'deep
grammars', where it is a question of their basic point and terms
of reference, they are thoroughly interdependent So they will
106
call each other forth, and each will make sense only alongside (at
least embryonic) forms of the others.
I now propose the thesis, intimated earlier:
educational theory is a duster of four discourses
reisting to educonal pradice, namely, (1) utopian, (2)
de]iberve, (3) ewilai'iHve and (4)	 scienc
discourses.
Each of these discxurses stands in a unique relationship to valne
and, therefore, to practice. But the stance of each presupposes
and supports the stances of the other three. Over and above
the fact of having a common subject matter viz, educational
practice - and all of them lock with the experiential intc'lligence
of practice - these four discx)urses will be seen to offer
profoundly complementary perspectives on that subject matter.
I shall discuss the basis of this general cx)rre]ativity later. First
I shall offer sketches of the discourses. These will suggest their
distinctive recognizability, the many ways in which they are
nevertheless interdependent1
 and their integrality to educational
theory.
(1) Utopian discourse has two defining characteristics. One,
which it shares with deliberative discourse, is that it is directly
committed to the flourishing of education (as an aspect of a
wider human flourishing). The other, in which it is analagous to
scientific disoDurse, may be expressed positively or negatively.
j. 07
Positively: it pushes to the limit; its focus is not just any good,
but the ideaL Negatively: it excludes considerations of
fesihility; it is 'purely theoretical' in the slightly pejorative
sense. Not that it is concerned with the unattainable as such
any more than the attainable. An ideal can become an aim if one
decides it is fesihle, or at any rate worth trying, but that
derision will take one beyond utopian reflection. This discourse
simply eschews the question of attainability.
Among the established disciplines, it is not only philosophy that
may engage in this discourse. So, and quite overtly, do some
kinds of historical work e.g. by Marxist historians, some areas of
psychology e.g. theorizing moral development, and that layer of
social science which Habermas partly identifies and partly
proposes under the title of 'critical theory'3.
Practices like medicine, law and social work aiso have their ideal
scenarios and therefore their utopian discourses. But education's
integral aspiration to a view of life as a whole implies that its
utopian discourse has to be particularly broad and complete in
its scope - in that sense particularly utopian. It embraces as a
matter of course discussions of educational values in relation to
general life values, analyses of cultural capital in general, and
theories of many aspects of human development More than that,
it is committed to seeking some coherence across these
discussions and theories. Its quest is for an ordering of
educational values, an analysis of cultural capital that will be
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related to this ordering, and a set of pictures of human
development that will cohere with each other and relate to both
the former. Carr and Kern mis remark that Dewey was perhaps
the last of the 'grand theorists' in the English-speaking world
arid that more recent thinkers have tended to focus on narrower
problems.4
 They remark this without murmuring against it, but
to the extent it is accurate it implies some abdication of
theoretical responsibility. A 'consciousness of the need to place
education as a process of "cxming to know" in the context of a
general theory of society on the one hand and a theory of the
chIld on the other' 5
 is no mere optional fashion but an obligatory
element in educational theory, as in the first place in educational
practice.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suppose that utopian
discourse is always fuflblown and visionary - not to mention
dogmatic and a-temporaL Admittedly, the word tends to conjure
up the committed, completed, and forever powerful portraits of
education of the likes of Plato and Rousseau. But this discourse
a1 includes the fragmentary, e.g. the abstract consideration of
an individual principle or value like equality or friendship, the
minutely argued and counter-argued, e.g. the question of the
tensions in education between the values of equality, freedom,
and quality, and the tentative and exploratory as well as the
passionately certain. It may also envisage in a general way some
definite socio-historical context, as do e.g. Marx's revolutionary
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vision and Freire's ideal of 'conscientLzation', while still
abstracting from everyday cx)nstrants.
Popper has criticized utopianism as an inherently impractical
project with a profoundly totalitarian tendency.6 But to engage
in utopian discx)urse does not amount to utopianism in Popper's
sense. First1 it is not inherently authoritarian; we may build
into it, for instance, something like Habermas' cxnditions of ideal
speech.7 Second, we may aspire to broad and stable bridges
between the various dimensions of a unified view of life, but in
our fragmented culture we are unlikely to achieve more than
rope-affairs. What the nature of education obliges us to is a
quest for coherence rather than the final achievement of
coherence. Third, utopian discourse is conceived here as just
one of a cluster of discourses constituting educational thry.
In particular it is tied to a partnership with the 'piecemeal
engineering' approach of deliberative discourse - to which we
now turn.
(2) De1ibera.ve discourse in education at once articulates and
directs the art of achieving the best that is possible in a given
situation of practice and development [ Not that it is
intrinsically conservative. Radical courses of action have to be
considered along with others, and one of them may be the best
that is possible. Only, that would imply that it was compatible
with a suffknt number of other goods, acceptable in its side-
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effects, feasible, thnely, and so forth - in addition to being good
in itself.] There is no mystery about the general
interdependence of this discourse with the utopian. They are
patently the two sides of an intelligent devotion to good
education. On the one hand, deliberative discourse cannot
identify the best that is possible without utopian discourse. By
itself, it would lack considered ideals and perhaps any ideals,
and would be too intuitive, or too conservative, or tack gutlessly
with every wind. On the other hand, utopian discourse on its
own would be literally useless. Its willingness to weigh anchor
eventually in deliberative discourse is a test of whether it is
really corn rnil±ed to the good, and not just to the pleasures of
speculation.
In genera],, deliberative discourse involves a step or two back
from, the better then to focus upon, some given teaching-
learning situation, and it relies on consultation, simulation and
action-research as principal research modes. Two sub-categories
can be broadly distinguished. One is the discourse of policy and
policy-making. This includes consultations, discussion-papers,
advocacy, and directives - products of a kind now flooding
British schools in the wake of the Education Reform Act. It
emanates from authorities, pressure-groups and interested parties
at all levels of an educational system, and busies itself with units
as large as the whole system and as small as the learning of a
single student it is as obliged as any discourse to support
itself by argument and research, and it may coopt academics to
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assist it in this, but its main exponents are those with
responsibility in, and for, practice. The second broad category
of deliberative discourse gives academics rather more to do,
though still in close collaboration with practitioners. It is that
form of practicil theorizing we discussed earlier, when we
reviewed, and in some ways qualifid Hirst's account of its
genesis from practice. It involves, we saw, subjecting the
articulated wi.sdoms of particular areas and contexts of practice
to critiriqm, revision, amplification, and further testing in action,
and then re-presenting the results to those areas and contexts -
all, as far as may be, in the task-orientated language of practice
itself.8 It is an essential resource in any practically minded
teacher education. It also contributes to policy-making, not least
by engaging in what Schwab called 'the anticipatory generation
of alternatives', which increases the stock of possibiliFis that
are available to deliberation and is particularly valuable when it
comes to identifying and dealing with novel situations.
Deliberative discourse must also 'take account' of theories in the
narrower sense - theories of society, culture, personality,
learning, knowledge, motivation, development, and many other
things - borrowing them mostly from scientific discourse. It
employs such theories on its own terms, so to speak. In relation
to their abstract nature, it uses various practical arts both to
span the distance to untidy reality and to maintain a healthy
sense of that distance. In relation to the mnitiplicity and
diversity of such theories (so very many areas of theory with a
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claim to relevance, and usually so many 'schools' within each
area!), it practises a sophisticated eclecticism, defined by Schwab
as 'the arts by which unsystematic, uneasy, but usable focus on
a body of problems is effected among diverse theones, each
relevant to the problems in a different way'.lO This requires, not
just outline knowledge of the theories, but enough understanding
of their controlling conceptions to be able to sense which
practical courses they will run well on, and which not.. A good
example would be Richard Peters' pragmatic plea for a pluralist
approach when using psychology in planning moral education:
that we should look broadly to cognitive interactionism in relation
to the development of a properly generalized sense of justice, to
depth psychology in relation to 'natural' virtues like compassion,
and to behav:burism in relation to 'executive' virtues like
courage. 1 ' [We remarked earlier that such eclectic activity can
have a spin-off for theory, too, by beginning to test assumptions
regarding the incommensurability of disciplines and schools.]
(3) Ewilii*ive discourse describes, analyses and judges
educational practices and contexts with a view to their
maintenance and development1 and educational proposals with a
view to their adoption. Considered as a discourse in its own
right, it has grown apace with the curriculum development
movement and the advent of professional evaluators in recent
decades, and it has been quite exercised with questions of its
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own direction and logic.'2 Some of this ongoing discussion is
reflected in the remarks that follow.
Since it has maintenance, development and adoption 'in view"
(the phrase is meant to suggest: both distance and relationship)
this discourse has an obvious 'deep-grammar' cx)nnection with
deliberative discxurse. In 1.3 we demonstrated that the
descriptive use of 'education' presupposed the normative use
while being in its turn needed, so far as its employment in
evaluation goes, as the complement of the normative use. The
felt importance of education dictated normative and descriptive
uses together, we said. Here we can extend that point in
reference to the symbiosis between the developed discourse of
deliberation, in each of its two forms, and the developed
discourse of evaluation. Project-evaluation reports, analyses of
politiral contexts, and 'pluralistic' policy-papers may choose to
refrain from recommendation, and even from judgement. But they
still need to be imbued with so lively a sense of the concerns,
constraints and possibi1iFis of a particular situation that they
are ready-made for insertion into the deliberative process
relating to that situation. Thus evaluative discourse achieves
much of its sophistication in relation to the complex particularity
of policy contexts. In the other direction, it may be said that
sophistication in policy and planning, including the moral
sophistication implicit in democratic consultation, depends on
developing this sustainedly impartial,, sometimes even non-
judgemental,, kind of clarification.	 Equally, what we called
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practical theorizing at once presupposes and gives a point to the
articulation of the operational theories of existing practice.
As 'particularistic', iike the previous one, this disoourse's focus
is the identified sing]e unit, large or small, even when it uses
oompansons with other units to illnminate this unit. Thus its
natural form of enquiry is the case-study, understood broadly to
include the system-wide survey - where 'the case' is the whole
of an education system, or of some sector of it e.g. primary
schools - as well as the naturalistic enquiry into the 'pond-life'
of an individual school or classroom. Such a study will be
primarily significant for those oonnected with the case itself. It
will be seoondarily significant for the many others whose own
different cases it illuminates, challenges, or casts into relief -
and this wider interest will in part derive from its very
particularity.
The subject matter of this disoourse is all aspects of practice -
not just new proposals and developments though it was in
association with these that it first achieved a formal prominence.
In principle it serves maintenance and protection as well as
development Furthermore, in a properly rational service of
development itself an evaluation of existing practice would
establish the need for development and suggest some initial
specification of it. Would not that evaluation, indeed, be
temporally and logically prior to the evaluation of the innovation?
Even if this last is too linear a representation, 14 evaluation of the
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status quo must: deserve an at least equal attention (which the
large literature on unsuccessful curriculum change suggests it
has often failed to get). This general point is, of course, one
strand of the 'school self-evaluation' movement
This discxurse includes both the judgemental and, as intimated
above, the methodically non-judgementaL The latter is a sub-
discourse that aims to fari1itte judgement while itself eschewing
it. Its rationale connects, on the one hand, with the ordinary
requirement of prudence and fairness that we should discipline
ourselves against hastiness of judgement1 and, on the other
hand, with the perception of educational evaluation as a highly
po1i1-iral business.' But evaluative discourse also includes the
moment of judgement - whether separated from reflection in the
way just noticed or proceeding more or less seainlessly from
reflection as in the exercise of curriculum 'connoisseurship' 16 -
when its dependence on utopian ideal becomes evident, when, too,
it easily crosses over into remedial recommendation and,
therefore, the second discourse.
Finally, formal evaluation is increasingly recognized as political -
having real effects on the distribution of power and the
advancement of particular interests, and, therefore, as obliged to
be democratic in the range of interests it causes to be
considered, the range of participants it will admit, and the range
of audiences it is prepared to address.' 7 It is obliged, we might
say, to fri1itate that wide democracy of comment on which we
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remarked ear]ier. To this end, formal evaluation properly
engages with the informal evaluations of many others, most
obviously of teachers. Again, a narrow professional protectionism
is eschewed and the new skills are appropriately taught to
teachers and others that they may more effectively monitor their
own and their cxfleagues' practice. (This is rather to define
some of the specialist evaluator's roles than to do away with
her.)
(4) Scientific discxurse of itse]f seeks only to understand and
explain education. It does not seek also to direct it and it lacks,
too, evaluation's indirect orientation to deliberation and action.
It views education, one might almost say, contemplatively, as a
quasi-phenomenon worthy of being understood in itself and in its
relationships with other human and social constants and near-
constants. At the same time we would expect it to be more
intimately caught up in values than natural science is. To
antiripate the conclusion of the next section: since it involves, if
not direct communication between researcher and subjects, at
least that they belong to a common communication network (for it
needs to know what its subjects say for themselves), it can
hardly avoid, and would be hard put to it to justify trying to
avoid, some resonance between the values that help determine its
questions and the related values of its subjects. Its detachment
may be radical and sustained in comparison with most inter-
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human discourse but is still to be contained within a sense of
common humanity and common human concerns.
There are of course difFicn1tis with the very idea of human
science. Positivism, already inadequate as an account of the
natural sciences, was not only even less adequate as an account
of the human sciences but has exercised a baleful influence over
much of their development Its association of 'objectivity' with a
particular interpretation of neutrality and value-freedom and its
pursuit of generi1iations that would be law-like in character
contributed to a voyeuristic depersonalization equally of the
relation between researcher and subject and of the subject. The
phenomenological reaction to positivism, on the other hand, was
much too quick to abandon detachment and objectivity in any
really tough sense - as though these were not particularly
important in a great range of human intercourse (we shall defend
the ideal of objectivity at length in 2.4) - as well as being often
too pessimistic about the possibility of any form of illuminating
cross-cultural gener1i7.tIon. These criticisms in effect suggest
the hypothesis of a discourse which is value-conditioned in its
definition of fi11, respectful and empathic in its conduct of
research, radically objective in aspiration, and distinguishable
from other discourses in being concerned just to understand and
explain. There is enough good science that is relatively
untainted by positivism - or rises above its positivism in practice
- on the one hand, and is passionate about objective
understanding - or rises above its subjectivism in practice - on
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the other hand, to encourage belief in the cx)m possibility of these
condiflrns.
If the hypothesis is granted, the scientific differs from the
evaluative in the foBowing interconnected ways: it lacks an
un mediate relationship to deliberation and action; it is not usually
focussed on the particular (history being a special case here),
though neither can its theones aspire to the degree of
universality avi1h]e in natural science; and it values
understanding for its own sake. On the other hand, the
scientific supports the evaluative, not only by making a store of
theories avaibhle to it (as to deliberative discourse), but by
standing behind its more provisional detachment with its own
special brand of fascination.
On this hypothesis, too, scientific discourse differs fundamentally
from utopian. For all its value-conditionedness, its concern is
what is rather than what ought to be. On the other hand, there
is an elusive relationship between these discourses. One aspect
of this is that they combine in that 'philosophical' involvement
which, we argued, is a conditinn of education. In progressivism,
for example, an ideal picture of human development and a
programme of educational action may draw on an empirical theory
of stages of deveiopment; in recxnstructionism the ideal picture
and the programme will draw on some broad empirical analysis of
existing society and cu]ture. It is in its broad theories that
science gets taken up in this way - again, and if for no other
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reason, because of education's particular stake in a broad and
cxherent view of ]ife.18
The unity of educational theory I have referred repeatedly to
interrelationships among the discourses. Deliberation gives point
to evaluation and feeds off it. Both draw on considered broad
ideals and models that may in their turn have absorbed, as well
as influenced, broad scientific perspecUves. Ideals are
approximately achieved, and sometimes cx)rrected, through
deliberation and evaluation in particular situations. Deliberation
and evaluation make eclectic use of more particular scientific
theories - and in their turn provoke theoretically fruitful
challenges to standard scientific polarizations - and evaluation
mimics scientific detachment to a degree. We might add that
discussion and writing about education switches easily and
coherently from one discourse to another. 19 But we have finally
to address the question of the formal logical basis of all this
complementarity.
There are two possthi1itis to consider. Common to each of them
is a distinction between the first two discourses as prescriptive
or normative discourses that extend the action-directing side of
experiential intc11igence, and the third and fourth as descriptive
discourses which extend the observing and appraising side of
experiential int11igence and give the first pair a purchase on
reality. (To repeat an earlier warning: this is not the fact/value
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distinction as cxmmonly understood and iightly criticized.
Logical symbiosis, rather than a logical gulf, is what is
envisaged.20) Beyond that the possibi1iti diverge.
The first possibility adds a further distinction between the
utopian and the scientific as general or context-free, and the
deliberatLve and the evalnative as particular or context-specific.
We then have a double-axis modeL
Figure 2
PRESCRIPTIVE
Utopian	 Deliberative
GENERAL	 I	 PARTICULAR
Scientific	
I 
Evaluative
DESCRIPTIVE
This fails importantly, however, to provide appropriate
accommodation for history (and perhaps anthropology) in which
the particular is pursued for its own sake but without an
orientation to action.
It may be more illuminating to see the discourses as occupying
four different points on a single prescriptive-descriptive axis
with the prescriptive! descriptive distinction applied first
moderately and then immoderately. Sustained methodical action
involves the twin thoughts of where one is starting from and the
better place one is trying to reach, at a more formal level the
concepts of the review and the plan which are the bases,
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respectively, of the evaluative and deliberative discourses. But,
extracting from these concepts the more abstract notions of
descripti.vity and normativity, we may push to the limit in both
directions. At one extreme, beyond the idea of understanding
how things actually are as a cx)ndition of effective action, we get
to understanding as a value in its own right At the other
extreme, beyond the idea of the realisable good, we reach that of
the ideal At one extreme, then, a discourse that is at two
removes (but not therefore altogether divorced) from how we
would wish things to be, and at the other extreme one that is at
two removes (but also not divorced) from how things actually
are.2' In this scenario history is made comfortable within a
scientific discourse whose primary feature is now r1rly a
concern for 'contemplative' understanding rather than a
preoccupation with generalization.
Conclusions
(1) We can represent the main points of our position
diagramatirlly:
Fig.3. Theory and Practice in Educai-irin
(arrows indicate the direction of marked or crucial influence)
(by discourse)	 (other practices)
Philosophy,	 { UT PlAN
sdence,	 I
human	 {
scholarship
LAthe artshistory	 I
EDUCATIONAL{I	
,>discu 
ve) p1itics THE
STUDIES	
PRACTICE work	 GOOD
family	 LIFE
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I	 friendship
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Working from the left, this diagram represents:
the two-way relationships between educational theory and
some other major disciplines;
the similar relationship that should hold between theory and
public opinion in this key area of democratic life;
the thesis that educational theory comprises four discourses
in a cluster;
the mutual presence to each other of practice in its
particularity and the evaluative and deliberative discourses,
and the general direction of the movement of ideas in this
inner triangle;
the containment of that triangle in a larger triangle which
indicates the interdependence of this practice, in its holistic
aspiration, with utopian and scientific discourses in
combination;
and, closely connected to the last, the strategic role of this
practice in relation to other practices and to the good life.
(2) We have been articulating two features of educational theory:
the breadth it must have to be adequate to a practice that is
genuinely educational; and the unity and coherence that contains
this breadth. In current po1itial terms, the main effects of the
argument are to sharpen the case for associating teacher
education with higher education and to enhance the status of
educational theory vis-a-vis other disciplines of higher education.
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Complex cxherence is a badge of honour in the world of theory.
Educational theory's potential claim on that badge has been, and
is, seriously underestimated. To realize this potential it needs to
exploit more adequately the idea of practice as a source of
theory by actually attending to the features of education as
practice, to exploit too the current openness to cross-disciplinary
research and theorizing, and, finally, to cxntribute to, as well as
draw from, other university disciplines. Such a more powerful
and cxrnfident educational theory would also be the best of
arguments for the continued involvement of higher education in
teacher education. There is an organizational case for this
involvement in terms both of relative costs and of the need for
central clearing-houses for ideas about good practice. There is
also a political case in terms of the education profession's need
for academic freedom. But the curriculnm case for this
involvement is surely the most basic of all and these last two
sections have articulated it. If any practice needs the curricular
context of the university and the college for educating its
professionals, education does.
NOTES
1	 Hirst (1966)
2 This contrasts with a search for distinctions between core and contextual (lnplied In
Hirst (1983)) or between properly and inroper1y called (Carr and kennis 1986,
Elliott, J. (1989)) types of educational theory
3	 Habermas (1971/2)
4	 Carr and Ke,mils (1986) p.11
5	 ibid.
6	 Popper (1945/66)
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8	 Hi rat (1983)
9 Schwab (1970). Schwab s series of papers on the Practical op.cit. remain the most
penetrating and assured discussion that I know of deliberative discourse in
education.
10	 ibid. Again:
A curriculum grounded in but one or a few sub-subjects of the social sciences
is indefensible; contributions from all are required. There is no foreseeable
hope of a unified theory in the ininediate or middle future, nor of a
metatheory which will tell us how to put those sub-subjects together or order
them in a fixed hierarchy of inportance to the problems of curriculian. What
remains as a viable alternative is the unsystematic, uneasy, pragnatic, and
uncertain unions and connections which can be affected in an eclectic. And I
must add.....that changing connections and differing orderings at different
times of these separate theories, will characterize a sound eclectic."
Schwab (1971) discusses these eclectic arts In detail.
11	 Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism, reprinted in Peters (1974).
12	 See House, (1977), (1980), MacDonald (1974), Hamilton et a?. (1977), Eisner (1984),
Simons (1987).
13	 Its further educative function, its particular contribution to the enlighterinent of
various categories of practitioner, depends on it retaining that primary intention.
14 A school asks itself if it should invest in Ginn Mathematics. Here the availability
of the programe (and the school will assume it has undergone evaluation trials In
its development) stimulates an evaluation by the school of its current practice, of
the Ginn programie, and of the two in relation.
15 There is also some carry-over from the Idea of the disinterested social scientist.
This is a delicate matter ahout which the most lnportant things to observe are that
it is open to a ron-positivistic interpretation, as we have seen In chapter 3, and
that there remains some difference between evaluative and scientific discourses In
the kinds of detachoent that are appropriate. Cronbach et a?. (1980) speak of a
'multi-partisan' spirit, and House, somewhat similarly, prefers to speak of
'irpartiality' than of 'objectivity' or 'disinterestedness, since the point is not
'to deal with interests by excluding them', but 'by Including and balancing them'
House (1980) p.224. It will become clear In 2.4, however, that I would be reluctant
thus to cede the terms objective' and 'disinterested' to their positivisitic
abusers!
16	 Eisner (1984), and elsewhere in his works.
17	 MacDonald (1974) has become the locus classicus. Sirrons (1987) chs.1-2 is a fine
review of the Issues and the literature in the UK and the USA.
18 Different from this overt kind of 'taking up', perhaps, is the kind of case In which
it is 'with invisible ink' that the utopian viewpoint is written into a theory in
social science, metaphysics, or theology, so that special interpretive skills are
needed to decode it (less a matter, incidentally, of utopian discourse masquerading
as scientific, than of the 'deep gramar' relationship between the two discourses).
For exanple, Val Walkerdine (1984) persuasively analyses Piaget's theories of
development in this way. We might note, too, the debate wong some christian
theologians as to the religious function of theology, with some claiming that
theology fails to the extent that it does not make God live for its participants,
while others maintain that it is no more In the business of making people holy that
is thermodynamics in the business of making them warm.
19	 Note:
(1) In more or less pure exalTples of a discourse (of which there are many for each
discourse) we often find borrowings from other discourses which fail to conpromise
'purity' because of the way they are adapted and assimilated to the host-discourse.
(2 By contrast. orooerlv mixed discourse (of which there are innumerable exazroles.
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cofmiitment to the diet nctive gramnar of each discourse In the mix. It Is
particularly it, and the coherence with which It can be pulled off, that suggests the
underlying conpl ementari ty of the discourses.
(3) Apparently borderline discourse, e.g. an election manifesto that is half-way to
the utopian, a heavily theorised case-study that seems semi-scientific, an
Inspectors report that glides effortlessly between evaluation and practical
prescription, poses a different question. Are the discourses distinguishable In a
fully adequate way, so that what looks like trderline discourse would in fact be
subtly mixed discourse with all its elements ultimately assignable to one side or the
other? Or, does each pair of neighuring discourses constitute a spectrum, with
utopian shading gradually into deliberative, deliberative Into evaluative, evaluative
into scientific, and perhaps scientific back into utopian? Our accounts of the
discourses leply (assume?) the first view viz, that the discourses are fully
distinguishable. But It Is not clear whether or not this Issue is of any real
Importance.
20	 p.37 above
21	 I owe the germ, at least, of this Idea to David Jenkins.
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HUMAN CIENC AND VALU
In this section we shall explore further the hypothesis of a
scientific discourse that is at once distinct from the other
discourses of educational theory and yet falls wiThin educational
theory by virtue of the integrality of its re]ationships with those
other discourses. We shall consider whether, and how, even
austere science maintains a connection with the normative and
practical sides of educational discourse.
It has often seemed that the involvement of the human sciences
with education, as with their other 'phenomena', is not only
purely descriptive but 'value-free', or descriptive in a sense
equivalent to 'value-free'. l
 Certainly, science seems to involve a
more thoroughgoing detachment than evaluation. The economist
attends to rival conceptions of education, vocational preparation
versus liberal development of mind say, not to judge between
them, nor yet (primarily anyway) to f&i1itte others in judging
between them, but simply as a variable to be understood in its
relationships with such other variables as rates of economic
growth and wealth-distribution patterns within complex social
equations. The detached comparativist takes care not to let his
'personal view' intrude anywhere on his meticulous analysis of
ideological training in China. And so on. Clearly this is the
more radical kind of detachment, extending beyond the efficacy
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of instruments2 to educational aims and cx)nceptions, which, as we
noticed earlier, is already a vital moment in the open society's
evaluations. But here it would seam to be sustained in a way it
is not in critical evaluation. There, one describes detachedly
that one may then pronounce more objectively; description is put
directly at the service of value-judgement (the evaluator's or
someone else's), and indeed the judgement itself remains part of
the description (until it passes over to remmendation). But the
case seems different with the human sciences. Such services as
they render to value-judgement and, beyond that, to the
improvement of practice, are less direct, longer postponed, and
rather more (which is not the same thing as 'totally') extrinsic to
the discourse itself. But does this warrant thinking of these
sciences as value-free? And, on the other hand, if there are
such services in the end, can the difference in question be more
than one of degree?
Our hypothesis might seem to involve the idea that any science,
natural or human, seeks understanding essentially for its own
sake in such a way that any 'utility' its disocveries may turn out
to possess would be quite irrelevant to its quality as science.
One might wish to push on further than this to assert that its
stake in understanding involves science in a corn mitinent to
critical objectivity of a kind that actually precludes entanglement
with (other!) values. But could one then make much sense of the
ideal of a critically objective evaluation - which would require
that matters of value be not irredeemably subjective? Indeed,
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we have been implying, and will shortly be arguing, that a tough
objectivity is an ideal of educational th&ry generally, and
therefore of all four of our discourses. Also, and in regard to
even the first idea, one might take exception to a too easy
lumping together here of the natural and the human sciences.
There are (ought to be?), surely, quite profound differences
between these, including some that will bear on the range of
values they connect with and the kind of detachment that is
appropriate in each. For instance, the anthropologist should
worry about what, morally speaking, distinguishes his trade from
the voyeur's, while the geologist need not.. What we want, it
seems, is an account of the human sciences that is alert to both
the similarities and the differences between them and the natural
sciences in such respects as:
- the nature of the understanding yielded
- the detachment with which it is appropriately sought
- methodology
- the relationships of research to values and value-
deliberations
- the distinction, and the relationship, between 'pure' and
'applied'.
This is too tall an order here, of course.3 But we can hope to
open up these areas a litfip before leaving them. We shall start
out from a fairly simple extended example.
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A Double-Involvement with Va]ne Suppose a discussion on the
relevance of education to ecx)nomic growth.
M 1 asserts a relevance - and appeals to a study of a large
number of countries which purports to show a correlation
between increases in educational provision and later
increases in national wealth.
N 1 denies a relevance - on the grounds that true education,
like true virtue, is its own reward. Education is cxrrupted
when pursued as an ecxnomic investment Indeed one of its
main tasks is to cxunteract the materialism of the age and
of humankind. As for the purported correlation, it is
hardly to be presumed that the researcher in question could
identify true education!
(1) We surely suspect here a confusion of two issues, as opposed
to just two views on the same issue. M seems concerned with
what is intended and offered as education (with education in the
descriptLve sense) and with what we may realistically expect from
it. N is concerned with education in the ideal sense and with
what it permits and does not permit. So it may be doubted
whether their claims really come to grips with each other.
Consider, by contrast, the kinds of counter to either claim that
would move unambiguously on the same plane. In response to
N2 queries, instead, whether the correlation demonstrates
the supposed cause-effect ]ink. It may be that educational
expansion is a standard part of the kinds of planned
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investment that yield economic growth because it is
generally thought to be an essential part of the package,
but that it is actually a non-contributing part. In fact - to
quibble further - that it regularly precedes growth does
not of itself entail even that it is generally thought of as
an agent of growth. It may more commonly be undertaken,
say, as an advance withdrawal on confidently anticipated
growth. In any case, even supposing there is some causal
connection, the cxrreiation is too coarse to help us identify
it with any specificity. It suggests, but is no help with,
such further questions as: does the expansion of primary
and secondary education pay a bet±er dividend than the
expansion of 1itc third-level institutions? do differences on
this score correlate with differences in the extent to which
the new wealth is shared around? how much depends on
whether curricula are given a deliberately vocational
orientation? are the answers to these questions the same
for industrialized and developing countries, and for socialist
and capi11ist ones?
The whole exchange is now firmly located within the economics of
education and its furtherance clearly depends on more
information and research in that area. On the other hand we can
also imagine the debate settling down on the other plane. In
response to N 1's original puritanism
H 2 retorts that economic growth is one perfectly ]egifimate
goal of education and a legitimate priority in poor countries.
Any ideal of education which denies this is unbearably
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precious and quite certainly p1*1st in practice. It is also
almost sure to be se]f-deluding, indeed a paradigm example
of 'false consciousness'.
Clearly, the conflict is now mainly about values.
So we have here our distinction between a discourse that is
normative and utopian, and another which is detachedly empirical
and, at some level of sustained sophistication, starts to count as
scientific. This distinction N 1 may have failed to observe.
(2) Yet on the evidence before us we cannot be entirely sure
that N 1 did fail in this way, did misinterpret M 1. For M's claim
that educational expansion generally led to economic growth might
not have been intended as a purely factual observation. It might
have been advanced as also a general reason or motive for
educational expansion - just as 'you have a wasp on your ear'
functions as simnitaneously statement and warning. In that case
the N1 response, whatever e]se we think of it, would have been a
genuine counter-claim. Now, that a statement can thus
simn1tneously belong to our two modes of discourse would
suggest that, even at their more formal and disciplined levels,
they are not so distinct as to have no bearings on each other
(which would also explain how they can be confused).
Two such bearings emerge from the questions in economics posed
in N. First, recall those distinctions between intended and
unintended consequences, presumed and actual consequenthlity,
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investment and consumption of anticipated income. They remind
us, if we need reminding, that the economics of education is
necessarily involved with the perceptions, intentions and values
that inform educational policy and practice as with an aspeot of
its sbject-mifFiar. For it1
 these are crucial 'phenomena'.
Secondly, and at another leve],, those empirical questions and
investigations would take much of their point from our
attachment to values like material progress, breadth of culture
and equality. Largely at least, it is because there is a practical
interest in bringing about and maintaining (or, perhaps, in
preventing!) material wellbeing, enlightenment, equality, etc, that
these questions first arise and become significant. Max Weber
gave classic, and robustly absolute, expression to this point in
reference to what he called 'cultural sciences' generally:
We have designated as cultural sciences those disciplines which analyze
the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural significance ......
. The
concept of culture is a value-concept. Empirical reality becomes 'culture
to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes
those segments and only those segments of reality which have become
significant to us because of this value-relevance. Only a small portion of
existing concrete realty is colored by our value-conditioned interest and
it alone is significant to us ...... . We cannot discover, however, what is
meaningful to us by means of a
	 presuppositlonless	 Investigation of
empirical data.
	 Rather perception of its meaningfulness to us Is the
presupposition of its becoming an object of Investigation.4
Values, then, are a crucial determinant of the questions posed in
economics, as in other human sciences. [ This is compatible, we
can say, with these values being in some way suspended or
'bracketed' during the actual conduct of research and
investigation. Now Weber himself translated this 'bracketing' as
'value-freedom' in research and investigation - hence his well-
known adage that the cultural sciences were at once 'value-
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relevant and value-free'. But the proper research relationship
of, say, the psychologist to children can hardly be the same as
that between the geologist and rocks!:I So it is not just a
matter that the findings of pure economies can later be 'applied'
in policy-making. 'Pure' economics is already shaped by the
kind of deep values that also remotely direct policy - which,
indeed, makes its eventual applicability seem less fortuitous.
Do these two value-invQlvements of sciences like economics not
begin to open a gap between them and the natural sciences? It
might seem that the second, at least 1 does nothing of the sort.
For in the natural sciences, too, theoretical research can be
motivated by practical interests - from the development of
weapon systems to the cure of disease. True, much natural
science (including some that later turns out technologically
potent) seems precisely not to be practically orientated in this
way. But then are there not areas in the human sciences as
well,, much of anthropology for instance, where research is
pursued from a desire, simply, to know and understand how
things are (Mas]ow's 'sheer fascination with the human mystery')?
These parallels are broad, however, and one suspects they
conceal important differences. In the end, surely, value-
relevance must condition the human sciences in some more
intimate way than it does the physical sciences. Now this would
be precisely because human sciences deal with the human. So
such a more intimate species of value-relevance would link up
with the feature we noticed first in them, that they include
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values and value-related aspects of life among their 'phenomena'.
Let us explore this clue, in effect the linkage between the two
value involvements of human science, between the values that lie
back of enquiries giving them 'relevance', and the subjects'
values being enquired into.
Communirt-ive Science The understanding which the ecx)nomist,
say, seeks is of a phenomenon which already has some
understanding of itself. Furthermore, since that self-
understanding goes into making the phenomenon what it is - an
investment rather than a cx)nsumer-purchase, a gift as opposed
to a loan, etc. - the eccnomist must take acccunt of it. Her
understanding must start from the phenomenon's, although it is
not bound simply to replicate it. In the same vein, we noticed
previously that the descriptive user of 'education' accepted the
self-identification, though not the self-endorsement, of the
normative user, and that an anthropologist might diffiientiy
speak of 'education' in a tribe that did not speak so of itself,
only if it did speak of itself in related terms like 'rearing',
'maturing' and 'learning'. Now what this implies, in a word, is
wmmuniration. 6 The researcher may be face to face with the
researched, or she may choose to rely instead on intermediaries
like pollsters or do 'key-hole' research with one-way mirrors and
such. The latter strategies may risk a lower yield in
understanding and probability, but, in any case, it remains
crucial in them that the researcher has access to what her
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subjects say, and say about themselves. It is not only a matter
(important though this be, and the basis of all else) that the
researcher shares human being with the researched and,
therefore, can draw on her ordinary understanding of herself
and her own circles (itself in large part based upon
communication) in understanding them. Beyond that1 she must
either share a language with them or rely on interpreters, if her
understanding is to rise above the rudimentary. It is, then, a
minimal condition of human science that the researcher and the
researched be]ong to a common communicRHve network, and an
optimal conilition - for at least some human sciences and other
things being equal - that they communicate directly. Clearly this
is a different relationship between scientist and phenomenon from
that which obtains in the physical sciences. Or, we may rather
say, it is only in the human sciences (though ethology might fall
in the miLld]e here) that there is really question of a
'relationship' with the phenomenon - and flow the term
'phenomenon' seems inappropriately detached!
That this difference between human and natural science is
fundamental is shown by the number of other differences that
can be easily represented as flowing from it:
Physical phenomena cannot query the researcher's motives
and righte, refuse their cooperation, bargain over the
dissemination of findings, set out to deceive, be deceived
about themselves, or in their turn research the researcher.
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In the other direction, the human scientist can change what
she studies by her study of it, and this not just by some
lack of refinement in her instruments but by virtue of the
ineradicably cxmmunicative basis of her work. So, it may be
that her very questions will promote in her subjects a more
distinct self-understanding and a more explicit mmitment
to their existing practices - or, on the other hand, her
'why?' may provoke them to a 'why indeed?' and to some
change in their practices. True, the chemist too will
manipulate, change, even destroy materials as he
investigates their structure. But the changes at issue here
are rather those which occur in, or near, the area of
precisely that which is to be understood about the subject
under investigation - the nature and incidence of certain
social practices, for instance. True, again, some
interventions in the physical sciences also change precisely
that which is to be understood or measured. A thermometer
measures heat by first absorbing heat, thus altering slightly
the ambient temperature. But this can be calculated and
allowed for. The changes of this kind which the human
scientist risks are, crucially, much less predictib]e. Often
she cannot be sure whether the effect of her research
process on her subjects will be nil 1 negligible, substantial
or massive.
Beyond that effect, and often just as unpredictib]e, there is
the possible effect on her subjects should they oome to
learn her results - and for this there seems no analogue at
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all in the physical sciences. 'Atoms cannot get to know
what scientists say about them, or change their behaviour
in the light of that knowledge. Human beings can do so.'7
Another rro]orary of mmunication-dependence leads us back
to value-relevance and detachment The subjects of research
may seek to involve the social scientist in their cares and vaiues,
or she may cxme of her own accx)rd to sympathize with these or
to react to them in some other way. This means that there is
question of the researcher extending her methodological
detachment from her own initial values to cxver those of her
subjects as welL On the other hand, there is also question of
cxming to redefine the research so that it will be relevant to
their cares as we]]. as to her own initi1 ones - or, since this may
be anlirdpated, of (one reason for) delaying the precise
specification of the research until after a period of getting
acquainted with the subjects.
Communicating with subjects with values of their own does not
just broaden the scxpe of value-relevance and detachment. It
makes for that more intimate kind of value-relevance we had
expected - and for a (slightly) paradoxical intimacy in the
practice of detachment itself. The crux, as we foresaw, is an
engagement at some level between the values that lie behind an
enquiry, giving it its signifit'ince, and the va]ues being
cxrnfronted directly in the enquiry. In the natural sciences,
even when the practical applications of enquiry are up front
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from the beginning, the enquiry is not into the cxnceptions and
values that make those applications desirable. There is nothing
in the abstracted phenomena themselves that can either mirror or
challenge those cxnceptions and values. Thus in bio-chemical
cancer-research the images, hatreds and hopes which give the
research poignant significance are not themselves under
investigation. It would be another kind of enquiry, no longer
bio-chemical,, that focussed on people's feelings and beliefs
regarding 'pointless' pain and disablement, 'premature' death, the
'malignant' incubus that ambushes and nsumes from within, and
so on. Now of that enquiry we might say that it had
cnsiderab]e human interest. This is precisely to say that the
attitudes it revealed in the particular subjects being researched
would tend to engage with the attitudes to cancer of those of the
general public who followed or read of the research as, in the
very first place, of the researchers themselves. An additional
point relates to certain groups like hospice workers, health
monitors, and drug-x)mpanies, who cxuld be expected to have a
special interest in this social research. Would these special
interests bring into play their owners' own attitudes to cancer?
I should be inclined to say that they would fail to do this to the
extent, only, that they were exploitative, that is, saw p&p]e
precisely not as fellow humans, but as things to be manipulated.
To be sure, there must be a place for detachment as well as
engagement in the human sciences. The Western anthropologist
studying traditional patterns of rearing and instruction in an
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African society, say, will guard against foist:ing her own
normatLve conceptions of education on their system, whether by
'reading them in' (underestimating the possible differences), or
by judging the system against them. She will place a disciplined
check on her natural inclinations to compare, challenge, or feel
threatened, and will seek to understand them 'in their own
terms', as opposed to her Western terms. But this
disqu1i9ration of her own educational values will be neither total
nor finaL These, as Weber would remark, will already have been
instrumental in her choice of education as an area of life that is
of common significance, significant not just to them and to some
envisaged audience of her work, but to her herself. Secx)ndly,
the contrast between 'their terms' and 'her terms' cannot be
made absolute. She aspires eventually to understand their
education as they do, but for initial reference must surely use
conceptions of education she already understands, including the
one she herself tends to espouse. Her first gropings, even if
they eschew explicit comparisons, will tend to highlight the
similarities and dissimilarities with these. More important,
perhaps,for her eventually to achieve an understanding of them
in their own terms is for their terms in some way to be brought
into relationship with hers, to enlarge hers as they become hers.
Thirdly, after detached understanding has been attained and
articulated, she (or others) may use it as a basis for explicit
comparison, and indeed for comparison and enquiry that lead to
value-judgement - whether at the general utopian level, or at the
level of evaluation and deliberation relating to this particular
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context. Questions as to what is true and false, just and unjust,
better and worse, good and evil, may then be let a the leash.
(Not, however, relieved of all discipline! That she might consider
this changed enterprise no longer 'strictly scientific' would not
preclude her tackling it too in ways that were non-ethnocentric,
openminded, nuanced, methodical and criticaL)
In short, detachment and human interest might be said to
interpret and to limif each her tlilctiri1ly in the human
sciences. We have arrived at a view of human science as
involving a form of layered communication (but perhaps no more
layered than any reasonably subtle conversation) in which a
detachment that is radical and sustained on the scientist's side -
more sustained than it can, or need, be in critical evaluation with
its fairly immediate responsibi1ifis to action - is to be contained
within a respectful solidarity, a sense of a common humanity and
shared human concerns.
Our argument, however, has been of the 'in principle' kind. The
way in which the human sciences have actually developed is
another complicated story. Suffire it to say that the influence of
pcsitivism 8 has inhibited normative interest to the point that
much human science does not lend itself eAsily to the further
step of critical normative enquiry. It is - as I should have to
say, having in effect argued that some normative interest is a
condition of profound understanding in human science - too
shallow for that. What this tainted work has seemed to lend
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itself to is 'social engineering' 9.	 This would be not too
surprising. The point here is not the frequent indifference of
scientists, both natural and human, to how their science might be
applied, but something deeper which bears fufly only on the
human scientist. This is that the positivistic project, by the
finality with which it shuts the door on a normative exchange
with the subject, or by the distance which it puts between itself
and any such exchange, must tend to a depersonalization of the
communication between scientist and subject and, thereby, to a
depersonalized view of the subject. In this the positivistic pure
scientist and the engineer, the voyeur and the manipulator, are
brothers and sisters under the skin.
NOTES
1	 Descriptive here, as all along, contrasts with prescriptive and 'normative -
not, of course, with analytic, explanatory', 'speculative or 'theoretical.
2 In fact these sciences have traditionally included evaluations of instrianents also,
but by reference only to the norms of the system for which they were designed, norms
towards which the scientist maintains a methodological neutrality.
3 P. Winch (1958) remains an inçortant work. It was seminal to a boom in the
philosophy of social science In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, of which the three
anthologies Emnet and I4aclntyre (eds.) (1970), B.R.Wilson (ed.) (1970), and the
nore recent Flollis and Lukes (eds.) (1982) are very useful expressions. Of course,
the philosophy of the physical sciences did not conveniently stand still during these
reappraisals of the social sciences. On the contrary, it was revolutionized In such
works as Polanyl (1958), Popper (1963) anong others of his works, Kuhn (1962), and
Lakatos and I4sgrave (eds.) (1970).
4	 Objectivity' in Social Science , first publ. 1904, transl. in N. Weber (1949) p.76.
5 Weber, ibid. Myrdal (1970) is one work that challenges the possibility of value-
freedom during investigation. Lessnoff (1974) ch.6. Is a clear survey of this and
related matters from a Weberian standpoint (emphasising, and concurring with, Weber a
fundanentally relativist position on values, however, from which I would dissent).
6 The work of Habermas, of course, brilliantly exploits the Involvement of the hsnan
sciences with comminication (sane of this being his legacy from the hermeneutic
tradition). It acknowledges both that the cormunicatlon of people with each other is
a central focus of hunan science, and that the coniiinity of human scientists Itself
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however, Ilabermas does not discuss, as I do here, the effects of this comijnication-
dependence on the scientist-subject relationship.
7	 Giddens (1982) pgs.14-l5.
8 Positivism might be said (somewhat disparagingly) to be the reduction of all
knowledge to the model of scientific knowledge, of all scientific knowledge to the
model of physical science, and of physical science to a device for recording events
and predicting their future courses. Auguste Cate gave it its classic expression
in the 1830 s in his six-volu,e Cours de Phi losophie Positive. It was taken up by
Emile Durkheim in his very influential (1895) The Rules of Sociological Method, which
proposed that a p rope rl y sd enti fi c approach to the social world depended on t reati ng
social phenomena like things, social facts like the facts of the natural sciences
and human beings as natural objects. (Contrast A.Giddens (1976) The New Rules of
Sociological Method .) Thence it becane an essential ingredient of functional lam,
the dominant orthodoxy in social science - at any rate until recently. (Fortunately,
beginning with Durkheim s own classic studies of religion, suicide and the division
of labour, functionalist social scientists have managed to avoid being too tediously
consistent in their positivism.) Positivism also Influenced, though less markedly,
Marx and marxism - perhaps the main rival perspective In the history of modern social
science. American pragnatism, though emphasising the unity of science (e.g. Dewey
(1910) was less inclined to interpret this reductively. But the real antithesis of
positivism Is the verstehen or InterpretIve tradition, with roots In the 19th
century German philosopher William Dllthey, which was a marked influence on Weber, of
which the phenomenological and ethnanethodological approaches to social enquiry
flowing from Alfred Schutz are more recent expressions, as is the herrneneutic
approach of H.G. Gadamers (1975). More recently, Jurgen Habermas, with the aid of
a theory of knowledge-constitutive interests (1968, tr.1971), Is embarked on the
mighty project of overcoming the division between positivist and verstehen
traditions, Indeed of drawing on all the traditions above to create a critical (and
therefore normative) kind of social theory. In referring to Habermas I have tended
to rely mainly on the highly praised study by T. McCarthy (1978).
9	 N. Rose (1985) has recently made a strong case for viewing much psychology In this
way. V. Walkerdine (1984) presents a similar view of specifically developmental
psychology In its relationship with pedagogy. Foucault is a principal Inspiration of
these two works, e.g. Foucault (1979). But the connection between social physics
and social control was both explicit and unashamed In Compte, with his slogan
prevoir pour pouvoir.
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.4 FH	 HLJMAI1 FAC	 Q1 QBCrIITV
In discussing the dialectic of open/loaded uses of 'education' in
1.4 we noticed that debate over general cxnceptions of education
is tacitly premissed on the assumption that there is a true
(right, proper) substantive sense of 'education'. The question we
shall now address is whether this objecti.vist anticipation of
debate might not be unrealisahie and illusory. [I shall use the
terms 'objectivism' and 'objectivist' simply as a cx)nvenient
shorthand for the belief that objectivity is possible and
desirable, in a sense of 'objectivity' that nnects it intrinsically
with 'truth', via notions like 'respecting the truth' and 'seeking
the truth'.']
The hard subjectivist believes indeed that this anticipation is
unrealizable. He either avokis debate, or engages in it without
hope of praEit and only because he cannot help himself. The soft
subjectivist believes it is unre1i7.able in the last analysis, but
that in the shorter term, and with just these people, there may
be something (exactly what may be difFirult to say) to be gained
from debate. A signiScant point about both these positions is
that they are more or less cxnsciously iiisi11nsioned and unhappy.
That suggests the question of what then drives people to them.
The answer is not primarily 'arguments' like the classical
sceptical ones, I believe, but certain values and beliefs from the
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interface of inteBectual and ethical life which are seen as at once
ncx)mpatble with obj&±ivism, and cx)mpensatng in some measure
for the sacrifice of objectivism. These include
an awareness of our fallibility and of the fragility of our
certitudes;
a distrust of abstract generalization;
a sense that some of the best of our thinking evades
'logical' expression;
a belief in a large freedom as a cxndition of human thriving;
and
a sense that certain perennial issues are for different
generations and individuals to face and to answer for
themselves.
Defending objectivism is, to a large extent, a matter of showing
that these values and beliefs can be accomodated within it, thus
too displaying the distance between it and the fanatical and
fundamentalist. This will require us to venture beyond
educational theory, and in particular into philosophy of science
since that is where the discussion has been most advanced.
Sodo-Historical Ri1Hvity There may or may not be one loaded
use of 'education', conveying one ordering of educational
priorities, that is right for every time and place. But any such
use would certainly be insuffknt. In some, if not all,
particular situations it would need supplementing by uses
responsive to just those kinds of situation and expressive of the
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right priorities for just them. You may think 'cx)nscientisation',
political consciousness-raising up-front as the condition of all
else, is right (ie. truly what is needed) for the adult oppressed
of 'cultures of silence' in Latin-America and elsewhere. 2 You
don't then have to think it equally appropriate for infant schools
in Western-type democracies. Assuming you don't1 you may seek
a thinner but still useful interpretation of it to apply to both
contexts. But even if you find this you will still need the more
substantial interpretation for the adult oppressed.
In other words, 'truth', even 'general truth' or 'principle', and
'local circumstance' are not incompatible objects of
acknowledgement At least one tradition in Western philosophy,
the Aristotelian, has always recognised this. For it practical
reasoning, like all reasoning, has an inherently general character.
But its job is to direct action, which is always particular, and
usually under real,, rather than laboratory, conditions. Hence its
principles have a rough-hewn character. Unlike scientific laws,
typically (perhaps not universally) they include an 'other things
being equal' clause in which the 'other things' cannot be fully
specified in advance. They can clash with each other in
particular situations while remaining generally consistent and
even mutually supportive. And exceptions do not necessarily
disprove the rule.3 This kind of 'r1 Hvism' is pez±ectly
cxrnsistent with objectivisin. Truth (in as absolute a sense as
you like) remains crucial in it - in regard to what is really best
in such and such particular circumstances, or the actual degree
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of generalLzabIlity of some order of pnorities, or the v1iity of
some individual va]ne-consideration. In these matters, it allows,
people are right and wrong, more and less right arid wrong, and
in real disagreement Le. hold views that really do, more or less,
exclude each other.
A Proper Freedom An 'objectivist' ethic does not have to
prescribe everything. The instinct is strong, indeed, to regard
freedom as the oxygen of real education. Much of education,
surely, including much that is most formative in it, is a matter of
interest1 bent and legitimate free-choice. But this is cxmpatible
with much else in it being 'essential', a matter of objective
requirement. Of course, the line here can be hard to draw and
is the subject of much disagreement. The same is true in sexual
matters, where we have example after example of one person's
question of inclination being another's question of morality.
Similarly with situations in which different cultures meet and
mingle. When should one redescribe one's 'moral distaste' as
'cultural prejudice'? And when should one not? Actually, in
each of these (overlapping) areas of life the line between freedom
and obligation is not only controversi.l, but is itself one of the
more important things to get right Again, matters of free-choice
and of obligation relate to each other in more or less complex
ways. Real obligations arise constantly in situations which one
was under no obligation to enter in the first place. Thus in
intellectual life - as in friendship, marriage, and career - paths
147
are commonly more freely entered than left, and this is as much
an ethical as a psychological fact. And on the other hand, we
are often free as to how we meet our obligations. But these
complications do not detract from - indeed they presuppose - the
main distinction between the essential. and the optional. For a
given society, time, or person, then, there can be many
cxnntxinaUons of learnings that wou]d each const±ute 'a true
edut'kion', as weU as very many others that would not.
F11ihfl*y and Uncertainty Truth as an ideal and truth as
attainment are quite different things. The worthwhileness of the
quest relies on no particular estimate of the extent of actual or
possible attainment. Whether it rules out some estimates, and
what these may be, are large questions in epistemology. But,
historically, it has even been thought compatible with some kinds
of scepticism and agnosticism. This was so in the best of
medieval natural theology, as is attested in this striking remark
of Aquinas':
It Is therefore said of us that when we come to the end of our knowledge,
we acknowledge God as the Unknown, because the mind has made most progress
in understanding when It recognizes that God s essence lies beyond anything
that the mind In its state of being-on-the-way can comprehend. 4
A bet±er known example nowadays is Karl Popper's 'dynamic
scepticism', which involves the following claims: (1) Of their
logical nature th&ries cannot be verified, only f1sifi pd. Any
thry can be false, though it fits or explains all the known
relevant facts - including improbable facts that have been
checked out purposely to test it and that would not otherwise be
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known. For, as the history of science abundantly illustrates,
yet-to-be-discxwered facts may cxntradict and falsify it - and
thereby challenge us to find a better theory. So it is as much
f1sfiations (which should therefore be deliberately sought) as
successful. predictions that advance our knowledge. (2)
Observation-statements (purported facts) can be mistaken, if only
because what we call facts are themselves impregnated with
lower-level theory5. Thus even our f1sifirations of theories,
since they depend on such observations, are fallible. (3) The
pursuit of truth is not therefore pointless. We may know
(fallibly) Newton's physics to be false, absolutely speaking. But
the vast range of what it cxuld explain and correctly predict
legitimates our thinking of it as 'having much truth in it'. If
Einstein's Relativity theory accounts for all that plus other
things, including the observations that contradicted Newton, then
we are entitled to think of it as getting us still 'nearer the
truth' - though it is unlikely to have got us all the way, and
even if it had, we could never be sure that it had. In short1 for
Popper, the idea that truth is 'manifest' - if only we had eyes to
see it1 could rid ourselves of prejudices etc - is a mistake, but
it remains that truth is ]aboxiously 'approachab]e'.6
Education is a practical business. Its theories are more
concerned with the truth (rightness, appropriateness) of action,
than the truth of fact and explanation. They are certainly no
less fi11ihle for that - the extent to which they vie with each
other makes that clear. The logic of this fallibility seems similar
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in some respects and dissimilar in others to what we have just
noticed. Thus here too openness to experience and its
corrections is commended, but so may be steadfastness in the
face of contradiction and, as we have mentioned, exceptions do
not necessarily falsify the general rule. The point remains that
fThhi1*y provides no more excuse here than in science r
abandoning the quest. 	 If Popper is right, even radical
unverifiRhility would not excuse this.
Incommensurability, vision and the lim*g of argument In 1.4 we
critiied the view that 'education' is an essentially contested
concept on the grounds that 'essential contestability' left itself
open to the interpretation 'rational irresolvability'. But why
suppose irresolvabi]ity? The most significant answer to this
question in the wider philosophical literature is that such
contests are irresolvable because the rival views are
incommensurable. This presents a trickier challenge. For one
thing, as we shall see, it seems to make f1sifiation not just
fallible but quite as uncertain as verification.
But does rational resolution require commensurability? Is
discerning the relative 'truth-fulness' of rival possibi1iths and
views fundainentafly a matter of 'calibration' - parallel listings of
pros and cons and step-by-step comparisons against some neutral
standards? On the one hand this is expected. The discovery of
its absence in key areas has caused dismay - in proportion to
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the previous reputation of the area for objectivity - and
promoted both rather desperate reafrmation and subjectivism.7
On the other hand this expectation may be no more than a
prejudice about how we do and should think. This kind of
mparabflity may n be necessary for an objective discernment
and choice. Perhaps it is not even a condition of everything
that could properly be called 'proof' here. I shall consider three
cases: irrational numbers (the original incom mensurables),
scientific progress (again), and (at some length) revolutions in
generaL
(i) Is there a number which mnThiplied by itself gives 2? Does
12 exist, in whatever way mathematicals do exist? Arithmetically,
though progressively approachable, it is not finally articu]ab]e -
which suggests a negative answer. Yet it must exist for it is the
exact ratio between the diagonal and the sii:le of a square - it
must be as real as they are. This had an importance for the
Greeks that is hard for us to recover.8 But it retains an
obvious vahie as a parable: that which cannot be fully articulated
can yet be exhibited; demonstration can go beyond articulation;
the incompletely articulable can be perfectly intelligible ('rational'
after all). And this emerges in mathematics, the spiritual home of
exhaustive articulation!
(ii) To return to science. We already have it from Popper that
science grows, not by simple accumulation - adding new thecries,
laws, and facts to the old, but by displacment of the f1sifid old
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with the new. We should now add, going beyond Popper and
following Thomas Kuhn, 9 that these disp]acements have the
character of revolutions. This is to say the following:
(1) They are relatively infrequent events, a fraction only of
the total activity in any particular area of science. So
there is a contrast with 'normal' science. Normal science is
characterized by a fine-tuning of existing theory, law and
fact - as opposed to a search for major novelty, and by
sustained at±empts to resolve known anomalies within
existing theory. These attempts involve high degrees of
mathematical, cxnceptual, and instrumentational innovation -
and are in most cases cx)mpletely successfuL
(2) Displacements of theory occur as parts of wider
displacements of whole orders of things. An order of things
(paradigm, disciplinary-matrix, theory-in-the-widest-sense)
for a particular area of science embraces versions of its
key-definitions, permitted metaphors and analogies,
interpretations-in-practice of general scientific values
including standards of proof, the reccgnition of certain
notable achievements as exemplars, a view as to what the
main unsolved problems are, criteria of membership of the
ccmmunity - all these as well as integrated sets of formal
hypotheses. Shifts in the last are tied to shifts in all the
other dimensions of the order. As a very partial example,
the definitional changes required by Relativity theory:
What had previously been meant by space was necessarily flat,
homogeneous, isotropic, and unaffected by the presence of matter.
If it had not been. Newtonian physics would not have worked. To
make the transition to Einsteins universe, the whole conceptual web
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whose strands are space, time, matter, force, and so on, had to be
shifted and laid down again on nature whole.1°
Taking on such a multi-dimensional change, though not to
be accomplished in an instant, is in the end an aU-or-
nothing affair.
(3) It cannot be proved that the change is right - not, that
is, in that common sense of 'proor that looks to mathematics
for its standard - as is attested by the usual resistance of
a section of the scientific community.
If there were but one set of scientific problems, one world within
which to work on them, and one set of standards for their solution,
paradigm competition might be settled more or less routinely by some
process like counting the number of problems solved by each. But,
in fact, these conditions are never met completely. The proponents
of competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross-
purposes. Neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions
that the other needs in order to make its case... .Though each may
hope to convert the other to his way of seeing his science and its
problems, neither may hope to prove his case. The competition
between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by
proofs. 11
Proof here includes disproof, fa19catj n. From Popper
one might take the impression that science likes nothing so
much as a f1sifiration, and strikes out the relevant theory
at the first whiff of one. But this wouk be very much too
simple. Indeed its refutation is implicit in Popper's own
view that observation-statements, 'facts', are already
impregnated with theory. This implies that the same
phenomenon may be read differently - thus, as falsifying or
as not falsifying. The 'problems' of a theory in a normal
phase of science cvuld as logically be read as
'f1sifiratjons'. 12	Those that are not resolved in the
meantime probably will be so read in the next revolutionary
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phase - while the uncx)nverted will read the problems of the
new theory as critical objections to it. We shoul1 not
expect, then, 'knock-down' kinds of f1cifiration.
(4) Finally, what does positively effect and legitimate the
change is a certain interplay between argumentation, critical
of the old and supportLve of the new, and a vision of new
promise - to which we shall shortly return.
The picture of scientific development in (1)-(4) is luckily and
persuasively supported in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
by a wealth of illustration from the history of science. It seems
to me essentially correct. However, Kuhn is led by it to dispute
that science progresses towards the truth. Not, he maintains,
that this should count as a failure for science. For the real task
of science is puzzle-solving, something with no particular
connection with truth, and at this it does progress. Now this is
deeply uncomfortable. If 'puzzle-solving' is not immediately to
reintroduce truth, as in e.g. criminal detection, the model has to
be the artificial puzzle, like the rubik cube or the chess problem.
Then science would be no more 'about' the world than these are.
There would be no connection between science and reality
sufFicnt to explain even the technological success of science.
Kuhn offers some not very thought-through reasons for his view
of jj13 But behind them - almost certainly - lurks the
assumption that a sequence of incommensurable theories can
hardly be a route to truth. We may note the, at least equal1
plausibility of the converse proposition that if even science
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proceeds incx)mmensurably then incommensurability can be no
very final barrier to objectivity.' We remarked in Popper the
intuitively attractive ideas that false theories can have truth in
them, that theories like Newton's owed their immense success at
predicting the improbable to a high 'truth-content', and that
basically objective procedures contribute to progressive increases
in the 'truth-content' of scientific theories. Are these ideas
really prec]nded by the incommensurability of theories?
(iii) To take this further we need to dwell on the positive
correlate of incxm mensurability, that is, the interplay of argument
with intii*inn and vision that takes the place of 'corn mensuration'
when incomrnensurab]es are deliberated over. But first we shall
move to a more general context than just science.
Consider, then, the more general form of 'the revolution', and let
us begin by distinguishing it from other kinds of departure from
the usuaL One kind appeals only to exceptional circumstances.
So doing, it reintegrates itself into the establishment, though
perhaps teaching it a degree more flexiblity. Another kind
presents itself as just modernization, keeping up with the times.
Again we are reassured that no fundamental challenge is
intended, though for some the idea that the system itse]f evolves
will be challenge enough. In a third kind, the renewaZ the
dissenter appeals to one part of the established order as more
fundamental or authentic, 'o]der' perhaps, against another part.
So, disappointed socialists of the Stalinist era appealed to Lenin
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against the Soviet state, Kierkegaard and a long line of christian
reformers to Christ against Christianity, Jesus himself (though
he belongs much more to our next group) to the Old Testament
against its lawyer guardians and interpreters, and the early de-
schoolers to the idea of education against schools. A way of life
or a central institution is chaflenged, but by reference to the
very ideals that gave it birth and by which it still professes to
identify itself. Such challenges essentially look backwards, then,
to shared first principles if not to a golden age, and their plea
is for repentance and purification. They are directed at
individuals (to recall the ideals of their youth, or their family
tradition), and small groups (a ooup]e is to recxllect the spirit of
their first love and honeymoon), as we]]. as whole societies.
Lastly, there is the genuine revolution where something new is
being brought to birth out of; and at the expense of; the old.
In addition to the standard po1ial cases, the histories of art
and science afford numerous examples and in the religious-moral
sphere we have, for instance, Jesus' 'It was said to you of
old.....But I say to you'.' Arguably, the transformations that
Piaget and the 'oognitivist' school see in ordinary mental and
moral development would also qualify - if they exist - and
education's involvement with them would make it a revolutionary
actLvity. Historical developments in educational theory and
practice that might qualify include Rousseau's Em.ile, the
introduction of mass schooling, and the transitions, first to
meritocratic, and then to oomprehensive, ideals and practices.
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'Revolution' entails some incx)mmensurabi]ity. For how is the
revolution to justify itse]f? 16 Not simply, ex hypothe4 by an
appeal to new or exceptional circumstances - and any such
appeal may seek to redraw the boundaries between the 'normal'
and the 'exceptional', and indeed the 'essential' and the
'circumstantial', thus serving only to restate what has to be
justified. Nor can appeals to the past or to accepted principles
snff9ce, and in any case these too will tend to involve
reinterpretations that seem to the sceptical to beg the question.
In the Piagetian model those at some higher stage cannot simply
explain its superiority to those less advanced. There is no
proving the moral relevance of intention, for example, to one who
does not yet see it. So, more generally, the revolutionary has no
straightforward way of justifying her cause to the guardians of
the established order, the accepted premisses and criteria of
justification (for the given area) being themselves part of what
she is challenging. Indeed, to begin with, for all her blazing
conviction, she lacks the means of articulating arguments that
satisfy even herself, since the concepts she has are almost all
from the old store. Her intuii-inn, she herself recognizes, runs
ahead of her discursive argumentation. In time, language and
argument win catch up and consolidate, but even then they will
not be such as to logically wznpel the assent of the old guard -
who will have as much trouble with the new premisses as the
revolntionaxies had with the old order's. This, then, is the
incommensurability of pre- and post-revolutionary situations -
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and the reason that revolutions succeed in part by having youth
on their side and outliving their opponents.
But they are not, as a rule, mindless affairs. Consider, now, how
much itive thought is involved in coming by the vision,
gaining adherents, and btiilriing the futhre.
(1) To start with, a radical critique of the old order. This will
display not just cxmpromise and inconsistency in the accretions
of the ages, but inadequacy in the sources themselves. For that,
it probably has to be already informed by some vision, as yet
incipient and inarticulate, of a new order.
(2) That vision develops in stages. This or that item is seen in
a new way - first fiffu]ly, then more steadily. A series of such
pictures builds up. At first they have in common just that they
cannot be accomodated in the existing general view. Then the
outline of the new vision is called forth in them - and embraces
them. And the pioneers will try to repeat these steps in
potential adherents - realisticilly, those already 'drawn' towards
the vision (not, we hope, by the lure of novelty alone, still ]ess
of violence) - getting them first to see this, then that, in a new
way, and so on.
(3) But now discursive reason reasserts itself. The old guard's
counter-attacks, a wider audience, intellectual conscience
(hopefully!) - all. these will force developments in argumentation.
Prominent among these developments, the critique of the old
order will now be transmuted into point-by-point comparisons
between the two orders. IncommensurabIlity allows that much.
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But it rules out the possibility of these being decisive by
themselves (the old guard will be producing their own counter-
calculations) - which is, perhaps, to say two things. First, the
force of these point-by-point comparisons is not purely additive.
Rather, they interact with more general arguments and
cx)mparsons, drawing from these as well as cx)ntributing to them.
Secondly, the vision cannot now be dispensed with, for it
continues to contain tacitly more than the arguments (particular
and general) do discursLvely. But - a final important twist to
this tale - whIle the vision remains a source and a touchstone
for the arguments, these are in turn a crucial test for the
vision, and not merely rationalization and propaganda. Weakness
of argument at first makes only for redoubled efforts, but if it
persists it starts to tell against the vision - even for the
committ:ed. It threatens not so much to disprove it as to dispel
it. In the end, just an illusion! (And visual metaphors stay apt
to the end.) Arguments, then, are never snfFiint but good
ones do become necessary.
[Of course for many kinds of revolution this would be a severely
disembodied account. One would want to add that the dialectic
between vision and argument is set into a larger dialectic
between life and thought. Actions, sufferings, the very lives of
the revolutionaries - we might think of the crucifixion of Jesus -
are charged with symbolic value and become part of the
revolution's thought, part of its process of envisioning and
arguing. And it is this larger whole that wins and loses people
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to the revolution. But this correction is beside the point here, I
think.]
Is rationality saved, then? Needless to say, the process
described is not infa]Iib]e. But can it be objective? Does it
make sense to speak of objectivity in cx)nnection with it, to aim
at objectivity in it? Intuitively, more than the act of revolution
is at stake here. A negative answer would imply that no
revolution cX)uld be justified before and in the event, but also
that none could be justified afterwards. The revolutionary was
not right to trust instincts and vision ahead of the argument,
even if they later 'turned out all right', and, in any case, it
could never be known objectively that the revolution had turned
out all right, that the new order did improve on the old.
Furthermore, objectivity could strike no deep root. in settled
situations since a settled situation is the product of the last
revolution and the material for the next one. So, if objectivity is
impossible (as opposed to just difficult) in the practice of
revolutions then it may be out more generally - at least in any
radical sense. This consequence the subjectivist will accept,
while the objectivist may see it (as in the narrower case of
science) as a zeductio ad absurdem of the premiss. The question
is whether our positive attention to the dialectic of vision and
argument can break the impasse between the objectivist and the
sub jectivist.
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We can see how it might The crucial reR1ition is that this
dialectic is not confined to full-blown revolutions. Argument
leading to insight and vision, then vision nurturing argument
(partly fixing the meanings of its terms, saving the interaction
between general and particular considerations from straight
circularity, and so on), before being in turn judged by it - all
this seems quite familiar! Are these not also the ingredients of
more modest innovations - indeed, one wants to ask, of all
thought except perhaps the most mechanical? Their balance
would vary, of course, but could we not take the overt
incommensurability of revolutionary disagreements to illuminate
the frustration of everyday disagreement, and the prominence of
vision in revolutionary thought to remind ourselves of its more
unobtrusive presence in other kinds of thought? That
prominence may even suggest the idea that vision is present in
all thought, no doubt often imperceptibly - as the dramatic
radioactivity of some elements suggests to physicists the
thretical radioactivity of all elements. After all, even the
'mechanical' actions of counting and measuring involve moments
of interpretation and judgement - regarding margins of error,
the degree of accuracy required, what counts as a unit or a
boundary, and so forth - do they not? Even here do we not
think rather more than we can articulate?
So, we reach again the conclusion that if there is no objectivity
in revolutions then there may be none anywhere! But, coming to
it from this direction, the effect is to spotlight that which all
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along is creating the difficulty, namely, the overforcing of
'mensuration' as a metaphor of objective thinking. It is being
assumed that objective thinking is just like measuring and that
measuring is just its mechanical cxmponents; that objectivity
requires everything 'out in the open', not only a readiness to
argue the case and an openness to critir!ism, but that the case
be articulated or 'objectified' in a sense that - so one might say
- empties it of thought, obviates the need ever to think about it
again, and turns it into a cxmputer programme. Without these
assumptions our problem would disappear. And just to state
them is to becx)me aware of their implausibility. A norm of
objectivity in thought which can be approximated only in the
measure that thought vanishes into the mechanical and automatic
seems fundamentally misconceived. At the very ieast. the burden
of proof is on those who would propose it.
So,
- that certain basic and lucid mathematical ideas are
incxmp]etely articulable,
- that scientific advances are to a degree 'immeasurable',
and, most important of all,
- that in just about all our thinking vision, or something
like it,precedes, informs and transcends our
articulations of it,
adds up to a strong case against taking 'measuring' too seriously
as a metaphor for objective thinking. We may well wonder how it
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gained its dominance and, in any case, why we should any longer
be troubled by itil7
Perversity and Conversion Science, we have seen, does
progress, if by a logic more complex than had been supposed.
In it, consensus may be lost but is soon found again. Much less
tractable, however, are educational differences and contests,
along with the ethical and cultural ones in which they are
rooted. Here revolutions do not carry all before them, even in
the long run, and they can be reversed. So, for example, the
ethical points of view expressed by the participants in Plato's
diRkgues, or those surveyed in Book 1 of Aristotle's Nicvmachean
Ethics, have a kind of interest for us, a contemporaneity, that
the biological disputes of that time lack. They are still with us,
broadly, and still competing. This suggests there is more than
logical incommensurability at work here.
Of course, some differences are of judgement on what is to be
done in complex or novel situations, and co-exist with agreement
on the principles involved. These are not the sinficant ones.
They are paralleled, indeed, by differences of scientific
judgement once science leaves the laboratory and its control of
the variables, as in ecology for example. What matters here are,
rather, the differences of fundamental principle and of broad
value-orientation. Note, too, that what matters about these deep
value differences is that they survive mutual exposure and
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critique. Exoticism of practice in very isolated societies, though
often trotted out in this context, is less to the point Like
exoticism of cxsmology in the same societies, it might be
attributable just to an insnffirincy of questioning. But the
evidence of pluralist societies and cultures, ancient and modern,
is that even after traditions have met, argued and dIluted each
others' purely inertial forces, ethical differences continue to
flourish. Thus it seems precisely not the case that deep
differences will disappear in some coming 'global viflage' of
rational humanity.
There is, however, a way of accxunting for many, perhaps most,
of these persistent differences that does not land us in
subjectivism. It refers to the familiar logic of human perversity
and conversion. The element of will, and therefore of freedom, in
value judgements can be taken as pointing, not to some
subjectivist construct like 'the criterionless choice', but to this
logic. To indicate some of its features:
We are creatures often drawn in conflicting directions, free in
our choice of an actual direction, but subject to ethical
judgements, in particular our own, which include half-hearted,
uncertain, and half-glimpsed ones. Differences between these
judgements and our patterns of choice and lifestyle will be more
or less painfuL The resolution of such conflicts will be our
natural desire, if not by changing our lives, then by moderating
or blocking our judgements - in which we risk self-deception.
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All this applies to classes, cxmmuriiti and societies, as weU as
to individuals (an only slightly less familiar thought, though one
that raises some difficult questions l8). Rationalization and self-
deception, then, are probabi1iti rooted in the very basic ethical
r1iti of choice and obligation. So too, therefore, is ethical
disagreement. It transpires then that, so far from being
embarassed by it, any half-sophisticated objectivism that
recognizes human freedom will ac±ually predict more or less
radical ethical disagreement!
Another part of this picture is our understanding that moral
enlightenment (an objectivist idea) depends, not just on
understanding and imagination, but on good wilL We may even
have to start by actually living differently if we are ever to
figure our way round the next moral corner. So the 'dialectic'
that we saw in paradigm-conversion in science becomes, in the
case of moral conversion, a 'trilectic' involving our deeds, as weU
as our arguments and our vision. Again, consider our responses
to bad faith. Satire, irony, good example, some forms of
correction, and the sublime 'overcoming evil by good' - these
combine a dearly objectLvist assumption of a moral truth that is
being evaded with an assumption that getting this truth
acknowledged is going to involve the touching of hearts as much
as of minds.
Imp1iciii in fairly ordinary moral consciousness, then, is a quite
sophisticated objectivism (the sophistication may get lost in
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translations into explicit theory) which is far removed from a
faith in the snff9cicncy of argument, yet holds fast to the
aspiration for truth. And it easily accomodates deep ethical
disagreements - which includes some deep educational
disagreements. Nor, incidentally, is it a recipe for intolerance.
It directs us at least as much towards our own self-deceptions as
to anyone else's. it is open to the realization that these mat±ers
are often impossibly difFkult to judge in the concrete. And, of
itself, it leaves open the question of how we should confront bad
faith where we may identify or suspect it.
Conclusion We have been defending the object±vist anticipations
of educational debate (and debate generally). We have argued
that the objectivist attitude is perfectly hospitable to a series of
values: sensitivity to the local and the circumstantial,, freedom to
follow one's bent, a decent humility considering our fallibility, an
acknowledgement of the tacit, intuitive and visionary, and a
sense of the inevitability of value-disagreement In specific
relation to education, we have been arguing that aspiring to the
true meaning of 'education' is compatible with recognizing
'education' as an idea that is flexible, permissive, uncertain,
vision-dependent to the extent of being incommensurable in its
variants, and, even, an idea for each of us to make up his or
her own mind about
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NOTES
I do not refer, therefore, to the doctrine that there is a small set of basic truths
which are foundational to all other truths, nor to the doctrine that there is a
certain kind of highly articulated 'objectification , mathematical and/or scientific
in character, which is a norm of objectivity generally. The latter doctrine, in
fact, I criticise below - even as a proposal for mathematics and science. In this
general connection, see Richard Bernstein (1983) Beyond Objectivisn, and Relativism.
The objectivism he seeks to transcend is, I think, nuch closer to the one I
criticise than the one I defend. I cane to this work after I had written this
section. In sane respects our approaches overlap, especially In our discussions of
Kuhn, though he does nuch nore than me in the way of situating the issues in relation
to the history of philosophy and, nre particularly, to the work of some inortant
contemporary philosophers.
(Still later - at the point of going to press, in fact - I read Maclntyre (1990).
This remarkable overcomes incamnensurability strong the three views it discusses in
a way with which, it seems to me, what I propose in this section is consistent. His
account is, however, much rio re developed.)
2	 Freire, p . (1970) and (1972)
3	 This was well recognized, for instance, by Aquinas. Surr,na Theologica I, IIae, q.94
a.4.
4
	 In Libro Boethii de Trinitatis Expositio 1,2 ad 1.
5	 A point beautifully made in the aphoristic remark of Goethes quoted at the head of
Part 2.
6	 Popper likes to string together some fragments from the PreSocratic Xenophanes in a
way which suggests a remarkable anticipation of his views:
The gods did not reveal, from the beginning,
All things to us; but in the course of time,
Through seeking we may learn, and know things better....
These things are, we conjecture, like the truth.
But as for certain truth, no man has known t,
Nor will he know it; neither of the gods,
Nor yet of all the things of which I speak.
And even i f by chance he were to utter
The final truth, he would himself not know it:
For all is but a woven web of guesses.
He returns repeatedly, Popper (1959), (1963) and (1972), to the main points of this
outline. As examples: the non-verifiability of theory in the first essay of the
(1971); the theory-dependence and the fallibility of basic observation-statements in
sections 25-30 of the (1959) and in Addendum 1 of the (1963); the Ideas of a theory's
'truth-content (its having truth In it), its relative nearness to truth, and the
related idea of 'verisimilitude', in the tenth essay (section 3) of the (1963) and
the second essay (sections 7-11) of the (1971). Section 32 of the last-mentioned
essay discusses 'dynamic scepticism'. The idea of the truth as 'manifest' and its
dominance in Western thought, at least since Bacon and Descartes, are discussed and
criticised in the first essay of the (1963).
7 On the subjectivist side Kuhn (1962), discussed below, and, among the slightly
desperate - in my view - Scheffler (1967), though this remains a useful corrective to
a too sweeping denial of connensurability.
8	 They held that proportion was the guarantee and the key of a rational universe and
were therefore disturbed to f i nd that the qeanet ri c mean between a nunbe r (n) and.
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Shone Well suggests, however, that the usual view of this Greek crisis may be upside
down. Pythagoros proved that the ratio of the diagonal of a square to Its side was
exactly 2 (and that In a rectangle [2 x 1] of that diagonal x a line equal to the
sides of the original square, the ratio of its diagonal to Its shorter side would be
exactly 3, and so on). Now what is usually said Is that this sparked off a search
for the numerical values of 2, j3, etc, leading to the discovery that they were not
rational' I.e. exact.	 But suppose the Greeks made their arithmetical discovery
first! Then the geometrical one could well have seemed the resolution of the
difficulty, showing that the proportions which could not be exactly articulated could
be exhibited as exact. The evidence for putting the matter this way up - apart from
the point that It seems Intrinsically more reasonable - includes, she says, the fact
that the study Of numbers began long before the study of lines, the likelihood of
Babylonian knowledge of arithmetic Inconwnensurabllity and of the Greeks having learnt
It from them, and the generally pleased and positive air of references to Pythagoros'
theorem in Plato and other Greeks. Slnone Well (1 g65 tr.), letters 37-3g
g	 Kuhn (1962,1970)
10	 ibid.	 p.149
11	 ibid. pp.147-148
12 Excepting those that are exclusively Instrumental, every problem that normal science
sees as a puzzle can be seen, from another viewpoint, as a counterinstance and thus
as a source of crisis. Copernicus saw as counte ri nstances what most of Ptolemy • S
other successors had seen as puzzles in the match between observation and theory.
Lavoisier saw as a counterinstance what Priestley had seen as a successfully solved
puzzle in the articulation of phlogiston theory. And Einstein saw as
counterinstances what Lorentz, Fitzgerald, and others had seen as puzzles in the
articulation of Newtons and MaxwelVs theories......There are, I think, only two
alternatives: either no scientific theory ever confronts a counterinstance, or all
such theories confront counterinstances at all times. • ibid. pp.79-80.
13	 (1) Kuhn: normal science Is com'rionly more a matter of finding ways to outcomes
already confidently anticipated in detail than of adding to the known detail.
(pp. 36ff) Perhaps But It remai ns, presuiiabl y, that to anti ci pate results Is to
assume that certain things will turn out to be true about nature. Truth remains a
rule of this puzzle-solving game.
(2) Kuhn: 'Does It really help to imagine that there is some one full, objective,
true account of nature arid that the proper measure of scientific achievement is the
extent to which it brings us closer to that ultimate goal?' (p.171) But this ('on&,
full') is too quickly to Identify the (modest) truths about somethings with 'the
Truth about the Universe.
(3) Kuhn: 'There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like
'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its
"real S' counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle" (Postscript 1969,
p.206). But this seems no more than to refer to the obvious paradox inplicit In the
very idea of truth, rather than to anything specific to science.
(4) Kuhn: The ontology of a theory (I.e. the entities with which It populates nature)
often bears scyes resent lance to a ,ruch earlier theory that it does not bear to its
lnrnediate predecessor. Thus 'in some ln'portant respects, though by no means in all,
Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle's than either of them
is to Newton's'. (p.207) The Idea this suggests is that progress towards the truth
may often be a matter of 'two steps forwards and one backwards - that scientific
revolutions may Involve losses as well as gains!
14 This is to use Kuhn against himself. Successfully to inport 'revolution' and
'paradigo' from art and politics into science was to bring them nearer to each other.
But where Kuhn saw this as tending to 'relativize' science, we may do better to see
it as allowing us to 'absolutize' art and politics a little.
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15	 The christian may Indeed go further to argue with Kierkegaard (Philosophical
Fragnents) that Jesus was a revolutionary in a class all his own.
16 Overheated rhetoric aside, it is not good sinly by definition - the contenorary
ganst runs from the Sandinista, whom it was mainly the sinister thought sinister, to
the unspeakable 'year zero of the Khymer Rouge - and indeed suspicion may be due as
nuch to knowing how atrociously revolutions can turn out as to any attacimient to the
given order.
17	 On this whole topic see Polanyi (1958), a hook that was years ahead out of its time.
See also, and especially on the historical side, Bernstein (1983)
18	 Here, of course, we overlap with Marxist notions of ideology as distortion and false
consciousness. But for a sore general, and unusual, discussion see Lonergan (1957)
pp. 217-244.
3A COIF:RF:t VIF:W OF ZIFF: AS
A	 P F: GIAL. ID F:L OF
F:D LI cA'rIO
EVeIy education teaches a philosophy; if not by dogma then by
suggestion, by implication, by abnosphere. Every pazt of that
education has a cvnneclion with every other part. If it does not
all wmbine to nvey some general view of life, it's not education
at all. G. K. Chesterton, The Common Man
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1 IS EDUCAIIDPI IcSSIBL III SOME
DSIFAW FOIt4 ?
At the end of 1.2 we caine upon the challenge to justify the
assumption, shared by nearly afl sides in educational debate, that
there is me cxnception of education under which it is worth
pursuing as a mal±er of cxnscious and deliberate policy. In this
section we shall address that challenge directly, and in 3.2 and
3.3 we shall in effect cxntinue to address it, though now
indirectly, by developing some of the key elements of a
substantive view of education.
Return to the prim*ive a life without education? Usually we
assume that we are better off for having developed an explicii-ly
educational perspective on childhood and growing-up, and
furthermore that - short of bombing ourselves back into the
stone-age - this adoption is irreversible. But perhaps both
these assumptions are wrong! In this oonnection it will be
instructive to begin by attending to what was an interesting
development in the deschoaling literature viz, a move from
abjuring school in the name of education to abjuring education
itself. We shall find here two explicit objections to education,
and we shall argue that, though certainly radical and directed at
a quite wide range of cxnceptions and practices, they need not
171
be cxnstrued as the objections to the vezy idea of education that
they present themselves as. In discussing them, however, we
shall ccme upon a third objection lurking in the background,
which is directed at that very idea, and which will prove rather
less tractable.
In 1970 fllich was claiming that the educational process would
unquestionably gain from the deschooling of society. This would
sound to many schoolmen like treason to the enlightenment, but
'it is enlightenment itself that is now being snuffed out in
schools'. l lIlich, however, was not advocating that education
should henceforth be left to happen as it may, that we should
learn to rely again simply on the family and the 'university of
life'. He argued, indeed, for large developments in the informal
educational power of a wide range of industrial1 cultural and
po1itical institutions. But he also pleaded for a new kind of
fonnal education and for agencies which, though quite different
from schools, would be specifically educational,, what he called
learning networks or 'webs'. These should be vcilnntary rather
than cx)mpulsory; provide access to resources rather than 'pre-
packaged' curricula; and be of three or four kinds acoording to
the nature of the resource: educational object; peer-learner;
mode]; and 'elder' or educator-at-large. Our ooncern with this is
just to note that fllich's new society would still be education-
minded. (Both the wide and the formal uses of 'education' would
survive in it, though both would be overhauled.)
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Within a few years, however, two works had appeared which
envisaged and advocated a society which would not be education-
minded. Their titles were already suggestive of this: Carl
Bereiter's (1973) Must We Educate?, and John Ho]t's (1976)
Instead of Educatfon. Ways to help ppie do things better. Both
were severely antipathetic to any kind of public institution or
provision of a deliberately educational nature. They advocated
resource-centres for children and youths (ones that might well
use present school premises), but on the oondition that they
would not think of themselves as educational; rather they were to
be places for the enrichment of the present ]ives of those who
attended them - voluntarily, of cxurse. Bereiter envisaged, in
ad1iticn, provision for formal skill-learning - even oompulsory
learning as regards literacy skills. But this was to be oonceived,
also in deliberately non-educational fashion, as narrowly task-
spifi- training. And neither author presented his total ban on
formal education as for the sake of education in a wider and
informal sense. Rather, Halt observed:
In such a society no one would worry about education'.
	 People would be
busy doing interesting things that mattered. Doing them, they would grow
more informed, competent and wise. They would learn about the world from
living in it, working in It, and changing it, and from know,ng a wide
variety of people who were doing the same.2
True, we might say of such a society, as of a primitLve one, that
education was going on informally in it, and even (some might
add) that it was going on the less i.mpededly for the absence of
formal education. But it would be unnecessary for them to think
in this way, and - if our argument in 1.2 for a tie-up between
formal and general uses is rrect - it is unlikely that they
173
would. They would be too 'busy doing important things that
mattered' to attend reflexively to their own resultant growth in
knowledge and wisdom! (Presumably, most uses of the word
'education' would eventually die away with them, weakened no
doubt by direct assaults of the kind we are familiar with in
regard to sexist usages.)
Why do these authors have it in for education as self-conscious
perspective and formal system? Two lines of objection may be
distinguished. The more explicit one is that the central business
of such deliberate education is always a determination of people's
beliefs, values and attitudes, what Holt calls 'people-shaping' and
Bereiter 'making people over'. Education is, then, an
irredeemably tyrannica],, indeed totalitarian, enterprise. Thus
Halt again:
Next to the right to life itself,the most fundamental of all human rights
is the right to control our own minds and thoughts.. .Whoever takes that
right away from us, by trying to educate us, attacks the very centre of
our being and does us a most profound and lasting injury... .Education, with
its supporting system of compulsory and competitive schooling, all its
carrots and sticks, its grades, diplomas, and credentials, now seems to me
perhaps the most authoritarian and dangerous of all the social inventions
of mankind.3
The other objection is that the educational perspective is one
within which the present is viewed simply as raw material for the
future and, in particular, the child is sacrificed to the adult she
is to become. There is no respect in it for what the child
actually is and actually can do. In fact in this mental-set she is
scarcely even seen as one who is and does, but only as one who
learns and becomes. This objection is, in particular, part of
Halt's critique of the biq deal he claims we make of
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distinguishing ']earning' and 'dcing' - a distinction he regards as
aimost wholly artificiaL
Can the idea of education be saved from these objections? Let
us try out the reply, to each of them in turn, that it may tell
against this or that educational system or cx)nception of education
but is miscast as an objection to education as such, because
deliberate education is not necessarily cxnceived in either of the
objectionable ways.
A tyranny? Does this charge not neglect the distinction,
laboriously evolved in more-or-less free and p]nralist societies
and now of fairly wide currency in them, between education and
indoctrination - a putatively sharp distinction indeed, so that
whatever cx)unts as indoctrination to that extent cannot count as
education? Of course this is now a more demanding or loaded
concept of education than, say, the one we lately envisaged
coming to birth in a primitive society. And even after
developing it we ourselves continue to employ the less
differentiated one to embrace systems we take to be
indoctrinatory, say those of ancient Sparta and modern North
Korea. But our purposes in this are ]3kely now to be only those
of non-committal reference and description. It is not education
in a sense still undistinguished from indoctrination that most of
us would seek to defend. Of course, too, we are often
hypocritical in our use of this distinction: we may be sensitive to
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the indoctrinatory features of systems that purvey beliefs and
values we dislike but oblivious to them in the transmission of
beliefs and values we cherish. But we can attend to this beam
in our own eye without having to ditch the whole idea of
education.
Again: it is indeed a characteristic of any system of schooling
that it is to some degree common - a common initiation into a
common heritage. But this does not have to be construed as
'monlding' educands to some pattern. On the contrary, we find it
again wired into many of our specific conceptions that education
must attend to the aptitudes and interests of the individual
student, and not merely attend to these (effective 'monidirig'
would require that much), but protect and promote them. For
instance, we find education being deliberately conceived as a
diIogue or negotiation between the individual and the common
heritage, and this latter itself conceived not rigidly as
'curriculum-packages' but flexibly as 'a conversation' of many
voices and layers. Thus Oakeshott (no radical) writes:
Education I will take to be the process of learning, in circumstances of
direction and restraint, how to recognise and make something of ourselves.
Unavoidably It is a two-fold process In which we enjoy an initiation into
what for want of a better word I will call a civilization S , and In doing
so discover our own talents and aptitudes in relation to that civilization
and begin to cultivate and to use them. Learning to make something of
ourselves In no context in particular is an impossibility; and the context
appears not only in what is learned but also In the conditions of direction
and restraint that belong to any education ......If, then, we recognise
education as an Initiation into a civilization, we may regard It as
beginning to learn our way about a material, emotional, moral and
intellectual inheritance, and as a learning to recognise the varieties of
human utterance and to participate In the conversation they compose.4
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True, here too our practice (and indeed our thry, the hardline
behaviourist versions of the 'objectives' curriculum mode],, for
examp]e) might often belie our ideal But, again, the joking of
complacency does not require an assault on the very idea of
education. In fact it could as well be achieved by an appeal to a
widely-held, if fairly loaded, version of that idea! Thus
Stenhouse in his well-known critique of the behavioural
objectives model takes it almost for granted that education must
be liberating to deserve the name. 'Education as induction into
knowledge is successful to the extent that it makes the
behavioural outmes of the students unpredictable.'5
It might be said that all this is too easy a way out of the first
objection. For it leaves us still presuming that there are me
legitimate ways of exhorting, persuading and generally
influencing others, and especially the young, at rather profound
levels - bsirally those ways that promote and appeal to their
reason. Again, while we have problems with forcing cx)nvictions
on others we remain happy to force a curriculum on them. We
hope not to be predetermining their opinions, but go on
compelling their 'conversation'!
Here we need to be carefully judicious. On the one hand:
though it seems true that in anything we would be inclined to
call a system of education there would be restraint and direction
of some kind and degree, including some that was externally
imposed, this in itself could not be a siifFiritnt objection to it.
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For it is impossible to envisage any form of human life in which
no restraint or direction whatever would be imposed (whether in
the name of 'education' or some other name), nor indeed one in
which restraint and direction would not be quite general
practices as regards the young. An extreme libertarian position
- such as Halt seems to flirt with - acxxrding to which the only
discipline ever jusHThthle is self-discipline, inc:orporates a quite
unreal view of the individual1 and especially of the young
individual,, in relation to her social environment This kind of
unreality is sometimes described as a neglect of 'original sin'.
But it might more appositely be cx)nveyed by reference to
another item in classical theology: the angeL The angel is said
to have no youth and no young. it is a being sprung into
existence without parentage or nurture, already fully-formed and
spiritually self-possessed, master of an innate stock of ideas and
knowledge, standing or falling entirely by its own autonomous
decision, each one in fact a species to itse]f. For such a being
external direction or restraint would indeed be an indignity - if
not an ].mpossLt)thty. But we humans fail some way short of
angels - and especially in our beginnings. Whatever is to be
said about being 'originally fIawed' it is certainly true that we
me into the world weak, ignorant, vulnerable and thoroughly
dependent - and the glory we may trail will have to be detected
in and through these humble circumstances. That is one side of
the picture.
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On the other hand: we should beware of concluding too much
from these very general observations about the human condition.
In themselves, for example, they come nowhere near overriding
all the scruples we might reasonably feel about a system of
cx)mpulsory schooling from 5 to 16. In more sophisticated terms,
they would not do much to soothe a Foucault-inspired dread of
education, with its attendant human science, as just one more
modern system of norma1i7tion and survciIkrice. But then it is
not our present intention to defend the standard system, nor to
preempt the power of imagination to envisage radical alternatives
to it. The idea was only to defend the continued use of
'education' as the flag under which imagination might saiL
A sacrifice of the present? What of the other objection, that
education sacrifices the child to the future adult?8
 It too calls
for a general remark on the human condition. A form of life in
which thought was never taken for tomorrow would hardly be
recognisable as human, and nor would one in which some did not
sometimes exercise foresight on behalf of others and in particular
of the young. To be sure, we can readily admit that a life lived
always 'ahead of itself, with little or no room for resting in the
present moment (no worship, no art, no play.....no leisure) is a
poor and desperate thing. On just about any calculation it is
also deeply irrationaL9
 To see and to shape the lives of others
in this pattern would be still more objectionable. But,
intuitively, just as earlier the real problem might have been said
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to be striking some appropriate balance between freedom and
constraint, so here it would seem to be finding a balance
between, or a higher synthesis of, living in the present and
living towards the future. So, education cannot be dismissed
simply because it is future-orientated. One point here is that
even if that were its whole story we might have been able to
compensate for it in our other perspectives on childhood. For
example, even educators who divorce education and play have
been known to give play its own time - not all have been
Gradgrinds! And if it is said that no compensation cxuld be
adequate here, considering the huge proportion of a child's time
that our society gives over to education, this would still be to
object to the exaggeration of a value, not the value itself.
But we must also attend to the possibility of redressing the
balance within the educational perspective. Thus, surely, play is
in fact educationally significant as well as immediately absorbing,
and these two aspects of it are not entirely independent - at
least in part, it is futurally significant because it is presently
absorbing. More generally, education need not be conceived
exclusively as preparation for adulthood and the future, nor its
immediate and future impacts as things quite unconnected. And
here again we find the point at issue actually written into
several of our more loaded conceptions of education. The most
obvious example is the 'child-centred' view, according to which
the curriculum is principally to be dictated by a pupil's present
interests. But there is also a requirement of significance-in-the-
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present, somewhat differently cxnceived, in the classical ideal of
'a liberal education'. For in it the curriculum is to be made up
chiefly of activities that are worthwhile in themselves - and
therefore worthwhile from the beginning. Educands are not mere
'learners' of things that in the future they might 'do' - history,
science, music etc. They already do these worthwhile things in
some real sense, and learn by their doing. Consider, for
example, 'learning physics' and 'doing physics'. The learner
already is (or should be) one who attends to the phenomena
under study, enquires about them, entertains hypotheses in their
regard, manipulates them, marvels at them - in ways and
degrees with which the enquiries, manipulations etc. of the
physirist are recx)gnisábly continuous. This is not altered by the
fact that the learner is by his doing one who catches up, as
opposed to one who expands, on existing knowledge.1O
These are not just starry-eyed ideals with no effect on practice.
For governments, indeed, the word 'education' triggers solemn
pronouncements on the needs of future citizens. For those who
have to work with children, like parents and teachers, the matter
is usually more cx)mp]ex. Long-term cxrnsiderations matter, but
the day-to-day measure of success is just as likely to be the
extent to which children are interested and fulfilled now by what
they are doing. When demands made in the name of future needs
are judged to be too strident or insistent (not to mention too
narrowly arnceived) teachers will sometimes interpose themselves
as buffers - against over-anxious governments and parents,
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against proposals to lengthen still further the shadow of
examinations, against their own impatience to get on with the
syllabus - and they will act thus precisely in the name of
education. None of which is to say that we have currently got a
proper balance of present and future, nor even that we are
moving towards it (in the UK the quite new deliberateness about
the marking of progress in 'key-stages' and subject 'levels'
worries many) - only that we are not entirely uninfluenced by
this ideal and that the term 'education' itself can remind us of it.
Is this a sufFitnt reply to the objection? It might still be said,
and with some inbiitive force, that its future orientation is more
basic to 'education' than any association with present value and
fulfillment, that the term always projects us forward more than it
directs our attention to the present. But if this is true, the
question it raises is whether it is enough, granted their time-
intensiveness, to think of schools and curricula in educational
terms. Might we not need other terms as well? Perhaps we do
need to offset, deliberately and as often as we speak of these
things, the disoourse of 'learning', 'beooming' and 'school' with a
disoourse of 'doing', 'being' and 'actLvity-centre'. Among other
things this would shore up the requirement of present-
significance we noticed in some uses of 'education'. It would be
modest cx)mpared to Holt's proposal to abolish education-
mindedness and education-speak, but still far-reaching - and at
once more just to education and less likely to be dismissed out
of hand.
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Finally, recall that we can think of education, especially
education in the widest sense, as a life-long process. True, it
may be only in some kinds of society that this thought is likely
to be entertained, and even in them there is perhaps a rider to
the effect that the precisely educational dimension of living and
doing is more to the fore in early life. It remains that this is a
further way in which we undermine a too-rigid distinction
between a ]earning-phase of life and a doing-phase - tunnelling
now from the other side of the walL
There are, then, versions of 'education' that require us to
conceive adult-life as continued development and schooldays as
days already of experience and doing.
Review - and a third objection We have been attending to two
objections to education-mindedness. We found against them that,
to the extent they do not simply neglect some basic facts about
human life, they seriously underest±nate the flexibility of the
educational perspective. What is reasonable and important in
them can be arxx)mmodated within the discourse of education, and
sometimes is. We found r them that they force on our attention
concerns that are reasonable and important The first makes us
think about the relationship of the (more-or-less) common
curriculum of formal education to the individual with her own
experience, talents, interests, ideas, ideals - perhaps, too, her
own sub-culture and language or dialectil. Some might see this
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as deciding when and how to iron out, and when and how to
tolerate, differences. But in proportion as a society values the
liberty of individuals to make their own way it will be cx)nceived
in more cxmp]ex ways: how to educate without indoctrinating -
against indoctrination even; and how to promote a common
civilization that will assist, not hamper, the individual as she
makes something of herself. The second objection makes us
think about the bearing of education, a protracted and time-
intensive enterprise with an inherent reference to the future, on
the present lives of children and youth. There is the general
requirement to tailor curricula and pedagogies to the
developmental stage of the educand, in taxing children not to
overtax them. This might be so interpreted, however, that
childhood is acknowledged only as a complicated passage to the
prize of a successful adu]thood. To go on actually to prize
childhood, we must conceive of education as directed at the
enrichment of the present as much as of the future. We may
even need to reinforce this by the further step of supplementing
education-speak with action-speak, a discourse that starts with
the future even if it comes to include the present supplemented
with one that actually starts with the present even if goes on to
include the future.
But it might now be wondered why we have been defending the
idea of education with such obstinate ingenuity? Why build into
it so many 'epicycles'? A deschco]er might acknowledge the
innocence of some of its variants, yet still think it compromised
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as a whole by its association with the standard educational
practice to which he objects. More prudent1
 in starting anew, to
abandon it altogether in favour of less ambiguous notions like
'doing', 'learning' and 'training'! Why, he may want to know,
should we insist on the idea even in advance of a verdict on
current practice? What, positively, does 'education' import that
could make it worth clinging to?
What it particularly imports over and above those other notions
is, of course, the pursuit of a view of life as a whole. The
near-tautologies that education 'is for life' and 'is of the whole
person' relate to this, and it is it1
 indeed, that gave some initiil
plausibility to cx)mp]aints about 'people-shaping' (Halt) and
'making people over' (Bereiter). We are becoming very familiar
with this idea, having invoked it, or presumed on it, in noticing
that schooling is challenged by the idea of education, most
explicitly by 'education (in the widest sense)', to justify itself by
reference to some wide 'scheme of things', again in imagining the
genesis in a primitive society of the ideas of teaching and
learning 'for life' out of a combination of nurture and training
ideas, and again in discussing and articulating the exceptional
obligation that is laid on educational theory to be broad and
coherent
But we have also sometimes hinted at the problematic nature of
this ideal of a unified view of life. Contemporary western
culture, secular and fragmented as it is, makes us sensitive to
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this (though we rarely appreciate that the idea of education is
among the things at stake). Is the pursuit of a unified view of
life possible without the artifices of indoctrination and/or self-
deception? What particular obstacles to - and perhaps
opportunities for - this pursuit are there in contemporary
culture and contemporary educational practice?
A view of life as a whole: ruminations We may recall Chesterton's
particularly forceful statement of this aspiration quoted at the
head of Part 3: an education, as such, is imbued with a
philosophy which it tends to convey - whether indirectly or
directly, and hence, too, it is itself a unity and much more than
just the sum of its parts; in short
if it does not all combine to convey some general view of
life, it's not education at alL
Against this we might set a satirical scene from the end of The
Life of Brian. After the caption 'The End', the camera returns to
John Cleese who says 'That is the end of the film. Here is the
meaning of life'. In the style of an announcer of an Oscar
award, he takes a card from a sealed envelope and continues:
Nothing very special really! 'Be kind, avoid eating too much
fat, read a good book now and then, get in some walking -
and live in peace and harmony with psople of all nations,
races and creeds'.12
The question posed by this juxtaposition is why it is thought
right and important to have (consciously), and to hand on
(deliberately), a view of life as a whole. Certainly a mnWitude of
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religions, ideologies, philosophical systems and therapies are at
one in assuming a hunger for some unifying, pervading,
overarching meaning to life. They assume this hunger in the act
of offering themselves as its true fulflflinent. Even some of those
who have denied the possibility of full]ment have borne witness
to the demand. Thus Sartre saw human being as a passion for
God, but 'a useless passion' because God was non-existent and
iinpcssib]e. A moving passage:
The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as
perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be It,
precisely because it could not attain the In-Itself without losing Itself
as for-itself. Human reality therefore is by nature an unhappy
consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state.13
On the other hand, the C]eese-]ike resistance to these traditions
and to an education in them - what the traditions will identify as
wor]iIiness, cynicism, indifference, apathy, philistinism - might be
read as evidence that the demand is less than universally
spontaneous. And where it exists it has often seemed a whipped
up thing, a case of advertisement creating the need. Also, it is
important soberly to remember the shadow side of ideology and
religion, the fundamentalism, fanaticism, or just plain simple-
mindedness, that goes with the closure of thought into total
systems, and, in other contexts, the quietism that results from
some kinds of belief in divine, or evolutionary, or historical,,
process. But - to switch back to the other side (which I believe
to be right in the last analysis) - these things may be seen as
aberrant or deformed expressions of the desire for unity,
integrations of human life that are premature, or of the wrong
degree, or located in the wrong dimension. Sometimes that is
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how some of them are seen within the traditions themselves -
thus superstition was in the first instance a sin. Counted as
deformations they would not discredit the aspiration to unity
itsf.
Richard Peters remarked in an early work that 'education' implied
the transmission of what is of ulithnate value'4. Commenting on
this iater, John Wilson wrote 'it might be thought to imply that,
until we actually know "what is of ultimate value", we cannot
know what is education and what is not." He seemed to intend
this as a reduc(io ad absurdem. But is it not reasonab]e to
maintain that uncertainty about ultimate values would entail some
uncertainty about what to do in education and what to count as
good education - and in that sense about what is, and is not,
education? Education seems indeed a prime example (morality is
another) of those things that are affected by uncertainty over
ultimate values. Of course, up to a point education can live with
uncertainty, even thrive upon it. A cut-and-dried conception of
ultimate values is not necessary to it. Thus a better statement
than Peters' (and more in keeping with his own general position)
might be that education implies the equipping and supporting of
pple in an ongoing quest for what is of ultimate value - by
those who do not know all the answers but who are more
experienced and advanced in this quest. But an uncertainty that
is not just over the best ordering of values and the relative
merits of various schemes for ordering values, but over whether
there can be any valid ordering of them, may reasonably be
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thought to create difficulty for the very concept of education.
To the extent that ideals ]ike 'seeing life whole', 'a scheme af
things', 'the quest for meaning and coherence' and 'ultimate
values' lose their appeal, then, the idea af education - not just
some particular loaded versions of it, but the basic structure of
the idea - is weakened.
Might there be in the ideal of 'breadth' a modern and syfFiririt
substitute for these grander aspirations? 16
 Arguably, this
substitution is already under way. But if it is, a weight is being
placed on 'breadth' than it cannot sustain. it is one thing to
cultivate it as the essential complement of 'coherence', our
insurance against too simple and monolithic a unity, but quite
another to ask it to stand on its own. For (like its companion
'balance') it presumes a background of what have been called
'prior value commitments' - it is across the range of
independently valued acti.vities and discourses that breadth is to
be sought - and, directly to the point, it is necessarily
accompanied by some notion of a due or just proportion' among
these, 17 which refers us right back to something like 'a scheme
of things'.
To begin to anchor these general ruminations. In education
there are two main arenas in which the issue is joined between
the requirement of unity and the doubt concerning it, as there
are two kinds of pluralism against which the aspiration to
coherence is tested. One arena is the common school of the
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pluralist society. Of its nature (by cxntrast with, say, the
church-school) it involves serious ideological compromise, and
therefore a diminution of the aspiration to coherence in one
dimension. As against that, at its best it works in another
dimension to an egalitarian, fraternal and democratic vision of its
own, paxtiafly captured in the image of 'the melting-pot'. This
vision might be described further and it might be asked if it
could be snfFint in itself, and to what extent the tension
between it and visions of the first dimension is inevitable,
indefinitely sustainable, resolvable at some higher level,, and so
on. 18 In fact we shall. confine our attention to the second arena,
which is the standard curriculum. The contest here is between
the ideal of curriculum coherence on the one hand, and on the
other hand, the plurality of subjects, practices and skills that
have to be covered and, at longer range, that explosive
fragmentation of intellectual labour that is a feature of
contemporary culture. This is as much, or not much less, an
issue for the church-school as for the common schooL It will
occupy us for the rest of this section, and the questions it
opens up for several further sections. But our reflections on it
may not be conclusive as between hope and doubt regarding the
prospects for coherence. There may be wisdom in keeping both
hope and doubt alive.
Curriculum connedions	 'Curriculum', used in the singular to
cover the varied activities of teaching and learning in an
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institution, already suggests some organisation and unity. (The
science curriculum, the mathematics curriculum, the humanities
curriculum etc. add up, not to 'curricula', but to 'curriculum'!)
The idea of a 'cvre-curriculum' is stronger in this respect. At
least in the hands of those who know its history (which seems
not to include governmental ministries) it implies much more than
a loose assemblage of basic skills and subjects. As the metaphor
of 'core' suggests, it is that part of the curriculum which is to
hold the whole curriculum together. Indeed it is to be an
instrument of unity and wholeness, of progressive organization
and reorganization, in relation to the student's life-experience
generally. Furthermore, as common-core, it is charged with
articulating and ennabling our common social life and citienship,
indeed our common humanity. This then is an idea that passes
Chesterton's test for an education, the 'reconstructiordst'
philosophy or vision that it conveys or 'teaches' being that of
actively 'whole' people in the open and participatory democracy.7
But the idea of an integrated curriculum is in some respects
stronger stilL It interprets Chesterton's requirement that 'every
part...has a connection with every other part' in the direction of
every part having to be explir!itly taught and learnt in its
connections with every other part.
But now, how much of all this is possible, in some desirable form,
in a complex and fragmented culture? What kind of unity may
the curriculum of today have? We shall assemble a patient
answer to that question. It will distinguish the partial from the
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overarching, and contrast the common perception of many
particular connections and the correlative enthusiasm for some
integrations and some cross-curriculum themes with the lack of
cx)nfldence regarding the overall coherence of the whole
curriculum. It is not too difficult to evoke a sense of the
curriculum as a veritable manifold, indeed, of connections. But
the questions will be: what kind of connections? who has to
make them? and, do they add up to anything?
One could begin from aimost anywhere, but let us take the
familiar business of teaching children to write in a primary
school.. From copy-shaping individual letters, this quite quickly
becomes a many-faceted affair. Pupils' work is soon being
judged against a formidable checklist of skIlls and qu1itis: the
'basics' of handwriting, spelling, grammar, syntax, speed; and
more 'literary' items like clarity, style, descriptive power,
creativity, expressiveness, authenticity. But, now, despite there
being times and exercises specifically devoted to this or that
skill or quality, it is not the case that these can be considered
and taught for in splendid isolation from each other. Let us
leave aside for the present overlaps and connections of a
conceptual nature (e.g. the bearing of syntax on clarity) and
consider them only as distinct. There remain - on any
reasonable account - two purposes for which these items must be
brought into relationship, namely, to settle issues of prrity
between them and to check on the compatibility of methods
relating to them.
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Under the first heading we would find that old chestnut of how
'the basics' as a bunch are to be weighted, in terms of time,
attention and resources, against literary qu1i1-ics - both in
general and at this or that stage of schooling and development
We would also find the more delicate issues of weighing these
latter intangibles against each other, honesty as against
imaginativeness, expressiveness as against polish, and so on.
Note that we are unlikely to get far with this ordering without
some reference to different uses of writing (e.g. expressive,
transactional,, poetic) and to different genres of text (story,
letter, diary etc.), and without some estimate of their degrees of
importance - and what oould not that lead us on to? All this is
to do with settling priorities. Secxndly, the mature act of
writing requires the simu7tnus deployment of clusters of these
skills and qu1itics, so they must be imparted with an eye to
their fit with each other. An insistence on oopperp]ate might
cripple expressiveness, now and later! There will be advantages,
in additinn to those of straight eoonomy, in techniques that
impart some of them together, for instance, in methods of
teaching spelling or grammar which associate them with some
literary virtues even if they are not the most supremely effective
methods in their own terms. In genera]1
 approaches and
resources are to be scrutinized for, and judged by, their full
range of effects and side-effects.
It will be risky, then, to proceed with teaching any facet of
writing except against some kind of oonsidered view of all facets
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together. On a wider front such a considered view will have to
mesh, for the same two reasons, with perspectives on other parts
of the curriculum. In one direction writing will be considered in
re]ation to reading, in another as it develops oral expression, and
in a third as it is required by and promotes a series of
particular subject-matters. An ordered set of these and further
deliberated perspectives will begin to look like a coherent
language-policy. This, in its turn, could hardly avoid reference
to other kinds of development, such as the emotional and the
aesthetic, and to other cross-curriculum matters, like race and
gender.
Traffic-flow or assembly-line? But what kind of coordination is
being i.mp]ied here? Is it just a matter of 'traffic regulation', of
rules and lanes for a large number of separate items that jostle
for the same space and compete for the same time, occasionally
travelling together but mostly not? If so, then 'curriculum'
would name an aggregate after a]]1 though of elements that had
been adjusted to each other (and the ideal might be as in the
classical liberal picture of the State: each element to enjoy as
much freedom, including the freedom to enter into cooperative
arrangements, as would not interfere with the equal freedom of
other elements). Checking for compatibility, the second of our
imperatives, of itself would imply only this much unity 2° But our
first imperative, the sewing of priorities, suggests another kind
of coordination, more convergent, like the assembly-line, than
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divergent, like the traffic-flow. For if elements are to be
weighed and balanced against each other then they must be
broadly mmensurabie. The picture lurking here is of a scheme
of things, some cxmposite of criteria of relative value and maps
of knowledge and skill,, in which each element has 'its proper
place'. If we are also to move away from managerialism e. from
a cxordination in which those cx)ordinated play no part, we
should add that this scheme is itself to be oommunicated to
students, not just in the interests of productivity - as perhaps
with Volvo's well-known attempt to humanise the assembly-line,
but as a principal focus of learning in its own right And if
there were, as we should expect, some uncertainty about the
scheme and some openness as to its interpretation, then these
features too could be communicated to students and they too
could work at resolving or expiniting them.
But, now, this is still to leave the question of how it is that the
elements are broadly cx)mparab]e. it is also, so far, short of
what a cxre curriculum or an integrated curriculum intend. It
omits, or omits to make explinit, the idea of the tailoring of parts
to each other, and of this, too, as something for students to be
active in on their own behalf, to do and to learn to do for
themselves. To get further, or even just to explain how we have
got so far, we should begin by reinstating conceptual
r 1 tinnships as a consideration.
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F]e]db]e curricuhini bricks? Returning to our two checklists of
writing quAlities, the basic and the literary, let us dwell on the
conceptual relationships between these qwililies indivis:lua]ly and
the practice of writing itself. Non-controversii1ly, let us say
that writing is a visual form and record of expression and
communication. (i) Of the 'basics', some relate to the specifying
idea of a visual form and recxrd, others to the more generic
linguistic ideas of expression and communication. Legibility is of
the first kind. It is a quality of nothing but written records,
and without it nothing succeeds as a written record and the
practice of writing becomes pointless. The same is true of
approximately correct spelling. Approximately correct grammar
and syntax, on the other hand, have this kind of mutually
conditirining relationship with linguistic expression and
communication generically, and are conditions of writing as a
particular form of these. (ii) The case with the more literary
quAlities is slightly more complicated. Clarity, expressiveness,
elegance, accuracy, authenticity - all these can characterise other
things besides language. They can characterize music, painting,
architecture and body language, and some of them can
characterize human deeds and natural objects. But as attributed
to speech and writing, one wants to say, they have a meaning
that is to some extent specic to that context. At any rate,
quAlities like clarity and elegance can only be identified in
speech and writing from the inside, by the use of the tacit
knowledge of these arts that speakers and writers possess.
They are not 'stuck on' and independently rxgnisable, like the
196
redness of an old pillar box. In the other direction, expression
and cxmmunicatk)n either require or are facilitated by these
qu1iti, depending on the context.
What is the significance of these conceptual cx)nnections? It is
that any impression we may have got that those checklist items
were basic 'units' of curriculum currency, or bni1ririg bricks
avRilRhle for just about any curriculum construction, would be
quite wrong. it is not the comparative weighing and the mutual
adjusting that first bring these items into relationship. They are
already parts of the same system. Yet their relative positioning
is not so fixed as to leave no need or free-play for the weighing
and the adjusting. Rather, the system makes weighing and
adjusting possible by supplying relevant criteria for these
operations. We ask 'how legible must the writing be?', 'how
explicit should be the knowledge of grammar?', 'how important is
style?', etc., and these connections refer us, quasi-automatically,
to the nature and purposes of writing as to a somewhat wider
scheme of things.
Is writing as a whole, then, the sort of thing that could count as
a basic unit? As the common bearer of those qui1itfrs it would
make a better candidate than any of them. But neither is it an
infinitely flexible biiildirig-brick. Most obviously, and despite
attempts in the nineteenth century to teach reading without it, it
has a relationship to reading that is as close and as mutual as
anything we have seen. What, then, about literacy as a whole?
197
Though large for a brick, are not its uses legion? But cx)nsider
for a moment its 'sideways on' relationship with school subjects
(those other curriculum 'bricks'!). It is more than a convenience
to them. It is, in fact, essential to the kind of sustained
concentration of thought that disciplines like science and history
evince, an internal conditinn of their development (This needs
some argument - to be supplied in one of our concluding case-
studies - which is consistent, however, with regarding it as at
least partially a conceptual point2l) In reverse, literacy
achieves much of its most valuable potential in its use in such
disciplines. The conclusion seems overdue that nothing quite fits
the bill of 'flexible curriculum brick'!
We have many times referred to education as 'a practice' in the
singular, and one that is foundational to other practices. We
have before also referred to it as a complex of different
practices, the level and degree of whose interrelatedness is the
point presently at issue. A]isdair Maclntyre, in a recent and
acclaimed book, presents a practice as any complex, coherent,
established and cooperative activity that meets the following
conditions:
(1) it has internal goods i.e. satisfactions that have to be
lived to be understood;
(ii) it has standards of excellence that partially define it;
(iii) it tends to the progressive development of our
understanding of both the goods and the standards, though
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without ruling out the danger of decline - thus it genuinely
has a history and prospects of its own;
(iv) these features imply another, viz, that it provides a
setting for the practice of virtues like courage, patience
and frlendship.22
Examples are said to include farming (but not planting turnips),
football (but not taking corners), chess, the making and
sustaining of family life, pnhitir!s (as classically understood, at
any rate), science, history, portrait painting - and arts
generally. Now writing would seem to meet the c]auses of this
definition just as well as the examples quoted. (We had already
ascribed to it (i) and (ii) above, and it would not be difficult to
make a case for (iii) and (iv).) But if writing is a practice, then
practices do not have to be too stxictly bounded. For equally
good cases could be made for the larger unit of literacy, and,
again, for a rather particular kind of writing and reading, viz.
literature. To the same effect we might consider portrait-
painting in relation to painting, or physics in relation to science.
'Practice' is indeed an appropriate and useful concept in relation
to curriculum. Its conditinn of 'internal goods' offers some
partial and provisional response to the demand for justification;
it implies just the kind of patient, sustained, initiation that is
associated with the idea of 'curriculum'; it suggests useful
queries about what curricula typically omit e.g. farming (even in
rural areas); and it would be a bulwark against the tendency to
'atomize' everything into lists of skills, qulitics, criteria or
objectives. But it seems - like 'plant', which covers both 'the
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tree' and 'grass' - to be a concept of a something that does not
have to be strongly indivi1uated (even if in particular cases, e.g.
chess, it is).
Curricu]um and cu]tural disunity To the extent that the
practices and sub-practices of curriculum are indivkuated and
autonomous they give the lie to the slightly silly23
 image of 'the
seamless garment of knowledge'. To the extent that their
individuality and autonomy are limited we can still hope for
something more unified than a patchwork quilt. But we have so
far referred only to the common dependence of many major
curriculum practices on literacy. This does indeed confer a
certain unity on the curriculum - the unity of the academic. But
what now of the relationships of these major practices with each
other? Oakeshott1
 as we have seen, suggests that education is
'learning to recognize the varieties of human utterance and to
participate in the conversation they compose' 24	 We may feel
like asking: what conversation?
It does seem obvious that in our culture such a conversation is
more fond dream that reality. There are sub-conversations,
sometimes struggling to start up or to keep going, within each of
the broad areas of the humanities, the sciences, the arts and
technologies. But there is litfip
 'lived' contact between these
larger blocs, and little enough between them and the work and
practices of everyday life. In the last century, for instance,
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Bakunin looked to science 'becxrniing fused with the real and
immediate life of every individual', and Marx, famously, to the
overcxmng of 'the degrading division of labour into intellectual
and manual labour' - but how much nearer are we to achieving
these things? Somehow, circuitously, each sphere may connect
with every other, but it seams precisely not the case that, as
Chesterton would have wanted it, 'all combine to convey some
general view of life'.
No archetypal ideas What we especially lack is much by way of
archetypal images and ideas running through these areas,
creating analogies and resonances between them. In the ancient
Greek world - so Si.mone Weil argues 25
 - 'form', 'proportion' and
'equilibrium' were a family of ideas at the very heart, at once, of
their mathematics and science, their ethics and politics, their art
and literature, and their spirituality. This comes across
marvelously in a passage of Plato's, in the dialogue Gorgias,
where he is considering the charge that morality is just a system
of conventions by which the weak attempt to rein in the strong.
Socrates, defending morality against C11i'] who has advanced
the proto-fascist position, argues that the excellence of anything
- implement, physical body, soul1
 organism - springs from its
having a 'certain ordered beauty' appropriate to it. He continues
as follows:
The man who adopts the course (of allowing all his appetites to go
unchecked) will win the love neither of God nor of his fellow-men; he Is
incapable of social life, and without social life there can be no love. We
are told on good authority (he means Pythagoros'), Callicles, that
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bonds of society and love and order and discipline and righteousness, and
that Is why the universe is called an ordered whole or cosmos and not a
state of disorder and licence. You, I think, for all your cleverness, have
failed to grasp the truth; you have not observed how great a part
geometric equality plays In heaven and earth, and because you neglect the
study of geometry you preach the doctrine of unfair shares.26
We are not entirely without feeling for this kind of sweep in
argument; it survives in pockets of our cu]ture and corners of
our minds. But in the mainstream the idea, for instance, that
geometry and physics lie near the centre of moral education is
likely to seem eccentric, of some 'poetic' force perhaps but
hardly a serious proposition. Actually to take it seriously would
involve us in radically rethinking our science education, and -
almost certainly - our science itse]f.27
No unity of method Another, but flatter, idea was that unity
cx)uld be found in method, in the principles of well-conducted
enquiry whatever the subject matter. It has surfaced from lime
to lime in Western culture, and never more strongly than in the
17th and 18th century school of Rationalist philosophy stemming
from Descartes.28
 Having himself discovered coordinate geometry
by a unification of algebra and classical geometry, and like
Galileo attributing the recent triumphs in science to a new
unification of mathematics and natural science, Descartes went on
to conceive of a distillation of mathematical method that could
function universally. It would bring to all spheres of enquiry
the kind of spectacular advances that were becoming the
hallmark of physical science and would, indeed, bring all
enquiries into one science.
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Those long chains of reasons, all quite simple and quite easy, which
geometers are wont to employ In reaching their most difficult
demonstrations, had given me occasion to imagine that all the possible
objects of human knowledge were linked together in the same way and that,
if we accepted none as true that was not so In fact, and kept to the right
order In deducing one from the other, there was nothing so remote that it
could not be reached, nothing so hidden that It could not be discovered.
We have less to mourn in the passing of this idea, but are we in
danger of being left with something flatter still as a basis for
unity in our intellectual lives? In the place of analogies of
cx)ntent or a common method, what have we got to add to the
bare fact that our forms of knowledge are all our's? Perhaps
only the thought that they are all 'academic' Le. literate and
'concentrated'!
Conclusion That would be a situation of some peril for the idea of
education. Let us take, as an example, the science teacher in a
secondary schooL She does not think that her identity as
'science teacher' should vanish into her role as educator - even
in the best of all possible worlds. But she does consider herself
an educator as welL On what basis? There will be, of course,
her general relationship with her students, her pastoral work,
and so forth. But she wants to think of her science teaching
as itself educational,, perhaps even as her main contribution to
her students' education. Now by this she means to imply both
some significant connection between it and the work of her
colleagues in other departments, and some distinctiveness in its
contl)uon to their collaboratLve enterprise - without which
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science could be replaced on the curriculum without educational
loss. We generally approve of her thinking in this way, being
haunted by this thought indeed, but does our culture provide
her with the means to realise her thought? Certainly the ideal
of 'the academic' seems insuffint. It points up a shared goal,
the development of literate and cxncentrated thought - though
this is only one of the goals that teachers would commonly
subscribe to - but it seems altogether too thin to sustain the
notion of distinc±ive and cvmplementary cxntributions from
different subjects. For that, surely, one needs to be able to
refer subjects to different aspects of human being, e.g.
cx,gnifive, emotional and physical,, and/or of the world around us
e.g. natural, social and spiritual,, and then to see these aspects
as constituting together ordered wholes. It is precisely this
reference and this holistic view that are made diffiru]t in a
fragmented culture.
In the end truth is a still more important ideal than education.
If we knew that unity was a chimera, or that it could be
achieved only by artificial imposition, we should perhaps abandon
'education'. But of course we do not know this. We only know
there are some obsf1 in its way. In the next two sections we
shall continue on our quest for a complex coherence. First we
shall address directly the question of overarching educational
values, those values with a claim to span and to direct the whole
curriculum, and we shall argue for a particular ordering of
these. Then we shall address the question of differentiated
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cx)mp]ementarty in relation to our cultural 'capital', and
endeavour to relate our discussion of what we shall argue are
the several dimensions of this complementarity to that order of
va]nes.
NOTES
Illich (1971) p.19.
2	 Holt p.19.
3	 ibid. pp.7-8.
4 'The study of politics In a university' in Oakeshott, M. (1962) (Cf. 'Michael
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206
23 Silly, if only because it neglects the obvious point that conceptual relationships -
and the differentiations that are their flip' side - are of many kinds, differing
e.g. in degree of closeness, of necessity and of mutuality.
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OFDFIIlG	 DLJCAFIONAL.	 ALLJ	 LDE
QF rHE WOFLD A
	 oAPINrAL
Four kinds of value Suppose that the question is raised as to
why science should be on the curriculum. The answer might
take any of the following forms, depending partly, no doubt, on
who the respondent is and what his relationships are to science
and to education.
One kind of answer will stress the 'pay-off': in societal terms,
the x)ntribulion of science mediat.ed by technology to national
wealth and power, and, cx)rrespondingly, the need to educate for
a scientifically literate mmunity which will at once produce and
support professional classes of scientists and technologists. This
is the perspective of governments in particular, both in the
developed and the developing worlds. it is also, surely, the
answer that best expresses that prestige of science which makes
the question itself an arresting one.
Another answer would proclaim the intrinsic fecundity of science
(both pure and applied) and the opportuniti it thereby
provides for the development and stretching of minds, for
intellectual challenge and adventure. It has a natural appeal for
educators and educationists, at any rate those in the liberal and
the progressive traditions.
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A third answer will insist rather on the rtiona1ity of science,
that is, certain ethical,, or quasi-ethical,, quiTh-ics which it
embodies (not exclusively, but paradigmaticafly) and which it
therefore enoourages in those who are exposed to 1t precision of
thought, objectivity, a xmmitment to truth, and maybe
international-mindedness (on the somewhat idealized view of
science as knowing no frontiers). Such an answer would appeal
to the sober, steadfazt philosopher.
Finally there is a romantic viewpoint according to which all the
values so far mentioned are but incidental to, or perhaps
consequent upon, a more fundamental value, namely, the value
that accrues to science from the object which it studies, that is
to say, from the order and the resources of the universe in
general and in its parts. These invite attention and enquiry,
and an education in this attention and enquiry, simply by being
awesome, wonderful,, marvellous, beautifuli Thus the young
Einstein (and the scientist herself is a not unlikely respondent in
these terms) on what he took to be the truly scientific spixib
A finely tempered nature longs to escape from his noisy cramped
surroundings into the silence of the high mountains where the eye
ranges freely through the still pure air and fondly traces out the
restful contours apparently built for eternity
and again:
The state of mind which enables a man (sic) to do work of this kind
is akin to that of the religious worshipper or lover.1
On this view, an education in science should be a profoundly
spiritual affair. Also, an ecological dimension would be more
si1y accomodated. In the 'green' movement, reverence for
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nature - a responsible reverence or, in HeiLlegger's terms, a
shepherd's tendance - is even more basic than is the calcu]jtion
of long-term, future-generational,, utility.
These four answers may be x)nsidered as each valiLl in its own
way - science, we might say, is fortunate to have four important
kinds of value going for it. But we cannot just leave it at that.
Science education is no mere matter of transferring a fixed body
of knowledge and enquiry to the minds of schoolchildren. There
are questions of which selections to make, how to present these,
what kind of developmental sequence to give to the science
curriculum - of, as one might put it in general,, the spirit of
science-education. Thus a covert competition to isolate the cadre
of university scientists and technologists may work out as one
thing and the fostering of the spirit of the lover or worshipper
as something quite other. These values may be expected, indeed,
to conflict often and deeply in practice. It follows that any
serious address of the on.ginal question 'why science?' must
attempt to order them.
But this fourfold categorization can be generalized to refer to
eduron as a whole, and it is in regard to their claims on it
that I shall presently discuss in turn what I shall call
possessive, expii-5ntial, ethical and 'ecstatic' (in the somewhat
technical sense of the Greek root 'standing out of oneself)
values and viewpoints. I shall also develop an ongoing sketch of
an argument for an ordering of these values that gives priority
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to the last-named, by endeavouring so to expose each of the first
three classes of values as ungrounded or incomplete that the
next one is naturally 1frited as its presupposition or corrective.
Necessarily fairly abstract, despite a use of examples in it, this
general sketch is complemented by the sustained case-studies of
some particular curriculum areas in Part 4.
Justification and a road n taken As a preliminary, let us recall
the burden of justification that education carries and then
consiLler strategies for dealing with it.. We have noticed that
education as theory cannot avoid making value judgements in its
normative modes nor running up against them in its descriptive
modes. This is because it is value-saturated as a practice. Like
other objects of public debate and policy - housing, health, the
economy, the environment, public order, defence, the arts, etc. -
education is both a value in itself and involves more particular
value-choices in all its policy deliberations. Unlike them (except
inasmuch as they too take on educational functions, as in
community health provision), it additionally involves a deliberate
wmmunication of values, as we saw earlier (pp. ). Education
consciously shapes values as well as being shaped by them. It
follows that to some consiñerable extent the justification of
curriculum decisions will be the justification of values and not
just of prudential or technical judgements. This remains true of
decisions that are also obviously prudential and/or technical e.g.
the choice of an approach for the teaching of reading2.
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How, in general,, might we prepare ourselves to accomplish this
justification of values in the educational context? We assume
here our earlier defence against a sceptical sub jectivism that
wouli:I preclude our ever starting out. Granted that, there are
two strategies we might consider. The one we shall actually
adopt, as indicated, will be to identify significant categories of
value to which individual values like equality or the vocational
might then be related, to consider the claims on education of
each of these categories, and to consider whether, and how, the
categories may be ordered. Alternatively, we might have chosen
to identify historically significant philosophies or ideologies (in
one sense of those terms 3), within which individual values might
be situated, and then to compare the merits and demerits of
these.	 We might have started by identifying educationaZ
ideologies like progressivism, classical humanism,
reconstructionism and technocracy, 4
 and later invoked some
philosophy of life as a whole, like liberalism, Marxism, Christianity
or Islam, to provide some more ultimate justification. The
advantages of this approach are in terms of intellectual
convenience and po1itis. It promises some intelligibility and
some basis for consistent action that are ready-made; and it
promises identifith]e Ths and historical roots. Its
disadvantages are three risks that it carries. There is a danger
of historical and conceptual oversimplification: there are Marxist
Christians, liberal Christians, Muslim socialists, non-elitist
classical humanists, etc. A closely-related s&xnd danger is of
getting trapped into some too narrow and/or inflexible set of
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positions. The third danger is of a phi]osopically disappointing
secx)nd-handedness. Of cxurse, we might have guarded against
these dangers by historical exactitude, a studied eclecticism, and
the treating of idso]ogies as starting points for our own
enquines. 5
 But then we would have ]ost the easy
systematization, and to put order back into our enquiries we
might have been forced, belatedly, to something like the first
strategy anyway!
(1) Possessive Va]ues and vora1ona1 education Wealth, status
and power, whether considered in relation to the individual,, a
class or a society, are values with which education has sat
uncx)mfortably in western culture, at ieast since Plato and the
Sophists were arguing over them. There has been, and there
remains, controversy over their actual relationships with
educational systems and, more markedly still 1
 over the stance
which education ought to assume towards them. And other
material values have been drawn into this uncertainty, though
they did not deserve to be, values like health, housing, making a
living, and creating (as opposed to accumulating) wealth.
What do these values have in common that they should be lumped
together in the same penumbra? To begin with, they are
inteixxnnected in the sense that one tends to bring the others in
its train. This is notoriously so for wea]th, power and status.
But if we concentrate for the moment on these we can, in
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addition, detect certain common features centring on the notion
of possession. They are all three such that they can be
possessed, in greater or lesser amount or degree, with more or
less security, and their possession bears some relationship to the
effort and contrivance of the possessor. Because of their
perceived relationship to effort and contrivance they can become
goals to be pursued. Because of the variations of quantity and
of security they can become constant concerns and, even,
overriizig pre-occupations. Now this much could also be said of
health, and indeed, as I shall emphasize presently, of knowledge.
But in regard to wealth, power and status we have to add both
that possession of them is exclusive possession - shared, they
are diminished - and that the generally avi1Rble amount of each
is limited (contingently in the case of wealth, necessarily in the
case of the others). Because of these features strivings for
wealth and for power have an intrinsically cxmpel±ive aspect.
These extra conditions do not apply to health or to knowledge as
such - though they do apply to many of the conthi-inns of these,
hospital beds and university places for instance, which is the
basis of much illuminating analysis of health and of knowledge as
'corn mod itics'.
There are two main manifestations of a rampant possessive
instinct in education: unqu1ifid vocationalism and
encyclopoedism. These are to be distinguished from measured
concerns, situated within a larger value-context, for the
vocational and for the breadth and the retention of knowledge.
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A rampant voctior'l'm 1th nceives education as a whole as
instrumental to working life, and cxnceives working life as wholly
instrumental to the securing of money, possessions, status and
power. The first is a narrowness of attitude that would entail a
narrowing of curriculum (though there would still be question of
'generic' as well as of specific job-skills, including, for
examp]e,the market value of an arts degree, and of work-
al-1-itudes as well as skills). The second goes naturally with the
first, for it would be inconsistent to value other aspects of work,
like cxmradeship, service or intrinsic satisfaction, without valuing
them in other contexts as well and then allowing them a
broadening curriculum influence. This kind of vocationalism is
the natural educational expression of vulgar materialism, for
which possession is the overriding value and passion. Obviously
it can take, overtly and covertly, societal as well individual forms
- so that when an individual seeks to bend an educational system
to his material advantage, he may find it, like the wider social
system of which education is a function, agreeably unresistant!
The most i.m mediately t11irig criticism of this stance is the old
one that it is irrational in the narrow sense of being inadequate
in its own self-serving terms. 6
 In general, possession, of its
very nature, refers beyond itself to other values. Vastness and
security of possession can rationally be valued only if what is
vastly and securely possessed has a value for us that does not
reside in the mere fact of possession. A secure title-deed to a
remote star would not be of much value to a rational person.
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More specificalLy, money and power have of themselves the
character of being means to further ends, while survival1
 health
and the extension of body-space called 'property' are all.
ennabling conditions in the pursuit of further goals, and derive
much of their real value from that fact. Among the further goals
and values that couid give point to possessions are many that
education, under broader conceptions of it than the materialist's,
seeks to promote.
Encyclopoedism is a subtler manifestation of the possessive
instinct, and a kind of mental materialism. In it know]edge itself
(and not merely the credits and diplomas in which it is given
pub]ic acknowledgement) takes on the aspect of a possession, and
the point becomes to amass it and possess it rather than to use
it and live through it. The crammer for an examination is a
materialist of this sort, though his usual unconcern at forgetting
what he has learnt after the crisis shows his commitment to have
been provisionaL But some may be more serious cram mers. A
person may buili an empire in his mind, embarking on each new
book or course of study as though it were new territory to be
annexed. He may glory in his store of learning, and when he
takes out and dusts off the odd item it is mainly to reassure
himself that he still has it. The library-walls may be the
principal horizons of his life, spiritual as well as physical, the
object being to transfer everything from the shelves on the wall
to shelves in his head - like the 'autodidact' in Sartre's novel La
Nausee.
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The irony is that he would be no nearer making knowledge really
'his own'. He would in some sense kill it in attempting to
possess it. 'Knowledge' for him will have no connection with
action, intimacy or cx)ntemplation, will not yield life-experience
nor wisdom, will be indeed altogether useless and hardly
deserving to be called 'knowledge' at alL
On the other hand, there is nothing in these arguments to show
that material values and breadth of knowledge should not be
given place within a larger cxnception of value and of education.
As it happens, vor,HonaI education is newly respectable in
educational discussion and proposaL The proper response to this
is a complex one7, as the following fairly standard observations
indicate:
First1
 Dewey remarks that 'in the past, education has been much
more vocational in fact than in name'.8 Arguably, education has
always in practice had a vocational dimension, even when it
pretended it had not, and we could hardly sustain an objection
to just making this exp1irii1 But, anyway, education and
schooling are properly in the business of communicating
knowledge and skills that relate to important human concerns and
that need a protracted period for their acquiiI-inn. At least
some material values, and the knowledge, skills, attitudes and
virtues that bear on them, meet these conditk-ns. In principle,
then, education takes them up legitimately. The qualiflation is
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two-fold, as we shall see: education has both to take up other
values as well, and to integrate material values with these others.
Second,a rational, balanced attitude to material values does not
come esi1y to the human species. ('Money isn't everything, but
who needs everything if you've got money' goes the wry
wisecrack.) Hence, among other things, the pressing need to
consider the distribution of goods and services, and to cultivate
and apply to this area the virtues of justice, equality and
humanity. Vocational education, then, overlaps with moral
education. (We refrained earlier from this ethical point because a
solid materialism would seem to have no 'logical space' for it -
and in practice a wiser self-interest may be a necessary stepping
stone to the ethical for the dedicated materialist. Besides, a
materialism tempered only by considerations of fairness and
justice would still be irrational, afl)eit impartially so. For it must
falter before the question of what use one's fair share of
possessions is - other, that is, than for enlarging further the
common stock, and so one's fair share, of possessions. This is to
say, perhaps, that distributive justice is not the most
fundamental virtue, even if sometimes it is much the most urgent
one.)
Third, there is very much more to an education for work than
'accommodating' students to the labour market by training them
in the skills and attitudes that make them easily employable. It
needs to include also, for example, the development of a critical
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and informed interest in the organization of industry, in labour
relations, and in the nature, destination, social effects and
environmental effects of products. Thus vocational education
overlaps also with ecxnomic and p1til education (tradi±ionafly
much neg]ected) and becxmes a part of education's
'transform atLve' mission in society.9
Fourth, 'employment', 'a job', 'a career' - most of all 'a vocation'
- are all concepts that break the bounds of material values as
defined ear]ier. Indeed they relate to all four categories of
value. For is there not question in a job of fulfilment and
satiEfaction as well as of a wage or salary? Is there not also a
relationship with such ethical notions as 'being of service' and
'playing one's part'? And is there not a matter of getting 'out
of oneself', perhaps 'out and about' and, in many jobs, a hard,
but salutary, contact with the wor]sl, with its sometimes pitiless
necessity but at the same time its beauty and inexhaustibility?
Unemployment, as everyone knows, is a tragedy not just at the
level of one's purchasing power, though that, and the effects of
that, are certainly not to be underestimated. The ncept of 'a
career' strikes an adiitinnal note of care for one's life as a
whQ]e, a concern not to waste it or throw it away. The still
wiiler and deeper concept of 'a vocation' strikes this note too,
among others:
• . . it is necessary to define the meaning of vocation with some fullness in
order to avoid the impression that an education which centers about It Is
narrowly practical, if not merely pecuniary. A vocation means nothing but
such a direction of life activities as renders them perceptibly significant
to a person, because of the consequences they accomplish, and also useful
to his associates.	 The opposite of a career is neither leisure nor
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achievement in experience, on the personal side, and idle display,
parasitic dependence upon the others, on the social side.'°
In this deliberately wide definition, Dewey omits to mention only
the special cxnnections which the word can still have with some
caring professions in which the dedication can notably outstrip
the remuneration, and, beyond that, with the idea of a ca]ling by
God 11•
(2) Exprintia1 Values and John Dewey Now the emphasis
passes from 'security of possession' to 'richness of experience'.
Culture, education, the disciplines of learning and the wider
curriculum are cx)nceived and judged in reference to their
potentially large cxntr.ibution to the full 1 or the interesting, life
(whether individually or socially cx)nsidered, and whether future
or mainly present orientated). There is a kind of vaunting of
the life of the mind - we might also have called these values
those of mental and intellectual 'vitality'. But a vaunting, note,
not in terms of pleasures alone, for this is more than a refined
version of hedonism. As elsewhere, so in the inte]lect.ual fiH
there is the hope that dfis apparent failure, the rather grim
satisfactions of endurance through thai, and the occasional
experience of oneself as living powerfully in one dimension of
oneself. 12
 These are themes of much literature - Kazantzalds'
Zorba the Greek and Hesse's The Glass-Bead Game cvme to mind,
of the film Dead Ft'et's Society, and among philosophers there is
Kierkegaard's Either/or, vaLl and Nietzsche passim. But in
directly educational terms, it is Dewey's view of education as
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growth that is espiaUy notable: 'the education process is a
continuous process of growth, having as its aim at every stage
an added capacity of growth.' 13
 In another p]ace l4, he quotes
Longfellow
all experience is an arch wherethro'
Gleams that untravelled world whose margin fades
For ever and for ever when I move
But if this is true of all experience, then how do we select
curriculum experiences. Wouldn't any experiences do? Dewey's
famous reply to this was that while any experience may promote
some growth in some direction or other, the question is rather of
whether it promotes or retards growth in generaL We shall see
that in giving this answer, and in making of 'experience' a sort
of self-contained infinitude, Dewey seeks to avoid having to refer
to the 'world-in-itself' as a source of value.
First, however, we should distinguish here too the rampant and
the qui1ifid: on the one hand, conceiving culture and life itself
as essentially 'play' and making the pursuit of the interesting
and challenging the cardinal value in a whole life-stance; on the
other hand, a contextualized admission and pursuit of these
values among others.
Considered as a whole life-stance, the pursuit of adventure and
the interesting does not necessarily wear frivolity on its sleeve.
The serious scholar or scientist may conceive his work primarily
in the spirit of the chase, and in that spirit choose to work at
the limit of his powers and endurance rather than well within
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himself. In personal relationships, 'Aesthetic Man', as
Kierkegaard calls him's, can be extraordinarily patient and
sensitive, even generous in his cxncern that others too shoul1
enjoy fulfilment, while fundamentally viewing all this as an
enlargement of his own life. Again, he may welcome discomfort,
anxiety and depression as novel and interesting experiences.
Such a person may smile at the futile materialist, but there is a
nemesis attending his own pursuit of experience by virtue of
which it gravitates fatally towards that which it most shuns:
boredom and what the medievals called 'acedia' or 'worki-
weariness'. Indeed, just as there is a sense in which the
encyclopoedist never actually possesses his knowledge, so there
is a sense in which Aesthetic Man never quite succeeds in
experiencing anything. He is indeed 'into' experience, but he is
not properly 'in' his experiences, tending rather to the role of
their detached observer and analyst. In Kierkegaard's Ei±her/or,
the absurdly introspective seducer stands revealed in his Diary
as longing to be the simple 'force' that Mozart's Don Giovanni is
while knowing that he, of all pp]e, cannot be this. This
nemesis is to be explained, surely, as the natural outcome of
taking values that are in fact parasitic on others as host-values,
while allowing the real host-values to languish in subordinate
positions. What are the real host-values? They are, particularly,
the trio of truth, respect and justice, all so many basic
acknowledgements of the independent value of objects of
experience. Experiential values depend in the end on such
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acknowledgements. This claim has some immediate intuitive
force, but we might envisage an extended argument for it in the
form of an analogue for affective and value-life of Kant's
'deduction' of the categories of cognitive experience l6. Just as
the possession of the concepts of 'experience' and of 'self' are
shown by Kant to be inseparable from the possession of the
concepts of 'things' and 'sorts of things' that exist in themselves
with their own pasts and futures, so 'experience' can only be
properly valued, it might be shown, in a context in which value
is being attributed to things, and sorts of thing, in their own
right, as they exist in their own tine-spans.
On the other hand, if 'vital' values are taken as just one
category of value among others, there is something almost self-
]egithnating about them. Just as a person does not usually have
to 'justify' going on with life (Le. not committing suic!ide), so she
shouldn't ordinarily be required to justify stretching herself and
living at the top of her bent - assuming, that is, that no one
else is being hurt and so on (though perhaps some conflict here
would not be so extraordinary). We should add to this that
these values, the will to live largely and fruitfully, to be
empowered to make one's mark, and to empower others, can be
taken up into a moral,, and even a religious, perspective, as in
the christian parable of the talents, or in the injunction carpe
diem, seize the day, which can have an ethical. as well as a vital
appeaL In the lives of some individuals and cultures, indeed,
experiential values may be so well integrated into the ethical
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and/or religious that it would be difficult for them to analyse
them out and conceive of a way of life focussed primarily on
them.
We must now return to Dewey as the philosopher non pareil of an
education 'of, by and for' experience. Relying especially on the
active or reconstructive aspect of experience, he mounted a
formidable critique of traditional education for the mismatch of
its methods and contents to student experience and to the
processes by which that experience can grow to be progressively
more sensitive, intelligent, empowered, cx)herent and absorbing.
On the other hand, he deployed analyses of other aspects of
experience - its cx)ntnulty, the interaction in it of the subjective
and objective, and again of the individual and social - to mount
almost as severe a critique of the excesses of some progressive
education. He is also the philosopher of democracy as the form
of social organization that promotes the widest access to good
human experience, so that there is a strongly ethical dimension
to his work which coheres well with the rest of his philosophy of
experience (but which, also, he thought to derive from that
philosophy). All this is accomplished on the page with great
humanity and a sense of the reality of classroom and student
learning that should be the envy of other philosophers of
education.'7
 These qu.i1itis make Dewey still the educational
philosopher most worth reading, and it seems therefore churlish,
though it is necessary, to go on to tax him with a basic flaw in
his approach.
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This flaw was his rejection, in line with his 'pragmatic' theory of
meaning arid knowledge, of the proposition that the objects of
experience can possess value in themselves. 18
 He did indeed save
himself from the worst cxnsequence of this rejection. Granted
that the reader may be occasionally struck by some lack of a
wondering awareness before the givenness of the world, Dewey
does at any rate incorporate - eloquently and originally -the
ethical significance of education in his position. The question
that arises, however, is whether he was logically entitled to this
- whether it does not put more weight on a self-contained
(though complex) 'experience' than this can take. Whence, in
particular, the principle of impartiality that is implicit in his
support for democracy? Why should the individual care about
the experience of others - unless only as a form of more
enlightened self-interest? it is all very well to go on about the
interdependence of individual and communal experience, as Dewey
does, but the ethical issue is, importantly, what to do when my
interests conflict with others' interests. Yi1tiing to what we see
as the superior claims of others is not always, as a matter of
fact, in our own longer-term or wider interests. More important,
even when in fact it is, this is not the ethicafly respectable
reason for doing it. That, rather, would refer us to the needs,
rights and, fundamentally, the independent 'reality' of other
persons. But it is precisely that reference that a view of
experience as self-contained seems logically to exclude.
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There is an obvious historical exp]anation for Dewey's uneasiness
about 'the given' in terms of a basic trend in philosophy over
the last three hundred years. In the seventeenth century,
Descartes drove a wedge between experience (what he called
'ideas') and the real world. At an early point in his argument he
finds himself alone with his experience, uncertain for the moment
whether it is anything more than a dream - and so he sets
him se]f to prove that under certain cxnditions his experience
cx)uld be relied upon to represent a world beyond experience.
The impossibility of any project formulated in this way had, as
its two 18th century heirs, the idlism of Berkeley, in which
experience and world were simply identified ('to be' was 'to be
perceived'), and the intellectual scepticism of Hume. Kant's
transcendental deduction, alluded to above, was the brilliant
response to both of these. Unfortunately, however, its
reaffirmation of the reality of objects was a severely relative
affair. For Kant chose to cntain objects within a 'phenomenal'
realm that remained, in the last - and mysterious - analysis,
distinct from 'the noumenal' realm or the world-in-itself. This
then was Dewey's inheritance, as it is that of other philosophers.
Certainly, he joined some other American philosophers in giving
it a new 'pragmatic' twist: he emphasised, probably
overemphasised, the interplay of knowledge with action in the
'cx)nstruction' of experience. Also, as had by then become
common in the tradition, he interpreted 'experience' in social as
much as individual terms (which cxnvenienUy glosses over the
likelihood that our knowledge of other persons oommands no more
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status, of the relevant kind, than our knowledge of other kinds
of object: why should they alone be 'noumenal' among the things
we experience?) But he retained the by now traditional wedge
between experience and the world in itself in the notion of
knowledge as fundamentally a constnicdon; and this is surely the
root of his rejection of the doctrine of independent or intrinsic
values.'9
I believe this wedge to be a profoundly mischievous instrument.
In general1
 the so-called 'problem of knowledge' is a misnomer.
Knowledge is not 'a problem'. That is not to deny that, like
existence, it is an appropriate object of great wonder. But it is
this precisely under a certain aspect, namely, as an 'assimilation'
of the world that yet of itself leaves the world as it is. If that
paradox is written out from the beginning knowledge ceases to
be a wonder - and what it then becomes is not a problem but a
surd. (Needless to say, all this is the merest outline. That
might be thought a pity considering that a - direct or non-
representational - realist position in epistemology is integral to
the argument about values that I am currently developing. But
even the philosopher must sometimes be content just to come
clean about his presuppositions!)
Ethical and ecstatic values: an expansive Interpretation
	 An
account of education, Richard Peters', that helped to shape a
generation of British teachers runs as follows: Education in the
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widest sense is to be conceived primarily as the initiation into
the wise, or at any rate the rationa],, life - what Socrates called
'the examined life', perhaps scaled down to the reach of the
average person. Formal education is to be designed primarily to
contribute to this strategy. Initiation into the disciplines of
learning in general education is to be motivated and structured
by the relevance which they can have to a rational approach to
the concerns and predicaments that are inevitable, or probable,
in life. 'A rational approach' is defined chiefly by a concern for
truth and related virtues like authenticity and integrity, a
respect for persons, justice, and a care for the intrinsic features
of activities and things.'9
Now, as so far outlined, this account suffers from a systematic
ambiguity. It could be interpreted as follows: The issues and
predicaments are those on which we inevitably take a position,
rather than all those we inevitably encounter; non-interference is
the main ingredient in respect; the paradigm exercises of a
concern for truth are the constraining of actual prejudice, and
the restraining of wishful thinking and of flights of fancy and
speculation; and 'care' is more carefulness than love. In gener4
the rational values are to be seen as primarily a series of
restraints, a regulative harness, on vital and possessive values.
They define 'duties', and 'duty', we all know, is easiest to
recognize when it runs counter to inclination. Interpreted in
this way, the account could hardly be presented as complete in
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itself. Rather, rational values would be added to possessive and
experiential values as their ethically necessary cx)rrective.
On the other hand the precepts of rationality can be interpreted
in a positively expansive way. The tradi1nal oath requires
t11irig the whole truth as well as tllirig nothing but the truth.
Rationality more generally, interpreted regulatively, requires only
that inasmuch as we happen to judge, believe, fee] 1 act and
pursue, we should do so rightly, appropriately arid effectLvely;
but interpreted expansively, it involves such injunctions as: seize
the day; see further and more - as far and as much as you can;
develop your understanding towards its limits; exploit your
knowledge to the full in your experience; cultivate depth and
refinement of feeling; aim at achieving much, not just a well-done
modicum; love the world.
There are three things to note already about these injunctions.
First, though open-ended in character, they are not unlimited in
their scope. For they refer us to our abi1ii-i and opportuniti.
They demand that we perceive, feel, understand and achieve, not
an impossible everything, but what we can. Indeed, since they
may conflict with each other in practice, it is rather the spirit
than the letter of them that counts: collectively they require of
us our general best (a familiar demand among those teachers
make of students!). Second, they have ethica]., as well as vital.,
force - an integrated vital and ethical appeaL Third, they would
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begin to bring to the fore the value of the objects with which
we rationally engage - as will becx,me clearer presently.
Peters never decided finally between these interpretations of an
educated rationality, it seems to me. 2° We must, however, prefer
the second. The argument I shall advance for this is indirect.
Its nub is that a regulative ethic actually presupposes an
expansive ethic. Only in the context of an acceptance of open-
ended formulations can the ethical force of the negative or
regulative formulations be secured. I shall attempt to
demonstrate this for that rational value that is most obviously
ethical - and most widely associated with the work of Richard
Peters - respect for persons.2'
We can take it that respecting a person - her decisions, beliefs,
feelings, in general her assertive point of view, involves, firstly,
acknowledging her, and their, independent existence, and,
secondly, taking account at her and them in the sense of
allowing her and them to have a certain kind of influence, namely
a limiting influence, on what one does oneself. Hence the
connection in philosophical tradition between respect and
rationality (which implies, at the least, an abi]i]ty to acknowledge
what is real), and its particular connection with practical reason.
But respect involves more. Poiitirins, demagogues and secret-
police interrogators may be highly-skilled at taking people's
points of view into account in their work. So we must add that
to respect persons is to set a value on them in themselves, to
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treat them never only as means but always (also) as 'ends in
themselves', as Kant put it22.
It is because of this cxnditinn that the concept of respect eRsily
passes over into that reverence, defined by Kant as 'the
awareness of a value that demolishes self-love'. Nevertheless,
there is a difference between these concepts. While both involve
setting a value on the object in itself, 'reverence' picks out a
kind of cx)ntemp]ative regard for the valued object1
 whereas
'respect' picks out a reluctance to interrupt or interfere with it.
Respect is, in that way, a negative attitude. But it remains that
it is the negative side of a primarily positive coin, a positive
v1nirig of persons - without which it is not respect in an ethical
sense.
This fact tends to be concealed if we take as our paradigm of
respect for persons that respect we owe those we don't know,
hardly know, or riislike, for in these cases the practical
consequences of our vInirig them as ends-in-themselves consist
entirely or mainly of restraints that we impose on our conduct
for their sakes. Now even in these cases the restraints are
based on a positive recognition of them as ends in themselves.
But have we not here chosen the extreme cases as paradigms,
ones that involve relatively thin and abstract modes of respect?
We could not have frst learnt that meaning and value of 'person'
that is involved in respect for persons in relation to the
stranger or the enemy - just as, in a Wil±genste.inian example, we
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cx)uid not have first learnt to calculate in our heads, and then
gone on to do it aloud or with an abacus. I am suggesting that
respect, like charity, begins at home. If we more reasonably
choose as our paradigm that respect which is an integral part of
good family life, authentic cofleagueship, friendship and love-
relationships, then the cx,nceptual connections becx)me clearer
between respect, on the one hand, and the more positive aspects
of valuing somebody like reverence and concern on the other.
Then, too, we might be bold enough to assert that respecting the
stranger or mere acquaintance as a person, though it certainly
does not imply that we love her in any ordinary sense of the
word, does involve the acknowledgement that someone could find
a world in her. We might also be rather less inclined to consign
love to the realms of the non-rationa], contrasting it in this with
respect. (No doubt there is some stipulation in this use of the
term 'love', some tightening-up in relation to the variety of
common uses, but so is there in the term 'respect' as used
ethically in 'respect for persons'!)
What this shows is that there is something inherently unstable
about a position that makes respect for persons the central
ethical virtue in our dealings with others. The ground on which
it tries to stand has a way of vanishing. If it is too
embarrassed to acknowledge its subsidiarity to love, it risks
collapsing back into a prudentially motivated regard for others, a
subscription to a social contract that promises respect in return
for respect given. It will lose that independence of fear and
232
inclination that Kant emphasized. But if it insists on its properly
ethical quality, then it will have to underline its basis in a
positi.ve acknow]edgement of the independent value of other
persons, the paradigm of which is a loving relationship.
An analogous thesis relating to truth as an ethical value can be
more briefly indicated. On the one hand there is a pragmatic
concern for truth, perhaps a wariness about it lest it should
take one unawares and frustrate one's designs, or, perhaps, an
acknowledgement that it provides a necessary point to the
exercise of inteBectual muscles, as goal-scx)ring gives point to
fcotba]L On the other hand there is a love of truth for its own
sake, of which Simone Weil rightly observes that it is really an
inaccurate expression for a love of reality, or an aspect or a
part of reality, for its own sake. 23 Between these two sorts of
regard for truth there is no middle-ground, unless it be a love
that is still too weak honestly to call itself anything but a sense
of duty. Though this may in fact be the ground most of us
stand on, it is an inherently provisional one.
Our line of argument again brings us up sharp against the idea
of persons, objects and aspects of the world having value in
themselves as a condition of their being values for us, and of
love of the world as a rational condition of our other prizings.
In this vein, the religious believer can acknowledge that the
praise of God, just because He is Goci, is his primary religious
response - more fundamental than his search for his own
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salvation through relationship with God (ultimately making sense
of that search and cx)nstituting his side of that relationship).
The scientist can feel that the order of the universe was worth
investigating because it is marvellous - this being what makes
the enquiry exciting rather than, vice-versa, the excitement
making the world marvellous. The artist may maintain that
beauty is for cx)ntemp]ating and highlighting just because it is
'there' and there to be revealed. The histonan may justify his
work, not primarily in didactic terms, but because people are
everywhere in history and people are, in themselves, worthy of
our interest. And education can be cxinceived as, in large part,
the loving initiation into these, and other such, mysteries.
Intellectual vitality, conscience and objects Ray Elliott has
sought to secure a due and balanced recognition in philosophy of
education for each of these three forces in intellectual
endeavour. In drawing upon his work, we shall try out a more
'convergent' approach than his with a view to reviewing and
reinforcing our own general argument Our interest will be in
how these factors can, not merely pull together on occasion, but
'grow into' each other.
Intellectual vitality, Elliott describes as a composite of eros and
energy that has its own characteristic virtues of involvement,
ambition, adventurousness, tenacity, endurance, hope and fai±h.24
It includes a reference to hedonistic notions like enjoyment and
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pleasure, but as part of a larger whole. Success for it is more
fundamentally 'victory' than 'p]easure'. Intellectual cxnscience or
probity, he suggest, is expressed in such virtues as authentithty,
integrity, and truthfulness. Whereas vitality functions in an
expansive way, conscience in isolation is typically regulative.
Thirdly, there is a sense of the importance of certain kinds of
object of enquiry, and a corresponding respect for them and love
of them.
It is a matter of some significance that the disciplines are concerned with
the various worlds or regions of worlds which are essential to mans being,
or on which his being depends, or which may shed light on the nature of his
being, or which express his being with such force and comprehensiveness
that they are essential for his self-understanding; and which reveal, also,
that which is other than man but with which man is necessarily concerned,
or upon which his well-being depends, or which is relevant to his well-
being as a valued or threatening part of his environment, or which is
worthy of his care and attention for its own sake, or which claims his
attention as having a being superior to his own.25
These three factors in mental endeavour can be characterized
independently, and they can function independently, or even
against each other - up to a paint. We have just given them
some independent characterization, and it will not be difFii-u]t to
imagine cases where they function independently, or in
opposition.
(1) Intellectual gaines are paradigms of the relatively pure
exercise of intellectual vitality. Neither cxnscience nor the
worl1 penetrate very far into chess (though - and it is
worth noting - a simulacrum of each does: the rules and
conventions of chess in the one case, and in the other case
the way players imaginatively project the legal pcssibi1itis
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on to the physical board and pieces, almost to the point of
seeing around each piece a series of pathways determining
its possible moves). Where conscience focusses on chess
from the outside it might even be with disapprova]. one
might consider it disgraceful that one devotes so much thne
toit
(2) There can be a lack of proportion in the importance
attached to the objects of some enquiry that turns love of
them into idolatry - and one can suppose that the enquirer
has an uneasy conscience about this. (There is the
question, of course, of whether, and how, we should
distinguish between idolatry and the kind of singleminded
dedication to a subject or project, usually based oriina]ly
on a decision that is pretty 'existential' in character, that is
fairly typical of great achievements in art, science,
invention and love, and that strikes contemporaries as
fanatical? Perhaps there is a basis for distinction in the
degree to which the object is pursued as a window opening
on the rest of the world.)
(3) An enquiry can be pursued as a matter of intellectual
conscience, without interest, and without attributing
intrinsic importance to the object of enquiry. This may be
justified as a part of a larger enquiry - so, much history-
writing consists of routine enquiries entered into for the
sake of completeness. But in the absence of a larger
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oontext we would speak of scrupulosity or an excess of
cxnsence that drains vital energy and narrows vision to a
pinpoint
Thus independent to a degree, each of these three is 'most
itself, however, when working in with the others; they are
'meant' or 'made' for each other, and they cannot be profoundly
characterized, nor ukirnat.ely justified, in isolation.
(1) Consider, first, the relationship between intellectual
vitality and the importance of objects. Whatever the range
of factors, from food and rest to peace of mind, that enable
this vitality, its fundamental summons oomes from objects.
We might say here that objects activate, stimulate, or
trigger the natural potenti1il-ies of mind. But that is
insnfFicint, for it is not the case that once started up mind
oou]d then function without objects. We might then add
that objects are the material and the energy-source of
enquiry. But that sdfl omits something. In an objectless
world, mental life would lack not only energy, but paint.
Perhaps all one can say in the end is that objects are
objects; the mind-object relationship is sui generLs. Again,
taking faith and hope, say, as virtues of intellectual life,
ask what they are placed in. The enquirer's own abilitis?
No doubt, and while the scholar is still standing off from
his enquiry that answer may seem appropriate. The clever
school-leaver who is making up his mind what to take up at
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university might have faith in his ability to master any of
several disciplines. But If we go on to imagine him - his
choice made - actually engaged on some enquiry, a deeper
intentionality emerges: the intelligibility of things. What
sustains him primarily now is his trust that objects which
pose questions will also yield answers, and that the answers
win be worth having.
(2) Consider, next, the relationship between vita]ity and
cxrnsdence Understood regulatively, the 'demands of reason'
discipline vitality ab extra, but they do not command it.
They get no purchase on the person who cannot bring
himself to go on living, and not much on the one who lacks
the appetite for a full life. But understood expansively, as
we have argued they must be to have any ethical force,
they set a value on life itself, and they also make fullness
of life a mat±er of some obligation. Now conscience seeks to
stimulate, to conserve, and to select the objects for,
intellectual vitality, and to develop the specific virtues of
intellectual power.26
(3) Consider, finally, the relationship between nscience
and objects We touch here on a fundamental issue in moral
philosophy, for the coupling of these would imply the
rejection, ultimately, of a Kantian-style formalistic ethic, in
particular of 'universa]izabllity' as the fundamental criterion
of morality.27 Instead of saying that killing, for instance, is
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wrong because it is non-universa]izab]e, we should say it is
wrong because of the ontological importance of what is
destroyed by killing. Similarly, the virtues and princip]es
of intellectual conscience are to be justified fundamentally
by reference to the importance of the objects with which
intellectual life deals, and they have force in proportion to
that importance. There is something fundamentally wrong
with conceiving it otherwise, with taking precision, clarity,
relevance, and care for truth as having a value that is
quite independent of what is being investigated. The idea,
for instance, that science is educationally valuable because
it develops such virtues in the pupil is, to some extent, an
insult to science. The truth of the matter is more nearly
the reverse, that those virtues are necessary because they
are required for science (among other disciplines) - but
then it should be added that science is not itself an
autonomous value, but a response to the value of the
physical universe.
Conclusion In the next section we shall track these value-
considerations into different approaches to cultural analysis, and
in the later case-studies into some specific curriculum practices
and concerns. But the lines of our general argument are already
clear: 'Security of possession' is a rational value only when
subordinated to that of 'richness of experience' which, in its
turn, becomes a pursuit of one's tai]. unless, firstly, it allows
239
itself to be cxnstrained and limited by the demands of truth,
respect and justice, and, secxndly, transcends both itself and a
negative conception of its ethical limits, in an acknowledgement of
the world that is properly called love. The cxnverse implication
is that only from the perspect:Lve of love of the world can the
values of the ethical life, of the rich or the fun life, and of
possessions be integrated, experienced and enjoyed. In an
adaptation of a biblical text that is lighter than it may appear,
we might say that if we seek first the world and its justice, all
these things wifl be added unto us.
Nes
Frau a 1918 address cited In Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Ma interiarice pp.105-6.
Corrpare:
'The order of the world Is the same as the beauty of the world. All that
differs is the type of concentration demanded, according to whether one tries
to conceive the necessary relations which go to make it up or to conteoplate
its splendour.
It is one and the same thing, which with respect to God is eternal Wisdom;
with respect to the universe, perfect obedience; with respect to our love,
beauty; with respect to our intelligence, balance of necessary relations; with
respect to our flesh, brute force.' Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, p.281
2	 See sectIon 4.2
3 'Ideology' is particularly conlicated. Theugh it probably oversinpl,fies, we might
usefully distinguish three current senses: a pejorative non-technical sense, where It
refers to 'the uncritical' or 'the dognatic' in belief; a pejorative technical sense,
where it means a 'false consciousness' that is the product In same way of class, or
other sectional, Interest; and a non-pejorative sense, where it means a philosophy'.
For a more cooplex and historically sensitive account, see the entry In Raymond
Williame (1976) Keywords
4	 See, for exanple, Skilbeck (1976) and Lawton (1983), ch.1.
5 Thus, for example, Pring (1976), as he surveys some of the main contemporaneous
movements of ideas - Hirst's theory of the fonns of knowledge, the child-centred
movement and the sociology of knowledge, draws from each elements that might serve
some (in his view) nore satisfactory synthesis, And Dewey in his (1938) classIc
essay, which is both restatement of prog ressi vi am and Cr1 ti que of the excesses of
some of his followers, attempts to present progressivisin, in and by its focus on
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experience, as the transcending (Dewey was a youthful Ilegellan) of either/or
dichotomies: authority or freedom; past or present and future; individual or society.
6	 See, for exa,rçle, Aristotle s (Nicanachean) Ethics, ok 1.
7	 Dewey (1916) ch. 23, White (1982), especially chs 4-5, and most recently Pring (1987)
all evince appropriately ccxnplex approaches.
8	 Dewey (1916), p. 311.
9	 See White cp.clt..
10	 Dewey op.cit. p. 307.
11	 These are mentioned in Pring op.cit.
12	 See the papers of R.K. Elliott alluded to later In this section, e.g. (1977), pp.9-
13.
13	 Dewey (1916) p.54. Dewey also expresses this thesis in tenns of meaning
'the chief business of life at ever point [is] to make living.. .contribute to an
enriclinent of its own perceptible meaning. We thus reach a technical definition of
education: It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to
the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of
subsequent experience.' ibid. p.76
14	 Dewey (1938) p.35
15 Kierkegaard articulates this stance in the first voli.wne of Either/Or, and in the
second volune criticizes it, directly and indirectly, from the point of view of the
more htsndri.m, ethical man.
16	 Critique of Pure Reason, I, 2nd part, 1st div. See the Interpretation of Strawson
(1966) pp.47-152.
17	 See especially Dewey (1916) chs. 4-6, and (1938) passlm.
18 See Dewey (1946), Introduction and part III, ch.5. The Introduction in particular,
specially written for a republication of some of his papers, shows him at his
eloquent and profound best, but is still wrong, I believe, inasmuch as It sets its
face against any givenness of value, any priority of value to experience.
19 There may also have been a simple confusion In his thought on this matter. In Ibid.,
Introduction, Dewey argues that the doctrine of intrinsic value as incoipatible with
the empirical presuppositions of modern scientific method. This is simply a mistake
that rests on a confusion of the necessary or essential with the certain and/or the a
priori. An essential truth can be both a discovered truth and one for which our
grounds do not justify certainty. (See Kripke (1972/1980).) The confusion is easily
understandable inasmuch as, historically, the former regularly consorted with one or
both of the latter - and Deweys historical sensibility was profound.
20	 See especially R.S. Peters (1966), (1973), (1977a) and (1979/1981). These represent,
it should be noted, a continuous revision and development of the account.
21 Broadly: his descriptions of education and the educated person tended, often
beautifully, towards the open-ended and expansive ideal; while his main ar.in-ient
tended only to the regulative Ideal (and, indeed, does not succeed, I believe, In
giving the desired ethical force to that Ideal). See Peters (1966) ch.V, and the
reconsidered and more mature case In The Justification of Education in Peters,
(ed.) (1973).
22	 See Peters (1966) ch.VIII
23	 Grouriwork to the Metaphysic of Fk,rals
24	 S. Weil (tr. 1952)
25	 R.K. Elliott (1975)
26	 R.K. Elliott (1977) p.13
27 On the other hand, this is, so far, to say nothing very precise about the dialectic
of vitality and conscience. It may even be true, as Simone Weil often argued, that
pure attentiveness to the truth (as to affliction) is a supernatural thing,
involving a kind of death to the natural man. But two things would then need to be
added. One is that this idea is far removed from the picture of conscience as a kind
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probably Involve the death' of conventional conscience as well as of vitality. The
second is that the death in question, without subtracting from Its painfulness, would
rot be just any kind of mental destruction, but one that had sane kind of 'life-
after-death' in view!
28 The essence of the Kantian view can be put In this way, perhaps. Posing the question
to ourselves, when confronted with a moral choice, of how it would be if others
followed the tettIng course of action - did it to us perhaps, is more than an
imaginative aid to gaining a moral perspective. It actually constitutes the moral
perspective and it intimates escape from self-contradiction as the essential reason
for moral action. So, not only 'do unto others as you would be done by', but do this
because only thus can you be consistent with yourself. This is the view I en
challenging here. Kant himself, however, fudged the issue by adding to the above
some glorious rhetoric about treating people always as ends in themselves! op cit.
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OFDflIPlG CLJLrUFAL.. CAIIrL:
	 rHE
SUGGEST IVENESS OF
	 NEP1TAFV IIAIS
Pr1iminRriPs (1) A curriculum is always a selection. The
question for this section can be seen as one in a series of five
that immediately attends this observation. Two of these are
po1ii-fr1 First who is to select, or - assuming some articulated
system of education - who is to participate in the process of
selection, in what ways, at what stages, and to what degrees of
influence? Second: who is the selection for, or - granted
universal education - what is to be the balance, and the mutual
articulation, of common and differentiated education? From these
questions I shall regretfully abstain as beyond our scope. A
third question we have already addressed in effect: what are to
be the criteria of selection? For us these would be the values
we have just discussed, ordered and coordinated as we have
argued they should be. A fourth question is: from what 'pool' is
the selection to be made? Two answers to this are suggested in
the literature. One is 'the disciplines of learning', whether as
potential 'items' with those selected then mapped straight on to
the curriculum, or as principal or exclusive 'resources'.l The
broader, more outward-looking, answer is 'culture', using the
word rather in its general sense than as 'high culture'. 2 It
commends itself to us as making fewer ini1-i'1 assumptions,
safeguarding the links between curriculum and education-in-the-
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wisest-sense, and suggesting the reasonable hypothesis that the
cultivation of possessive, experiential,, ethical and quasi-religious
values is not restricted to the learned disciplines. Of course it
is compatible with regarding, and invariably does regard,
academic disciplines as among the important resources and items.
But it would be more generally comfortable with the notion of
'practice&. 'Practice' not only embraces biii1iiing and
housekeeping as well as science and psychology, and, more
generally, suggests a broad view of the possible uses of the
cumulative, 'drip-feed', approach of curriculum. It also is firmer
about the organic links between theory and practice, between
studying music or poetry, say, and making music or poetry. Our
preference for the broader answer will be clear in what follows
and we shall come upon some of the distorting effects of the
narrower answer. But our principal focus will be on the final
question: how are we to 'map' cu]ture (including the diwip1ines)
for purposes of curriculum selection? The general assumptions
of this question are that there are categories of things to be
learnt which are severally important (e.g. sciences, arts,
humanities, and technical subjects make up a familiar, if rough-
and-ready, set), and that from each of these categories basic
and/or representative excerpts can be so taught that the student
learns a feel for the category as a whole, is enabled to
communicate with people who have studied different excerpts, is
inclined to pursue further excerpts on his own initiative, etc.
We shall also address the important sub-question of whether we
shall need one map or many. Other sub-questions that are
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beyond our scope include what the balance should be among the
identified categories in terms of time and other resources, and
whether, and Iw, we may distinguish here the essentia],, the
important, and the merely worthwhile.
(No mapping exercise is even hinted at in the UK'S Education
Reform Act of 1988, which proceeds directly from the general
goals of mental,, physical,, moral and spiritual development to a
rather discx)nnected and arbitrary-seeming list of subjects and
themes constituting the new National Curriculum. This omission
has since come to be fe]t at the National Curriculum Council.
Subject working-parties report and subject programmes are
seWed and resettled, but issues of omission, overlap (when does
'valuable reinforcement' bexme 'wasteful duplication'?), and
general adequacy to the statutory goals are proving a struggle,
one hears,3 in the absence of any considered and endorsed
picture of cultural resources and possibi1i1. This is not at all
surprising. In whole curriculum planning the analysis of
knowledge intervenes crucially between deliberating over goals
and designing the curriculum itself, overlapping with each of
these and translating them one to the other. In its absence
grand statements of goal come all too quickly to be regarded as
ignorab]e rhetoric.)
(2) There are different analyses in circulation and, more than
that, different kinds of analysis with different kinds of
aspiration. Three kinds may be distinguished. First is the kind
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of analytic map that is essentially deliberative and pragmatic in
character: perhaps a matrix of areas of experience, elements of
learning, and structural principles, designed by an Inspectorate
newly cxnscous of its whole-curriculum responsibIlity, and keen
at the same time to loosen the stranglehold of 'subjects' 4; or an
outline 'core-curricul_um', a matrix now of life-areas, learning
processes and learning environments, offered by a Federal
development centre to autonomous States as a flexible 'working-
model' for the '8Os. Such maps emerge from particular
situations, involve some degree of consultation with practitioners,
and take deliberate account of local challenges and constraints.
They are essentially exercises in practical and poliI-iral
responsibility; if they are sometimes conceptually complex and
theoretically well-informed, they still aim more at the next major
step forward than at logical rigour and utopian ideaL Of them
we shall only say that they are to be judged, like deliberative
discourse generally, from two directions at once, from the point
of view of their feihi]ity and practical appeal on the one hand,
and from the point of view of educational ideals and related
theoretical work on the other. Another kind of map is, by
contrast with the first, grandly theoretical.: Bloom's Taxonomy,
Phenix's Realms, Hirst's Forms, and Lawton's Cultural Systems.6
We shall consider two of these, one at considerable length, later
in the section. They are ambitious, not only in the measure of
vThiity across contexts and times that they claim, but also in
seeking to project - misguidedly, I shall argue - all the really
significant distinctions on to a single Master-Map or Taxonomy.
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Now modesty on that latter score is a feature of a third kind of
map, the elementary map based on some set of simple distinctions:
maps of this kind come at culture and knowledge from obviously
different angles and never look like pieces from some one-
dimensional jigsaw set. Resisting theoretical synthesis with each
other, what they yield in combination is matrices Le. practical
devices for the simultaneous deployment of diverse theories.
Another feature of them is their familiarity. They are deep in
our language and our thought about ourselves, and more or less
venerable in our philosophical traditions. This is not to say,
however, that we effortlessly appreciate their curricular
significance; there are inhibitions to overcome in our present
value-systems and epistemologies. The main positive intention of
this section is to display in the case of each of three maps of
this third kind, i.e. each of three different 'elementary' maps, its
analytic reach and its critical and reconstructive power in
relation to standard curricula and standard cultural assumptions,
and so to make a case for each being a useful guide and a
criterion of adequacy in relation to some particular 'dimension'
(rather than section) of the curriculum. This revives the
pluralist approach to mapping of Joseph Schwab. In his day he
also reminded people of the first two elementary maps we
consider, which we shall develop, however, in rather different
ways from him.7
(3) There is a fundamental connection, underemphasized in the
literature, between significant maps of cultural capital and
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values, between the topics of this section and the previous one.
I shall attend cx)nstantly to this as I go along. But In prospect
we may note that the secx)nd and third of the elementary maps to
be discussed will articulate, respectively, the 'ecstatic' and
experiential categories of values, while the first will relate
simiiltiineously to all four of those categories - pointing up areas
in which all are pursued, can conflict, and need to be ordered.
We may also note the paradox that our sketch of a coherent view
of life in these sections will culminate in an insistance on
pluralism and multi-dirnensionality in cultural analysis. The truth
of the matter is, I believe, that the synthetic element in this
cx)herence is properly sought at the level of value-analysis.
Many Maps Just as things have many aspects, so collections of
things to be classified have as many potential bases of
classification. A crowd of people, for example, may be grouped
and regrouped endlessly according to sex, age, hair-colour,
nationality, interests, income-levels, and so on. This elementary
point of logic applies also to cultural achievements and
disciplines of knowledge: they too may be vli1ly mapped in an
indefinite number of ways. Our concern, however, is limited to
classifications that have educationally significant bases and so
identify categories that are important enough severally to have a
serious claim on the curriculum maker. The number of these
maps should not be endless.
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But cx)uld it be just one? On the face of it that is unlikely. It
takes no more than a rummage in the history of philosophy to
oome up with a number of maps that differentiate in ways that,
intuitively, seem valid, important, and quite different from each
other. Three such shall occupy us fruitfully. Philosophical
defence of the distinctions they make will not be my main
ooncern here. Largely accepting the intuitive v1iii-y of these
distinctions, I will ooncentrate on their value-signifir'ance and,
relatedly, their suggestiveness for cultural and curriculum
critique.
Let us preview them together before getting down to each in
turn. First is the Aristotelian division of thought by aim, into
science, art and p1itics - that is to say (since each of those
terms was meant very broadly), the differences between thinking
aimed at:
- good (or better) understanding of how things are
- making good artefacts;
- good dethsions and good living.8
This division can be a stick for the traditional liberal curriculum
with its overwhelming emphasis on the propositional,, its
downgrading of axt and still more of technical education, and its
neglect of the ethicai, pn1ifll,, legal,, ecx)nomic, ecx)]ogica], and
family studies that bear most directly on deliberation and po]icy9.
And we shall find subtler uses of it besides. But now, cutting
right across that division are the historical variants (Greek, neo-
P]atonist, medieval,, Comptean) of another elementary division of
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know]edge, this time by reference to the layer of reality engaged
with, e.g. thought1 studies and practices specifically relating, in
turn, to:
- the physical world;
- the biosphere;
- the animal kingdom;
- the human;
- the Transcendent 10
Our ordinary curricular distinction between sciences and
humanities, and the sub-distinctions that go with it, can be most
naturally located here. But it may be queried whether these
standard school subjects sometimes act to screen their objects
from the gaze of students, and so to frustrate the underlying
point of this division? Finally, and from yet another direction, a
modern philosophical and educational tradition employs age-old
psychological distinctions to urge the necessity of educating the
whole person, in her varied dimensions and powers:
- physical as well as mental;
- moral as well as cx)gntve;
- imagination and emotions as well as memory and
- intellect.
But, some may ask, is this tradition now in some disarray and
retreat, in part because of an inherent vagueness in its 'zoning'
of the person and in the 'folk psychology' on which it relies, and
in part because of a tendency in it to narcissistic excess? We
shall cxrnsider how it may be defended and reaffirmed.
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In sum, taking knowledge and culture as sets of relationships
between us and the world, we anticipate elementary but
interesting divisions based in turn on the precise nature of the
relationships, the part of the world that is most involved, and
the part of us that is most involved. (Putting it that way
suggests that1
 after all, the maps may fit together, though three-
dimensionally, and amount to a broadly cxmplete analysis, but I
shall not pursue any claim of that sort.)
(1) Mapping cxgni.ve aims The immediately obvious practical
interest of our first map is, to repeat, as a reproach to our
traditinnal curricular neglect of both making and deliberating.
Of oourse theoretical school subjects give some opporturiitis for
technical oonstruction, as in experimental work, and for
deliberation, as over the r1iibility of an historical explanation.
But these are subordinate to the theoretical purposes of those
subjects. The significant thing is the lower status, if not the
absence, of subjects that are primarily to do with making or
deliberating. In 4.1 we shall oonsider at length the importance
of 'making subjects' of one broad kind. Here we might advance
some simple propositions regarding an important part of an
education in deliberation.
There exists a whole range of causes, all profoundly matters at
once of prudence and of justice, which are of more or less
critical importance for the future that our pupils (and their
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children) will live in. They are captured in labels like 'world-
hunger and North-South relationships', 'disarmament and nuclear
deterrence', 'ecology, energy and the green movement', 'racism
and a multi-cultural society and world', 'patriarchy, feminism and
women's rights', 'relationships, the sexual revolution and kids',
'localism, nationalism and internationalism'. All of them are
complex, requiring patient and sustained reflection towards a
multi-disciplinary understanding (part scientific, part historical,
part economic, etc). Aside from a proper care about them, if the
various kinds of relevant concept and information are not being
imparted in schoo]1 it. is unlikely that many wifl go to the large
trouble of seeking them out in later life; surely, a substantial
start must be made at least in secondary schooL Second, these
causes are so many foci. of propaganda and counter-propaganda
in the battle for public opinion. It would be an educational
challenge to avoid indoctrinating students, indeed to arm
students against indoctrination, as one set about provoking their
sustained concern. Third, and further, they are all matters
involving powerful and deeply entrenched interests, po1itical and
other. So we may expect to have to fight a rearguard action
here for the legitimate freedom of schools - as in connection with
that more general Thghtening' thing, a practically-minded
pn1itiral education. Fourth, there are spec±c curriculum
projects that relate to these issues: peace-studies, black-studies,
women's studies, energy studies, etc. Where these are taken up
they struggle for time with traditional subjects, and it is a nice
question how much effort should be put into them and how much
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into opening out existing subjects towards these issues, into the
pursuit of a just astuteness as a cross-curricular theme. Fifth,
we must not overestimate the contribution of 'lessons' here - that
indeed is very much the point! An education in deliberation, to
be authentic, must involve actual deliberations, just as we make
students read literature itself and not just cx)mmentaries on it, or
do science experiments and not just read them up in the
texthook. Thus some of the study, criticism and discussion of
our issues shoulLi be in the context of real student participation
in, for example, the running of a school and its sub-systems."
These propositions are among the many that woul1 find root-room
and comfort in Aristotle's triad of cognitive aims. But so much
for broad brush-stroke. If we pursue this map now to two of its
sub-divisions (weBknown already to Aristotle himself), we
highlight some further fundamental issues.
The first is of 'science' (thinking about the worlI as it is, rather
than as what it might become through the thinker's art or
action) into investigative and apprer tEve/contempbHve modes of
thought On the one hand, there is acquiRitive enquiry that
seeks to extend the human stock, or one's own stock, or one's
students' stock, of knowledge. On the other hand, there is a
knowing which has the character of a resting in the object - and
this is something else of which the very mention raises the
suspicion of neglect. In a profound paper Ray Elliot expresses
both the distinction and the suspicion:
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But a student might say, with some justification, that he has been taught
to love Criticism rather than literature or history rather than the past,
If literary works and the past become for him nothing but objects to
enquire into in accordance with the methods he has learned. If a student
of philosophy thinks of philosophy as enquiry for its own sake, enquires
into whatever the other philosophers enquire Into, and is unclear about the
point of the whole activity, he is at best a lover of enquiry, hardly a
lover of wisdom, which Is something beyond enquiry .....(In philosophical
aesthetics) it is frequently taken for granted that when a work (of art)
ceases to offer any further scope for enquiry one ceases to have any
further interest in it, and turns to something else. No account is taken
of the lover of art who after having come to know a work returns to it
again and again, not with the hope of discovering anything new In It but to
live in it and take it to his heart. This tendency to regard acquisitive
enquiry as their sole or chief aim makes the practitioners of the
humanities seem more like hunters than shepherds.12
The secxnd sub-division is of 'art' into the aesthetic and the
functional.: two kinds of product (or aspect of product), two
kinds of making, and two kinds of the thinking that inhabits
making. We shall touch briefly on this, a prime site for cultural
and educational reflection, in the next section. But note that,
whatever its nature and importance, it remains a sub-distinction
here. Considered as a whole, this map rather associates the arts
with, than dissociates them from, other kinds of manufacture and
would certainly not preclude some association of the arts and the
technology sections in schools.
Our first map allows us, next, to identify some discourses and
practices as involving unique and valuable integrations of
elements from more than one of its categories and as having a
consequent prima fade claim, among other claims they may have,
on the general curriculum. Thus, as we saw in 2.2, 'utopian'
discourse combines a commitment to good action with a theoretic-
type interest in the idea]., and the human sciences embody a
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(cx)ntroversial) balancing-act between detached understanding on
the one hand and relevance to human valnes on the other.
Again, technology, though it obviously centres on making, also
draws integrally both on many parts of science and on many
kinds (cx)mmercial1
 environmental, legal, ethical) of deliberation.
(The original three categories remain basic - even archetypal,
however. These integrations imply only that they are not
quarantined from each other.)
Finally, it is also to this map's credit that we can find
educationally significant cross-distinctions that derive
simultaneously from it and the next map. Thus the distinction
between the human and the natural sciences remains in some part
the result of applying the human/physical distinction from the
list of layers of reality (the next map) to the category of
'science' here. Again, we might draw a distinction, intuitLvely
significant, between software and hardware, using these terms in
a generalized way to refer to artefacts that are primarily
linguistic or symbolic (books, newspapers, television programmes,
oomputer programmes) on the one hand, and those that are not
primarily symbolic (houses, vehir1, food, weapons) on the other.
Such a distinction emerges as the result of applying the
human/physical distinction, this time to the category of making.
For the essence of 'software' is meaning (not paper, ink, discs,
etc.) and so it is an extension of mind, while 'hardware', though
it has human (inclnding inhuman) purposes, is in itself purely
materiaL This distinction, inciientaLy, woul1 cut across our
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earlier distinction between aesthetic and functional and be
posi±ively hospitable to such associations as of bni1lirig with
architecture in its hardware division, and of journalism with
literature - or of most of the things brought together in the
school-subject 'English' - in its software division.
To end on a more formally philosophical note. This first map is
replete with practical implications precisely because its
distinctions are - as it seems to me - profoundly archetypaL
They are even in some way anterior to the categorization of
valnes. Each category of valnes has a purchase on (can be
pursued in) each of theorizing, deliberating and making (we shall
demonstrate this for making in 4.1), and from that would seem to
follow at once the fundamental importance of each of the three
and the artificiality of any attempts (ancient and medieval
philosophy offered several) to place them in an order of
importance.
(2) Mapping the in1 l1irjThl wotid Our seoond map will prove
suggestive as a pointer, less to particular :imbalances and gaps in
standard curricular provision, and more to a possible general
mlise in that provision. The main question, we shall see, is
whether we rather neglect the 'extravert' spirit of this map even
if we generally observe its letter.
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The map, it. will be recalled, distinguishes layers of reality such
as the material, biological, animal, human and divine. There are
purely cx)nceptual relationships among these. Each category after
the first one, excepting the last, is, extensiona]ly, a sub-class ct
the preceding, while, intensianally, it includes the preceding
within itself. The class of animal, for example, nthins the class
of human while the meaning of 'human' cxntains 'animal'. More
interesting, and very much more problematic, are the
metaphysical relationships between the ]ayers. Of each of the
distinctions between non-living and living, non-cxnscious and
cxnsous, non-rational and rational, one may ask whether it is of
kind or of degree, ultimate or not. Is humanity siifFitntly
described as a more developed animal species? Is the mind a
brain? Is an animal a cxmplex machine? Also: what is to unt
for and against answers - what, for instance, is really entailed
by the evolution of each layer from the preceding, or, were they
to occur, what would laboratory syntheses of living substances
and silicon inFc11igences imply? Three broad approaches to these
questions may be distinguished, one of them pluralist, the other
two monist. We may attend to the differences between the levels
and insist upon them as finaL We may instead attend to, and
insist upon, the cxntinnitis. This latter we may do either in a
levelling-down spirit - mind is 'nothing but' brain, the human
being 'no more than' a sophisticated animal, and so forth - or in
a levelling-up spirit - matter can think, evolution reveals the
extraordinary p entilitips of matter, biology and psychology tell
us more about matter than physics, and so forth. Levelling down
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is usually called 'reductionism', and we might call levelling-up
'elevationism'. Moving now to the divine, in our culture there is
of course a question of Its real existence. Beyond that there is
the perennial question of Its proper characterization. It is only
very crudely thought of as one more ('the highest') level of
reality - since It would be the urce of all levels, and as such
would enter our experience. The main issue is sometimes thought
to be between transcendent and immanent conceptions of God. In
fact each of these may entail the other: because God is whole in
all space and time, He has to be 'outside' space and time, or
because He is, as the medievals were fond of saying, more in us
than we are in ourselves, He has to be totally Other.
Using this map as a check on curriculum breadth does not
actually commit us to the pluralist approach and it excludes only
an arrogantly confident version of reductionism. For the
distinctions in question are not dearly unreal, and that,
combined with their cultural significance, is enough warrant for
representing all the layers on the curriculum. On the other
hand, the metaphysical questions are not then educationally
irrelevant. One would expect some actual engagement with them
somewhere in a decent curriculum - and not only as
contextualized in (say) literature, history and science, but
directly and for their own sake.
But curriculum's 'metaphysical involvement' is not primarily a
matter of adding bits of philosophy to the student's other
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subjects so as to sensit7e her to certain historic controversies.
What is primary, and determines curriculum 'relevance' in its
deepest sense, is the bearing of her school-subjects generally on
the student's lived relationships with Nature, Man, and God,
which may inc]ude a lived sense of the unity of these as
constituting her world and entering into her identity. Do her
studies in history, literature and religious studies, for example,
really allow the student to observe all this in others - at arm's
length so to speak - and then attend to it in herself as a matter
of critical self-development? If it is required of her curriculum,
first, actually to 'make a connection' with these lived
relationships, and, second, to walk the fine line between quizzing
them and blasting them, would we be more anxious about the
second if we were better at meeting the first requirement?
Not long ago two leading philosophers of education were
converging on these matters from different directions. In some
of his later writings Richard Peters sought to capture a kind of
enquiry and knowledge whose main - and great - significance
was neither theoretical nor practical but its bearing on the
framework of our beliefs and attitudes regarding the general
conditinns of human life.
Suppose a man is exercised about why his friend Is rude to him, worried
about his own prejudices and uncharitable feelings, or concerned about
whether he should be patriotic or feel awe for the sea or at the sight of
death. Suppose that he is led by such uneasiness into studies in
psychology, ethics, politics, and religion .... . Notions like knowledge for
its own sake and curiosity suggest a stance that is too detached and
disinterested to do justice to his concern about such questions. On the
other hand, answering them is not obviously connected with any particular
course of action or further end to be achieved .... . What is he to make of
objects in the natural world and of phenomena such as the dark, thunder,
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other people and of their reactions to him and to each other? What Is he
to to think about himself and about questions of ownership? What attitude
is he to take towards the cycle of birth, marriage and death? In what way
Is he to react to authority, suffering, and violence? These are questions
arising from the general conditions of human life.
By neglecting such questions and such uses of the disciplines of
learning traclitinnal education had switched off a great many
students, Peters suggested.'3
More than frameworks or 'general conditirns' are involved here,
however. It is as much a matter of mental vitality - the mind's
teeming engagements with the natural,, the human and the divine
- as of wisdom. In a wU-known paper'4
 Ray Elliott wrote of the
Understanding's need to live, with fertile intellectual ems, in
close cxrntact with its chosen objects, and suggested that
progressive educators might be interpreted as proclaiming just
this. A distinction, non-ri.gkl but real, may be drawn between
natural understanding and the understanding provided by the
learned disciplines. Natural understanding can be of a very high
order - Elliott reminds us of Shakespeare. Also, it is far from
impossible that a discipline may lose its way for a time, its
relationship with its objects becx)me distant or distorted - too
exclusively that of the hunter as opposed to the shepherd, for
instance, or too ooncentrated on a single feature, or too
manipulative. At one time or another, the quality of thlogy's
relationship with religious life, of science's with our experience
of nature, of literary criticism's with our response to literature,
of psychology's with our ordinary intersubjectivity and of
academic history's with our love of the past, have all been
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reasonably challenged. These facts entail, not that we drop the
disciplines from the curriculum, but that we 'problematize' their
role. We must cx)nsider how they might best be used (here a
discipline's own history may somet±nes suggest escape-routes
from its ntemporary orthodoxies and odhims), and how they
might need to be supplemented, if the understanding's life with
its objects is to be developed rather than cramped. Elliott also
postulated an experience of 'a primitive synoptic unity' of Nature,
Man and God. By their abstracting nature the disciplines will
diminish this, breadth of disciplines by itself being a breadth
without unity, unless education also teaches a method of 'recall'
to its naivety. Without these attentions to natural
understanding, Elliott suggests, 'the educated person' comes to
fulfil his own tragi-mic caricature: one whose mind moves in
tracks that he neither cxrntributes to nor fully understands,
which he cannot relate to the mmon experience that he somehow
despises or is no longer interested in, and which have already
been superceded in the disciplines themselves!
Let us draw some cxnclnsions from these reflections:
(i) Like others, this map may be used as a simple check on
curriculum breadth and to 'spot gaps' like (despite people's
involvement with pets, ncern about various forms of cruelty to
animals, and interest in wild-life) ethology -zoology, which is
generally on affer, being about as adequate a representation of
the animal kingdom as physiology is of the human world - and a
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productive involvement with the biosphere as in gardening or
farming.
(ii) Its more profound use is as a reminder of the values that
undergird it, the cherishings of material, living, cxnscious, human
and divine worlds for their own distinctive sakes. The particular
map of the 'ecstatic' category of values, it is essentially
'extravert'. But disciplines, like churches, may be introverted,
turned in on themselves to the point of forgetfulness of the
being of their proper objects. There is a corresponding
responsibility on the educator to look out for this introversion,
teach the disciplines in a way that offsets it, and supplement
them with more informal approaches as necessary - not only in
primary schools or with 'non-academic' students, but in all
schools with all students. (It is probably the case that the
concern for relevance in the curriculum development movement
has increased awareness of all this among teachers, subject
associations, and examination boards. But the battle has to be
constantly renewed if the costs of insdtution1i7ing disciplines
are not to outweigh the benf9ts.)
(iii) One kind of introversion to guard against is a discipline's
concern with the recruitment, selection, training, and assigning -
and ail-pervadingly with the status - of its professionals. Quite
proper and responsible of it, if the result is not to distract itself
too much from research and enquiry, but a notorious threat to
general education and to future amateurs and 'consumer-users' in
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its area! For the institutional self-interests of disciplines and
the interests of education in disciplines overlap but do not
cxincide. Providing opportunities for youngsters to try
themselves out at various things and passing on some critical
appreciation and respect for disciplines are, doubtless, shared
interests. But, to speak ideally and from the point of view of
this map, education's great interest in a discipline is its potential
to develop the appreciative consciousness - eye, hand and heart
- of students in relation to its segment of reality, and it is not
clear how large is the discipline's own stake in this. The
community of scientists, say, may take a cheerful view of a
science-curricu]nm that is ordered and sequenced so as to steal
a march for its future specialists and burn the rest off. But
education cannot share this arrogance. It has 'apostolic' duties
to the world's grandeur which, as much as straightforward
egalitarian considerations, give it a deep interest in limiting
failnre and the significance of failnre and keeping everyone in
the game. If the selection of professionals is 'norm-referenced'
in the end - though it is true this end can be delayed, then
education is 'criterion-referenced', welcoming late as well as early
development, average as well as high achievement, and breadth
as well as depth.15.16
(iv) Finally, there is the issue of education's relationship with
the unity of the world and of our experience. We have Elliott's
suggestion that unity is awiilRhie only in natural understanding,
and not also across the disciplines. In 3.1, I suggested
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fragmentation was indeed a feature of our intellectual culture,
but implied this was not in the nature of things. A unity of
archetypal ideas and images across disciplines, such as the
Greeks may have enjoyed in their use of ncepts like 'form' and
'proportion', remains an inte]]ectual ideal And where such
mutual echoes and resonances linger on, or new ones start up, it
would be important to attend to them in education.'7
(3) Mapping self-expression If the previous map re]ated
particularly to realizing values in the 'ecstatic' category, mapping
the zones of human being can be seen as instrumental., especially,
to what we called experiential and vita]., and might also have
called self-expressive, values. We shall, in turn, remark upon
- the logical informality of our discourse in this area
- the perspective on personhood that is fundamentally
involved
- the possible re]ationships between specific 'zones' of
the person and specific curricular disciplines and
practices.
First, then, we have here not one division, but an ovr1apping,
intersecting cluster of divisions: mental/physical,, moral/cx)gnitive,
intellect/memory! imagination/feeling, and perhaps a few more. It
would seem that education borrows these schemata, with
occasional adaptations, from ordinary ]anguage, where the
'psychology' they represent is pervasive and subtle but quite
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unsystematic. If, by some shoving and hauling, they were
overlaid on a single map, it would be at a cx)st to nuance and
overtone. Again, complex interrelationships among the items
distinguished, a feature already of our first two maps (e.g
between material and human, or between science and int11igent
making), combine here with some instability in the meanings of
terms. Thus, from Aristotle to Kant to Sartre, there have been
philosophers to argue that imagination is routinely involved in all
understanding. But this would not preclude some acts of
understanding being conspicuously imaginative (in a perhaps
slightly different sense of the word) - our ordinary sense that
'imaginative' is just the right word for them, rather than, say,
'precise' or 'lucid'. Nor would it preclude the educationist from
critirisirig a curriculum or a pedagogy for neglecting this kind of
understanding. Again, philosophers point out that feelings like
fear, envy, anger and so forth, embody wgniiive appraisals of
situations, e.g. as dangerous, or as of someone having what one
does not have oneself. But this omnipresence of the cognitive
would not justify a treatment of students as 'brains on sti]ts', as
though the education of the feelings would then look after
itself. 18 Yet again, in education 'the physical' refers to bodily
ski]]1 fluidity, and force primarily as expressions of the mental1
but it remains important to distinguish these from other
expressions of the mental and to cater specifically for them.
In passing, we may distinguish proper and improper uses of this
unsystematic 'psychology' in education. Properly: it provides
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key-words and key-contrasts to the plain-language plans,
descriptions and evaluations, that are our ordinary means of
lighting our way. Improperly: its schemata might be
decontextua]ized and burdened with systematic theorising, as
perhaps by Benjamin Bloom in his famous project to create a
complete taxonomy of educational objectives under separate
cognitive, affective and psycho-motor heads' 9 - as though, to
mention the main difficulty, these three zones were not
conceptually interpenetrative. [This informality suggests to some,
however, that we should work towards replacing this 'folk'
psychology with something more scientific, something that would
take a full theoretical strain. They envisage not just a scientific
psychology that continued to develop its specialist applications
and to tinge our general awareness with some of its more
speculative ideas, but one that overran our awareness of
ourselves and others - and, so, overran our history, literature
and, of course, educational discourse. 20 I am sceptical about
this idea. If some future flowering of our minds could make
Shakespeare seem primitive, I doubt that it would resemble
contemporary psychology in form as much as it would
Shakespeare! But I am conscious that the argument for thus
backing the informal over the 'scientific' for the long run would
not be easy to assemble - in addition to taking us far from our
present tasks.]
There is a further and more basic ambiguity to note, a narrow
and a broad rendering of the idea of a harmonious development
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of the whole person. Narrowly, the idea is rendered through the
psychological schemata alone: it proposes, simply, the due and
proportionate deve]opment of each of the zones that these
schemata pick out. Broadly, it would be articulated additionally
through our frst two maps. That is, 'all-round fulfillment' would
also include a balancing of our relationships with the material,
animal, human and divine, and of the three main modes of
relationship, viz, understanding, disposing, and fashioning. After
all, we may be 'starved' of human cxmpanionship or contact with
Nature, and 'ache' for an opportunity to make something or,
again, to influence the course of events. Indeed classical
fulfillment theones, like Aristotle's, tended to restrict themselves
to an articulation in terms of objects and modes of relationship.
But the psychological schemata surely do amount to an
independent criterion of breadth and balance, though it may have
taken the Romantic movement and Idealist philosophy to draw
them out from the shadows of the first two maps. 21
 After we
have said that a balanced education will include making and
deliberation as well as the propositional, and will deal with each
of material1
 living, animal1 human and divine, do we not still need
to say that in all this we must provide space for the body as
well as the mind, the feelings and imagination as well as the
intellect, and the character as well as the brain? On the other
hand, neither should considerations of this third kind be allowed
to swamp those relating to the objects and the modes of
relationship - what may be dubbed 'the Californian fallacy'!
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This merits further reflection. There is a particular side af
personhood, of what it is to be a person, that is represented and
safeguarded by this third map: s self-expressiveness. The
person is, among other things, the centre of an assertive point
of view, in Richard Peters' phrase, who seeks to put her stamp
on things. And one aspect of disciplines and cultural practices
is that they are so many expressions of the assertive human
spirit and vehicles, endlessly, for the self-expression and self-
discovery of their practitioners. So the point of the
psychological schemas is to map a self-expression that would be
full and balanced. Again: with Marx, we may view human life as,
through all its historical forms and phases, essentially productive
activity. Not only technology, commerce and the economy, but
pnlitirs, religions, arts and philosophies are products of our
work. And in Marx's concept of 'alienation' and his project to
overcome the alienation of the worker from his products, and,
relatedly, to heal the split between manual and mental labour, the
ex-Hegelian shows his continuing commitment to the idea of a
rounded and coherent self-production.
The contrast, of course, is with the limpidly receptive side of
personhood, by which it mirrors, reveals, faci1itjtes the world -
what we might call the person as 'fri nd'. Notice that this
contrast cuts across the triad of understanding, making and
doing, though not perhaps at a full right-angle. Understanding
lends itself very readily to a description in terms of receptivity.
What we come to know, we take in, entertain, assimilate, digest,
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even (as the Greeks had it) becx)me, and truth is the shaping of
the mind to the world. But making and doing also have, or
ought to have, their own receptive sides, as our new 'green'
consciousness brings home to us. Technology and art may be
seen as revelatozy, rlcasing the latent powers and revealing the
latent meanings and beauty of things. Also, proper action on
things is a kind of obedience, it might be said, even when it is
transformative. In the natural law tradition, it is obedient to a
law inscribed at the heart of things by God. On the other hand,
it is not only making and doing that have their active side; as
the Greeks were already well aware, so does understanding, and
we can it 'enquiry'. And from that point of view, which is our
present one, the enquiring mind is - like the creative urge, the
determined wi]]1
 or the active and agile body - a fit expression
of human personhood.
These two interpretive keys, expressiveness and friendliness, are
not mutually exclusive perspectives on personhood, but
complementary. The aspects they pick out degenerate, surely, if
cut off from each other, the one into a kind of narcissistic
desperation, the other into an abnegatory quietism. it is along
these lines, I think, that one would develop a fuller case for
complementing our first two maps with this more narrowly
psychological approach to curriculum balance.
But, now, what kinds of curricu]ar acbon and adjustment does
this criterion of balance involve? There might be disagreement
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over this. First, we have the old, but persistent, idea that
subjects may be classified according to the aspects or powers af
the person that they especially draw upon and develop - at its
crudest and clearest: the arts for imagination, drama for
empathy, the humanibes for affectivity, physical education for
the body, and the sciences and mathematics for sheer bloody
intellect. But this at once attracts rejainders of the kind that
dwell on the amount of sustained, critical analysis in history and
literature, the ways in which mathematics and science reward
passion and imagination, and even the perspiration of piano-
playing. These may come from either of two general positions,
themselves opposed. One claims that any one of many curriculum
areas and, for that matter, of many non-curricular pursuits,
could be siiffiricrit in itself for the development of all the mental
powers, if properly handled and sustained (part of a case,
perhaps, for specialization). The other, instead, insists on the
different ways in which the mental powers are exercised in
various subjects and pursuits: thus, imaginadve thinking is 'one
thing' in the arts, 'quite another' in personal relationships, and
'different again' in mathematics, so that the proper development
of imagination will require its exercise in each of these, and
other, pursuits.22
The tolerant view, which I think is right, is that each corner of
this triangular debate contains a kernel of truth. Stripped down
and persuasively qu1ifid, they yield propositions (i)-(iii).
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(i) Of its logical nature, discipline D (say, literature) makes
a specially large demand (relative to other disciplines) on
psychic area A (say imagination), and more modest demands
on many otther psychic areas;
(ii) within limits, the sizes of the demands D makes on A
and other psychic areas vary with pedagogy and related
factors;
Clearly (i) and (ii) are now compatible (and the question is left
open of the relative importance of the variables of logical
structure and pedagogy).
(iii) qu1itRtively, D makes fafrly distinctive demands on A
and other psychic areas.
Here, the word 'fairly' makes (±ii)'s qu1ithtive point compatible
with both (i) and (ii). It suggests a degree of distinctiveness
that limits the significance of informally 'quantitative'
comparisons (say, with imagination in mathematics), but does not
make them nonsensical. (And if these were nonsensira], could
we still be sure we were talking about the same psychic area?)
In practical policy, too, these lines are naturally harmonized.
Suppose an agreement in a school to correct a curricular
imbalance by a more vigorous targetting of the imagination. It
would cause little surprise to gloss this as involving, at one and
the same time, more work in the arts because of their overall
significance for imagination, a reoonsideration of pedagogy across
the curriculum, and attention to some designated modes of
imagination (empathic understanding, fertility in problem-solving,
271
open-ended creativity, etc.) and to the disciplines, or parts of
disciplines, in which they may be particularly exercised 23•
One Map? Hirst's Theory of Forms: Our reElections, summary
and exploratory though they were, have tended to vindicate each
of the three maps, and, with them, the multi-dimensional approach
to curriculum design. But might there be, after all, some way of
bringing everything into a unified theoretical vision, some basis
for a curriculum 'masterp]an'? Paul Hirst's well-known theory of
the Forms of Knowledge aspires, it seems, to just such a bold
economy. First, it presents other kinds of knowledge as either
reducible to, or thoroughly dependent upon, propositional
knowledge. Then a division of this knowledge is proposed
according to certain 'purely logical' criteria which are to absorb
whatever is not simply to be discarded of traditional criteria
relating to levels of reality and aspects or powers of human
being. This division yields some seven forms of knowledge, at
once distinct and inter-connected, which together constitute the
fundamental prescription for a rational core-curriculum. In
additinn to its economy, the theory is attractLve by virtue of the
quasi-intuitive plausibility of many of its aspects (insnfFintly
acknowledged by its critics). Some would add as a merit the fact
that it endorses the broad intellectualism and the main
distinctions, though not the actual subjects, of the traditional
liberal curriculum. For others, this arouses their deepest
suspicions!
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I will formulate and review the main steps in Hirst's argument.24
Indeed I will, to an extent, reformulate some parts of the
argument the better to expose some of its cxnsiLlerab]e strengths
and with a view to some refinement of my own position. In the
end, however, I will be confirmed in my preference for the
'divergent' approach to mapping. [Very recently Hirst has
changed his position - in one respect drastically - and we shall
refer briefly to this in a postsaipt.]
(1) The primacy of the propositional? The prologomenon to the
thecry proper, in which propositional learning is made pivotal to
learning in general, is already of far-reaching curricular
consequence. One of Flirst's starting-points for this is a
standard ciassifiration of kinds of knowledge under three heads
(which is similar to the first of our maps, though lacking
Aristotle's discrimination between making and de]iberation):
propositional knowledge or 'knowledge-that', where what is
known is a truth or a set of truths e.g. 'London is the
capital of the UK' or the seven times table;
procedural or practical knowledge, often called 'know-how',
where what is known is how to carry out a performance or
activity of some kind e.g. to ride a bicycle or to remove a
brain-thmour;
knowledge with a direct object or 'knowledge by
acquaintance' where what is known is an object, like a
person, a place, or a work-of-art.25
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Plausibly enough, Hirst claims that knowledge by acquaintance
(our contemp]ati.ve/appreciaUve knowledge?) is analysible into
some xmbination of 'knowledge that' and 'know-how' plus an
implication that these are founded in part on direct experience of
the object in question. Less plausibly, Hirst also claims that
because some 'knowledge-that' is always presupposed in 'know-
how' - thus knowing how to ride a bicycle involves being able to
identify some things as bicyc]es, to understand some statements
about the purposes of bicycles and of some of their parts, etc. -
it is the more fundamental of the two, and therefore the most
fundamental kind of knowledge. And a similar conclusion is
reached starting out from kinds of development1 and, again, from
the cxncept of meaning.26
Hirst infers from this that education should consist centrally,
though not whoUy, of propositional-type ]earning 27 - a matter, of
course, not just of piling-up facts, but of the mastery of those
processes by which propositions may be generated, related to
each other, and tested.
No matter what the ability of the child may be, the heart of all his
development as a rational being Is, I am saying, intellectual, and we must
never lose sight of these ends on which so much else, nearly everything
else, depends.28
He would add that the importance of the intellectual is not only
strategic. Propositional learning also constitutes 'a liberal
education' - as illuminating and making sense of our experience
it is worth pursuing 'for its own sake'. It is not clear,
furthermore, that he accords that self-justifying status to making
or to deliberation. The educational primacy of 'knowledge-that'
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may thus be doubly insured, once by reference to its strategic
role in practical living, and again by reference to its intrinsic
value.
Some of our earlier discussions have prepared us to see why this
line of argument is shaky. It would seem to assume that
dependence has to be a one-way street. Thus it overlooks the
likelihood that the affective, the mor4 and the practical are
properly interdependent with the intellectual - in a great variety
of ways, depending on the oontext. The result is a view of the
autonomy of the propositional with which few, or none, of the
following sit at all easily:
- the evidence from psychology that 'enactive'
understanding is a frequent cxnditinn of propositional
understanding;
- as a particular case of that perhaps, that priority in
some respects of educational practice over educational
theory on which, as we saw in 2.1, Hirst himself now
sets much store;
- the fact that advances in engineering can stimulate, as
well as result from, scientific advances;
- the role of values, and the dialectic between interest
and detachment, in the very structuring of a proper
human science;
- the engagement of the heart to the propositional in
contemplative-appreciattve knowledge in the humanities,
if not also in other areas of knowledge;
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- the extreme subtlety of the relationship between
evidence and faith in some religious believing;
- the common belief that moral insight Is as much a fruit,
as it is a cx)ndition, of goodwill and right action;
- the cx)ntribution of the experience of practising and
performing in the arts, to the understanding of works
of art.
This first step in Hirst's argument seems the least considered.
it is, however, the most fatefuL It would legitimate, not only the
traditional low status of 'practical' subjects, but that distortion
of many subjects that has resulted from isolating their
propositional from their deliberative, technical,, and contemplative
elements. It also has a diminishing effect on the next step in
Hirst's theory, his identification of the criteria of a Form. For it
conceals from him the likelihood that the relationship of
propositions to value and action within forms of knowledge is
just as integral to their logic or 'grammar', and just as
distinctive in each form and as significant a variable across
forms, as those features of propositions on which he fixes.
Nonetheless, this next part of his argument is of great interest
I shall endeavour to do it justice, while giving myself a fairly
free hand in the way I assemble it.
(2) The rrWeria of a Form of knowledge: If propositional
learning is the crux of the curriculum, as Hirst believes, then
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the ciassiflcatk)n of kinds of proposition will be the crucial guide
to curriculum-planning. But propositions, like everything else,
can be classified in a great many ways: as positive and negative,
categorical and hypothet-i4 according to tense, etc. What we
are after is a c]assific'ation according to the most fundamental
logical properties of propositions as such. These would seem to
be truth-value (the proposition's being always either true or
false) and meaning (which is carried by the concepts of the
proposition). Thus, the two most fundamental questions about
any proposition, it might be said, are: 'What does it mean?' and
'Is it true?' Can we then find among propositions different
kinds of meaning and of truth?
Let us try at once to point and to answer this question. We
know that there is a variety of strategies for testing truth and
that this corresponds with a variety of kinds of proposition.
Thus, Pythagoros's theorom, 'e= mc2', 'Napoleon ]ost the battle of
Waterloo', 'you don't understand me', 'lying is generally wrong',
'Crime and Punishment is a great novel' and 'God exists' are each
to be argued for in significantly different ways. Again, as
Wittgenstein remarks in critit-i7ing behaviourism, we really do see
consciousness in another's face, including particular shades of it
like indifference or excitement, the glance he casts at someone
else, the look in his eye, etc., - but not in just the way that we
see the colour of his eyes. 29
 More generally, the seeing that is
believing comes in many modes. We may say, then, that there is
variety in the trUth-Crit'ri of different kinds of proposition
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(and duck the question of whether that entails different kinds of
truth). If we ask, next, what determines this variety, the answer
can only be the different Jdnds of meaning and concept involved.
And if we press that idea, will we not come to different forms
and degrees of networking of concepts, definitions and
propcsitions? 3° Perhaps we should go on to say that there are
four, not three, ideas here which belong together in a
particularly fundamental way, namely, kinds of truth-criteria,
kinds of meaning and concept, kinds of inter-propositional and
inter-conceptual relationship, and kinds of (propositional)
knowledge. In any case, definitions of the last that use the first
three as interdependent criteria will indeed be pretty
fundamental (Whether they touch actual rock-bottom, however,
is something we will query shortly.)
We may consider some examples of the interdependence of these
ideas:
(i) By nature, the concepts of mathematics form a relatively tight
structure. Thus we can define the infinite range of natural
numbers in terms of just the three concepts 'one' 'pins' and
'equality' (2=1+1; 3=1+2; 4=1+3 etc), a large number of operations
by reference just to addition, and all the concepts of a geometric
system in terms of a few primitive ones. But one cannot thus
inter-define, and organize into a set, aesthetic epithets like
'beautiful', 'fine', 'graceful', 'elegant', 'majestic', 'monumental',
'pretty', 'neat' and 'picturesque', though they do belong together
in some kind of family. Now in the mathematical case the
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interdefinibflity of cx)ncepts is ciar1y a conditinn of such a
typically mathematical mode of validation of propositions as
reduction to axioms. And the quite unsystematic relationships
among aesthetic epithets is similarly reflected in the informality
and the variety of the ways in which the choice of one epithet
rather than another, 'monumental' rather than 'picturesque' say,
would be defended.
(ii) Compare the mathematical statement 32=2.42
 with the scienbflc
one e=mc2. Despite the identical mathematical operations, quite
different kinds of relationships between the constituent concepts
are being affirmed. We are safe in saying that in the first case
the relationship is perceived as necessary in a way that in the
second it is not. And this difference is intimately related to the
presence in the scientific case, and the (at least re]atLve)
absence in the mathematical case, of an appeal to empirical
evidence, that is, to a difference in the truth-criteria of the two
statements.
Thus, more generally, what we are faced with in the domain of
knowledge is not just a matter of different families of
propositions and concepts, with parallel relations between the
concepts in each area, and parallel truth-criteria, but rather with
families that are in these internal respects quite dissimilar - so
dissimilar indeed, we might add, as to make us appreciate the
elasticity of words like 'family' or 'form' in embracing them a]].!
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Hirst has sweeping ambitions for these criteria. One aspect of
this is that they would provide us with, not only a fundamental
classifIration of kinds of proposition, but thereby (since
propositions are taken to be the original home of all concepts) of
kinds of concept as weB,, and therefore again, a fundamental
analysis of experience too, since it is only as 'cx)ncept-soaked'
that our experiences come to us and can mean anything.31 We
are offered, then, what purports to be the fundamental analysis
both of knowledge in its developed, disciplined forms and of the
elements of relatively undifferentiated corn monsense know]edge.32
(3) The seven Forms Applying the criteria to knowledge in our
present evolutionary phase is said to yield us some seven basic
Forms of knowledge and experience. In its mature form, the
theory identi19es these as: ]ogic-mathemM-iril, em p1 ric1
interpersonal1 moral1 aesthetic, rAligious and phi1osoph ir il 33 Each
of these has a decent, though not in all cases an unassailih]e,
claim to constitute an area of possible objective enquiry and
knowledge. Each has its own distinctive kinds of concept, of
networking of concepts, and of touchstone of truth, and so each
may claim to be a separate logical form. This does not mean,
however, that they are logically isolated from each other. Hirst
(increasingly) acknowledged, as he had to, that the autonomy of
each was limited by myriad relationships and dependencies among
them.29
 Thus we may remind ourselves of the relationship
between the empirical and the mathematical in the physical
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sciences; of the various ways in which the interpersonal depends
on the empirical and of the fact (a necessary fact?), at bottom,
that the human person is, among other things, a material object;
of the interre]ationship of the interpersonal and the moral, which
is cxntroversial but in any case very close - to the point where
from different perspectives each can seem even to enclose the
other; of the similarly cxntroversial, but on several acoounts
close, relationships of the moral to the religious, and, again, to
the aesthetic; of the relationships of the philosophical to all the
others, the perception of which varies with differences of view
on what 'philosophy' encxmpasses; and so forth. Many of these
relationships, it will be noticed, are precisely lcd of traditional
philosophical cxntroversy. The theory of Forms should not be
read as foreclosing on these controversies. It presumes only
that none of the specified Forms may be simply identified with
another.
It should be acknowledged that Hirst's derivation of criteria and
of Forms is persuasive as well as subtle. Once grasped, its more
argued aspects have a high intuitive appeaL Indeed they
represent, I suggest, not so much a set of new 'disx)veries', as,
like a Jot of good philosophy, a making explicit of what we
already knew, and indeed had to know in order to see the force
of the argument But the theory is open to important cr*iisms
in relation to the more vaunting aspects of its claims: that not
only may Forms be distinguished, but there is me defini±e,
unambiguous number of them (probably seven, at our present
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stage of development); that there are these criteria and no other
that the truth of propositions counts and no other kind of truth;
that this c]assiffration, pre-empts metaphysical and psychological
casFifications. In adiiitinn, the theory has lacked an adequately
developed theory of value. Let us thke these points in turn.
1 A good case can be made on the criteria for each of the seven
Forms. Furthermore, they would seem to encompass everything
collectively - one would be hard put to it to find an eighth Form
that is not already in some way incinded. All the same, there is
some arbitrariness in allowing no more and no less than these
seven - indeed in insisting on any definite number.
This is a matter, first, of an uncertainty in the abstract as to
how far to carry the division of know]edge in each sphere. Thus
Hirst divides the general area of the humanities into
interpersonal,, moral and religious Forms of knowledge. Doubtless
the criteria permit this, but it is not clear that they require it,
considering the closeness of the relationships between the three,
especially on some accounts of them. On the other hand, Hirst's
list does not distinguish among the sciences, nor again the arts.
But we can envisage a case, on the criteria, for countmg some of
our usual distinctions in these areas as distinctions of Form.
Thus the biological might constitute a Form in its own right, and
the etho]ogical may constitute another. Their heavy mvolvement
in physical science would not be enough to precinde this, for, as
we have seen, the autonomy of a Form does not preclude close
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relationships with other Forms. More positively, these areas are
demarcated by such apparently fundamental concepts as 'life' and
'cx)nsciousness'; again, one could say that such specie]. features
of the observation of animals as that they can observe
themselves being observed and that they can, indeed, come to
'relate' to their observer, constitute it a logically different form
of observation to that of, say, the astronomer. Some scientists
may entertain the ideal of one day representing the whole of
biology and ethology as logically quite cx)ntinuous with physics
and chemistry, but certainly they have not got there yet, nor is
it clear as to what form this continuity would take and precisely
what reinterpretations it would force upon us. In similar vein,
we might find good reasons for pronouncing music and art as
different Forms, though with significant common features. Our
uncertainties all along here are a function of some indeterminacy
in the criteria of a Form. This is not necessarily to be judged a
weakness in them - to be overcome by seeking a greater degree
of precision. It might be thought a positive advantage that it
allows us to have broader distinctions and fewer Forms in
contexts where the intercxrnnectedness af knowledge is the point,
and finer distinctions resulting in more Forms in contexts where
the relative autonomy of forms is the important thing.35
Second, Hirst does not consider the possibility of logically
'compound' Forms, as opposed to fi1'1s of study that are logical
'mixtures' of different Forms. The analogy here is with the
difference in chemistry between a mixture, like a solution in
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liquid, in which each substance retains its own properties, and a
compound, like water, in which the elements combine to form a
quite new substance with its own distinctive properties.
Geography, for example, is more 'a mixture' of its physical and
human elements, inasmuch as these remain easily distinguishable
within it. But other complex subjects seem rather to be
'cx)mpounds', with a claim to be Forms of knowledge in their own
right Thus the human sciences apply scientific method to an
area delimited by interpersonal concepts, but if we have learnt
anything from their development it is that both method and
cx)ncepts are transformed in the process. 36
 Consider, too, the
case of narrative literature. A great novel 1 like Crime and
Punishment combines affective, aesthetic, moral and religious
elements and its greatness resides, among other things, in the
unity it achieves among these elements. Is that a reason for
regarding narrative literature as an additional Form, or a reason
for reducing down the interpersona],, the aesthetic, the moral and
the religious to a single Form of the humanities? Either way, the
insistence on an exact number of Forms becomes, again,
problematic.
It is to be acknowledged that these queries do not challenge the
broad lines of Hirst's distinctions. But they add up to a case
for a much more flexible application of the concept of 'a Form',
and one that is probably less prescriptive in curriculum terms.
The next point strengthens that case.
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2 Should we not add to the three acknowledged criterial
variables of meaning, truth and logical structure a fourth, viz.
point (significance, interest)? It would seem to be as
fundamental as any of them and as implicated in them as we have
seen them to be in each other. Adding it would have three
effects. First, it would fruitfully cx)mp]icate the prrif91s of, and
the comparisons between, the orinafly acknowledged Forms. It
would bring to the fore the relathnships between knowledge of
persons and personal relationships, religious beliefs and worship
and good works, critical appreciation and artistic practice and
performance, and right thinking and right living, and it would
bring out the contrast between the points of these Forms and
the more 'intrinsic', or exclusively propositional., points of
mathematics and science. Second, it would let in deliberative and
technological discourses. Their propositional elements are so
'1rly not their most prominent features that even Hirst was not
tempted to distort them into purely propositional Forms, and yet
the inclusion of moral,, aesthetic and religious Forms might well
be thought to have prepared the way for them. Third, it would
force broader interpretations of the three original criteria.
'Meaning' would no longer be restricted (somewhat artificially?) to
the meaning of propositions. 'Truth' would include, alongside the
truth of propositions, such practical analogues of truth as the
virtues of accuracy in application and execution, authenticity,
integrity, fidelity and truthfulness. Finally, 'logical structure'
would embrace the role of action and/or making in relation to
propositions.
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A good case for adding this criterion and accepting these
consequences has been made, in effect, already. Earlier in this
chapter we listed many realities that sit uneasily with Hirst's
prioritizing of the propositional In previous chapters we have
argued the following claims more fully: that the human sciences
are importantly distinguished from the natural by the greater
intimacy, in principle, of their involvement with values, arising
from the proper resonance between the values that give point to
their enquiries and those that their enquiries confront that
within the general sphere of practical reason utopian,
deliberative, evaluative and scientific discourses may be
distinguished, as well as related, on the basis of their different
relationships to value and action; and that there is a 'trilectic' in
ethics, imp1iit1y recognized in much ordinary moral
consciousness, that involves action as well as vision and
argument in a constant interplay with each other.
3 We may challenge, next, Hirst's claim to have surpassed
'metaphysical' and 'psychological' divisions of knowledge in
absorbing them into a single 'logical' division.
In respect of the psychological, this amounted to the idea
concerning powers of mind, like imagination and feeling, that
they varied quite irreducibly in their action across the Forms.
Earlier we represented this type of claim as one tendency in a
three-cornered debate, opposed both by the tendency simply to
correlate individual powers with individual Forms and by the
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tendency to make the powers of mind altogether independent of
the variation in Forms. We proposed a softening of each of these
three positions, thus allowing them to cxmbine harmoniously into
a synthesis more plausible than any of them. Here, the
implication of that would be that our psychological distinctions
and maps remained significantly independent of the
distinguishing of Forms.
In respect of the metaphysical1
 one understands, of course, the
scruples of the post-Kantian philosopher in basing any division
of knowledge on supposed levels of reality. For the Greeks this
basis had been essential for their conceptuli7ation and
justification of their version of a liberal curriculum. But it
presupposed a realist position in epistemology, the view that we
may know things about the world as it is in itself, and that,
properly speaking, 'knowledge' entails precisely the conforming
of our judgements to aspects of objective reality. We, however,
might be considered the heirs of Kant, and, in particular, of
Kant's 'Coperrucan revolution' according to which knowledge is
rather the conformity of the world to the laws of the mind.
Impressed by this part of Kant's philosophy, perhaps, Hirst
argues that the old realism in epistemology is too speculative a
basis for curriculum construction. We can no longer be confident
that knowledge is the understanding of reality. We can be sure
only that it is the understanding of our erpenence, that is, the
coherent organization of our expenence37. And as experience is
the stand-in for reality in this view, so there is a surrogate for
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the old objectivity in the new idea of the essentially shared or
'public' nature of our concepts and our criteria of truth. Thus
the thsory of Forms, in its putative strictly 'logical' character, is
presented precisely as a substitute for a division of knowledge
accxrding to levels of being that offers a more secure basis on
which to build the liberal curriculum.38
We should not be taken in by these substitutions. At bottom, the
project of the 'Copernican revolution' is scarcely even a cx)herent
one. For it promotes experience at the cxst of falsifying
experience. The following is the argument for that claim, in
summary form. In our judgements we implicit1y affirm precisely
the reality of this or that state of affairs as independent of our
judgement of it. But judgement may be deemed a crucial element
in our experience (in a properly full account of 'experience') - a
fact not generally disputed, indeed; we can say that our
experience is simply shot through with understanding and
judgement. It follows that we may be said to xpr'ince the
independence of PM of fF1jr of our exprince of them.
That is just the kind of experience we have (as indeed Kant
himself brilliantly and inconsistently insisted in another passage
of his philosophy). Of course many of our judgements turn out
to be wrong, the experiences or appearances of which they are
part therefore illusory. But that fallibility institutes no 'divorce'
between experience and reality. On the contrary, the business of
refutation and correction revivifies the relationship. Note that it
is not just a matter of a sense of reality forming some sort of
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'background' to our experience, or of our experience cx)nveying
'intimations' of a reality beyond experience. For of what do we
experience, or seem to experience, the independent reality? Of
those particular states of affa]rs, those distinctions and
relationships between particular things and kinds of thing, even
those particular values of particular things and kinds of thing
(sometimes intrinsic ones) and those particular orderings of these
values, on which we cxnfidently pronounce.
This argument suggests that there is no 'third way' threading
between, or somehow 'transcending', realism and scepticism. The
'Copernican' way is no more in the end than a camouflaged form
of scepticism. Unabashed scepticism makes a better alternative
to realism, indeed, inasmuch as it is at least open and clear that
there is an ordinary assumption in ordinary experience that what
is being experienced is independently reaL
To refuse scepticism is, then, to reinstate realism. In the
present context, it is to reinstate the possibility of some basis
for the Forms in independent reality, the idea that some
significant proportion of the differences in logic between the
Forms is necessitated by, and derivative from, differences in the
way things are, the kinds or levels of reality. It is to reinstate,
in principle, the sea)nd of our three earlier mapping exercises.
Hirst's exposition of the logic of the Forms is genuinely valuable
(though incomplete). But we have, in effect, undermined his
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attempt to project all the significant differences on to a single
logical map. First1 the resultant ignoring or margin1ising of
considerations relating to powers of mind and aspects of
personality seems illegitiin ate. Second, the attempt involves some
conflation of considerations that are better seen as separate and
cross-cutting. There are considerations, on the one hand, that
are ultimately based on differences between kinds of being which
are probably the most significant in distinguishing Empirical1
Interpersonal1 and Religious Forms of knowledge. Thus an
elaboration of the criterion of 'meaning' would surely involve
some reference to what a proposition refers to, or is about, and
this in turn, as we have argued, should be given a realist
interpretation. On the other hand, there are considerations
relating to the differences of point between 'science', 'art' and
'politics' which are probably the most important when it comes to
distinguishing the Aesthetic and the Moral from each other and
from the other Forms. (This argument implies that the criteria,
though implicated in each other, do not function in a wholly
interdependent way. Thus within the enlarged set of Forms that
I have proposed we would get different divisions into sub-sets
depending on which criterion we emphasised.)
4 Our final criticism of Hirst's position is for its lack of any
developed theory of value. We have outlined one such theory in
the previous chapter, and we have kept it warm in this chapter
in noting the special relationships of the 'reality' map to
'ecstatic' values, and of the 'personality' map to experiential
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values. Furthermore, by stressing here that values and
distinctiveness of value should be seen as internal to the logics
of the Forms, we have indicated the 'handles' by which the
general theory might get to gnps with the Forms. Some such
strategy is essential to an evaluation of the worth of individual
Forms, and, therefore, to the least curricular prescription
relating to them. We cannot require people to climb the mountain
of mathematics, for example, simply because it is 'there' and
because it is not quite like any other (though if it is
magnificently there and shiningly unique, there begins to be a
case). But in Hirst's writing there is very little either about
general kinds of value or about the values that are internal to
the Forms to back up his broad curricular prescriptions.39
Postsczipt Hirst has recently abandoned one part, in curricular
terms perhaps the single most significant part, of his theory of
Forms, namely, the doctrine of the primacy of the propositionaL
Indeed he now affirms in its place the primacy of the practical.
In place of the claim that 'know-how' always presupposes
'knowledge that' there now seems to be the c]aim that 'knowledge
that' is ultinate.ly based on 'know-how'. The Forms of
propositional knowledge and their criteria may be identified much
as before, but they should now be thought of as themselves
'practices' of a particular kind - theoretical practices - alongside
the social practices of daily life, personal relations, vocational
practices, etc. Furthermore, it is practices in general that are
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now the sthrting-point for mapping curriculum objectives and
'theoretical practices' are no longer accx)rded an ultra-privileged
position. In advance of Hirst's published text40
 I can oer only
some brief and provisional comments on this about-turn. In view
of our general argument I would obviously find agreeable both
the broader starting point (in our earlier terms, 'culture' rather
than 'the disciplines') and the ending of the downgrading of the
practical. I am pleased, too, that Hirst has retained his criterial
approach to the identification of Forms - by which we were
impressed at the same tine as we proposed developing it further.
My reservations also follow from the general line of this chapter.
As regards the relative status of the practical and the theoretical
I have argued that it is not a matter of the priority of either,
but of a mutual interdependence that takes different forms and
strikes different balances in different contexts - and this
connects with my proposal to add the variable of point
(significance, interest) to the list of the criterial variables of a
Form. Second, we should not forget intelligent making ('Art'),
the third member of Aristotle's triad, and its relationships to the
other two as, for example, in Technology. Finally, Hirst conthiues
to take a line in epistemology that disallows any consideration of
different levels of objective reality and on this score our
positions still differ rather profoundly.
A map of cu]tural subsystems Denis Lawton proposes an
adaptation for curriculum purposes of a technique of cultural
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analysis originally developed in anthropology. All societies may
be said to have certain cultural sub-systems: socio-po1itic'-a]
economic, corn munication, rationality, technology, morality, belief,
aesthetic and maturation sub-systems. This thought allows us,
not only to develop a properly mull±-faceted understanding of a
society, but to begin to plot a curriculum provision that might be
adequate to its culture. Lawton goes on to make shrewd and
t11irig use of this instrument, 5rst to provide an educationally
relevant analysis of cx)ntemporary British culture, then to
criticLse conventional British curriculum practice in relation to
his analysis, for instance, for its neglect of economic and political
education, and, finally, to suggest ways in which the dricncies
might be made good in practice.41
In contrast both to our three elementary maps and to Hirst's
theory of Forms, this instrument of analysis is to some extent
empirically based. If that fact places the full evaluation of the
approach outside our scope, it can also provide a focus for some
brief observations about its general character.
1 The adaptation of anthropological tools for curriculum purposes
is in princip]e appropriate inasmuch as culture in general is the
business of curriculum. One is impressed by the breadth of
curriculum consideration that results. The map allows Lawton to
carry through his commitment to a genera]f as opposed to a
merely academic, conception of education.
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2 In its original 'scientific' context this map is an analytic
instrument and prescribes nothing. Necessarily, therefore, it
needs supplementing with a theory of value if it is to be used
for curriculum prescription, and all the more if it is to be an
instrument of cultural critique and reconstniction as Lawton also
intends. Lawton (like Hirst) does not provide such a theory.
3 Considered as an instrument of scxia1 science, it has some
inbuilt bias towards the social, as opposed to the individual, aims
of education. 'Sub-systems' are seen in the first place as things
shared, bonds that hold some people together and distinguish
them from other people, and only in the second place as
organising individual experience and developing individual minds.
In this perspective individualism is itself seen as a social
construct and a phenomenon of particular cultures. But some
emphasis on the development of the free mind, individualism in
its broadest sense, connects up with the values of truth and
amplitude of truth and, like them, may be seen as transculturally
normative whether widely acknowledged or not.
4 Though a theoretical construct in anthropology, the map may
be presumed to have emerged in some contact with fiH
experience and its usefulness in the fi11 may lie partly in such
considerations as its dividing up the project of understanding
into tasks of a roughly equal size, the sort of practical cognitive
advantage that might then be carried over into the different
businesses of cultural critique and curricular prescription. This
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should be put into the balance against some impression of a
cx)nceptual untidiness (e.g. the extensive overlaps between belief,
rationality and moral sub-systems) that might worry the
fastidious philosopher. Empirically derived maps may be muddier
than the intuitive products of the philosophical armchair but
have some advantages of their own.
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arranged around us was not less than everything. In any case science cane along to
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to distinguish different forms of the Important exercise of Imagination (etc.), arid
ensure that each Is catered for. And note that this would supplement, rather than
replace, such grosser associations as that of the arts In general with I negi nation In
general.
This differs from the interpretation that powers arid sub-powers, like Imagination arid
empathy, may be securely identified only within, and not across, disciplines. That
would be tantamount to a dl snn ssal of the 'psychology of ordinary 1 an1age which,
cheerfully and pretty unequivocally, applies terms like Imaginative across
disciplines arid intentional objects, and It is implausible in the exact measure that
this ordinary vocabulary is illuminating.
Of course, the general not ion of 'a mental power • needs the general notion of • an
intentional object S as a correlative, and that different disciplines exercise mental
powers differentially relates, no doubt, to differences In their Intentional objects.
If you will, classifying Intentional objects by the powers on which they principally
draw, one way of classifying them, can be related to other ways of classifying then,,
for instance by level of being. (Thus empathy's special association with drana arid
history will connect with their association with the human.) it this, clearly, Is
quite different from a clam that this classification would coincide with any other,
and so could be ignored.
24 The theory was first published In a 1965 paper, republished with most of the other
key papers In Hlrst (1974). See also Hirst (1973) and (1979), and Hirst and Peters
(1970) ch.4. Its long Innings was never uncontested. See, for exaile, Elliott,
R.K. (1975) and (1982), Pring (1976), Wilson (1979), O'Ilear (1981), and C.W. Evers
and J.C. Walker (1983)
25	 Hi rat (1979). See also Realms of meaning and forms of knowledge, In Hlrst (1974).
26 (1) Kinds of developoent The proper analysIs of, say, emotional, or moral development
can only make us aware of its dependence on intellectual development: emotional
responses Involve cognitive appraisals of situations; and moral conlnittment
presupposes moral knowledge.
(2) Kinds of meaning Though many things besides true propositions have meaning, e.g.
false propositions, questions, camTlands, actions and events, the meaningfulness of
everything else ultimately depends on that of true propositions. This Is because, in
turn, meaning requires concepts, concepts require agreed criteria of their
application, and such criteria require agreed judgements. See ibid. pp.63-4 In Hlrst
(1974)
27 Ray Elliott (1982), p.51 challenges even this Inference: Hlrst might legitimately
have Inferred the fundarnentality of propositional knowledge to the curriculum, but
not Its centra7ity in the sense of Its comanding the most prominent place. It Is
true, I think, that Hirst needs an additional premise about the extent of the
propositional knowledge needed by other kinds of knowledge to make his case. Such a
premiss, however, would not be too difficult to supply.
28 The nature and structure of curriculum objectives, in Hlrst (1974), p.28. Here,
and elsewhere, Hiret criticises the 'anti-intellectualism of many curriculum
proposals, especially those for the average and less-able pupil. But it is unlikely
that these would have advocated the impossible course of eliminating propositional
learning and it may well be, indeed, that they could be seen as 'anti-Intellectual'
only from the point of view of that high Intellectualism that makes everything non-
propositional secondary.
29	 Zettel, paras.220-3
30 Hirsts accounts of this third criterion are in general less developed than his
accounts of the first two, but in at least one passage he conveys the general Idea
clearly.
.there is a network of relations between conceots in each case which will In
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with each other and with other kinds of concepts that produce a unique
structure. If there are different kinds of criteria for truth In the areas
concerned, then, for instance, noral arguments, being concerned With the
application of moral concepts, and not the application of physical world
concepts, must have a different logical structure fran that of arguments In
science. The Idea that the relations between concepts and propositions in all
forms of knowledge must conform to those of mathematical or scientific
knowledge Is a matter of pure dogmatism. We must examine these re atlons for
their own structure In each case. Looser forms of relations are not
necessarily suspect as these may be of the nature of the concepts.
Nevertheless, certain elements within a moral argianent may be identical In
form with those In a scientific argument. The forms of knowledge revisited
in Hi rat (1974) p.90. See also Hlrst and Peters (1970) p.65
31	 The forms of knowledge revisited' tn Hlrst (1974) pp.91-2
32	 IbId. p.90
33	 See, for instance, Hlrst and Peters (1972) ch.4.
34	 See 'The forms of knowledge revisited' Section III, and 'Currlcuhan integration' in
Hirst (1974).
35	 I owe this last observation to a discussion with R.K. Elliott.
36 Hirst comes close to acknowledging that the human sciences have this strictly
'compound' character, but then drifts away from the point, In 'Forms of knowledge
revisited' p.86
37 'To acquire knowledge Is to become aware of experience as structured, organised and
made meaningful in some quite specific way...' It is a mark of some ambivalence,
perhaps, that Hirst follows this sentence up directly with one that is much more
'realist' In tone: 'To acquire knowledge Is to learn to see, to experience the world
in a way otherwise unknown...'
'Liberal education and the nature of knowledge' In Hlrst (1974) p.40
38 This Is clearest, perhaps, in the original proposal of the theory of Forms In Ibid.,
e.g. '..justification for the concept [of a liberal education] must now however stem
f ran what has already been said of the nature of knowledge as no metaphysical
doctrine of the connection between knowledge and reality Is any longer being
Invoked.' p.41
39 The argLsnent as to value that he did try out originally was of the kind loosely
called 'transcendental deduction': any serious challenge to the value of knowledge
and enquiry will, as an Intellectual exercise itself, bear implicit witness to the
very thing it challenges. But this argtsnent falls well short of a justification for
pursuing, or Imposing, the Forms - as I believe Hirst has long acknowledged. First
It is much too general. It would establish only that value cannot be denied to
enquiry in general, not that it cannot be denied to this or that Form of enquiry,
say, mathematics. Second, It would fail to establish that Intrinsic value of
enquiry that 'liberal education' asserts. Our challenger, after all, may be seeking
a justification for enquiry from us In an entirely pragmatic spirit. He may wish to
be sure that the life of the mind has some practical use before going to the trouble
of embarking upon It. What we catch him out In, in that case, is the Implicit
assumption only of the the practical utility of at least this enquiry.
40 My sketch of HI rst' S new position Is based on a paper he read at the London
University Institute of Education in the Sp ri ng term 1991 and on subsequent private
co rrespondance.
41	 Lawton (1983, 1989)
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A prefatory n.e In this final part of the thesis I shall be
concerned with technology, a basic category of human activity
that defines a category of school-subject currently humming with
change, literacy, a quintessentially educational preoccupation, and
history, one of the traditional Ivy League of subjects. I have
three interrelated reasons for including these 'sub-curricular'
enquiries:
- To represent that substantial proportion of educational theory
which is sub-curricular, in particular as it. bears on the main
concerns of this thesis.
- To wunterpoint my discussions of whole-education and whole-
curriculum. Education is more than the sum of its parts, and
hence the need for a theory of the whole. But an unrelieved
diet of general theory would homogenize the parts. In reality
they are quite disparate, which already implies the need for some
separate study of them. They are also more than parts. Unlike
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the components of a machine, they have lives of their own and
studies of them do not cohere without remainder into some
ordered theoretical whole. Even in the best of all possible
worlds some 'bil±iness' would remain, whatever the 'poetic' unity
of its culture. But our culture is more fragmented than most
and so for us especially theory must deal with the fragments on
their own terms and 'negotiate' with them regarding its more
general concerns. This point coheres quite well with current
events in the UK, where every few months has brought us
another National Curriculum Subject Report emanating from its
own special working-party, but with attempts to 'harmonise' these
Reports just now getting going.
- To exemplify and to test my views on general educational
values. The task is to test as well as to exemplify, to weigh
more soberly as well as to make more vivid. So I shall not be
taking my position as established and 'all ready for application',
but shall reargue it in context as appropriate. In the first
section, I shall test the four-fold value-schema in relation to
technological education. In the second section, I shall enlarge on
my earlier exposition of vital values in the context of teaching
literacy (as well as show that questions of value remain integral
to such 'technical' tasks). In the final section, I shall explore
the idea that love of past humanity should be the ground-motive
of historical study, thus paralleling the earlier ascription of
primacy to a more general 'love of the world'.
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- 1 FCI-IPlOLOGV	 A VALUE CLAflI FICAFION
To put a youth with a vocation for manual work on an assembly line
is a crime as great as putting out the eyes of the young Watteau.
Simone Well
Terminology Our subject is a diffuse one. It is that part of the
curriculum which relates to working in woods, metals, plastics,
textiles, foodstuffs and other materials, to making from materials
what the National Curriculum classii9 ps
 as artefacts, systems,
and environments, and to practices that are built around this
making, such as carpentry, mechanics, cookery, fashion, buiHirig,
decorating, elsctronics, design, by extension gardening, farming
and bio-technology, and by an extension of another kind
programming - whose business is software. Among established
school subjects home economics, CDT (craft, design and
technology) and IT (information technology) are central to this
area. Art, science, and business studies, and, perhaps to a
lesser extent, mathematics, language and environmental studies,
overlap with it.
This diffuseness has made for some diFFiru]ty in finding the right
name for this curriculum area. 'Practical', though often used,
woull be better restricted (in the Aristotelian terms discussed
earlier) to those subjects that focus on deliberating and
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dec±iing, like moral and pn1itical education and business studies.
The focus here is, rather, making ('to operate effectively and
creatively in the made world' [is] the overall objective for this
subject') and, we should surely add, growing. It is true, of
urse, that these interact with deliberation and decision-making
in real-life practices like house-keeping and engineering; the
obligation imposed upon such practices to be 'functional', to
relate to human needs, ensures this. Reflecting this fact, the
UK'S new National Curriculum in Technology has one clearly
deliberative target out of the four attainment targets it adopts as
together defining a design and technology capability:
Identifying Needs and Opportunities: Pupils should be able to identify and
state clearly needs and opportunities for design and technological
activities through Investigation of the contexts of home, school,
recreation, community, business and industry.
And this target then dictates roughly one quarter of the new
statutory programmes of study.2 Interaction is not identity,
however, and the distinction between making and deliberation
remains a profound one in educational1 as in other, cxntexts. To
say that the subject technology, for example, is p7±narily to do
with making, while business studies is primarily to do with
deliberating, is to indicate no mean difference between these
subjec±s. The matter ought to be seen as parallel to what
obtains between making and science. The interaction between
those two, quite fundamental though it is, does not inhibit us in
the least from insisting on the underlying distinction between
them. We cxuid say that the status of science sees to that. If
we are more inclined to fudge the making/deliberation distinction
in our curriculum analysis, this probably reflects the traditional
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begrudging of status and thne to both of them, as much as any
fine sense of the interplay between them.
'Productive' activi1-i3 and 'materials', are each too general as
titles since they not apt for distinguithing this area from the
arts. 'Technical subjects' arid 'technical education' have
historical support, but also, perhaps, an historical association
with special schools and institutions that makes them problematic.
'Craft, design and technology' has been used in the UK to refer
to a particular set of these activities and usually excludes, for
instance, cookery and textiles. 'Technology' is now the ciFFiri11y
adopted general title in the UK. In many of its uses it is too
redolent of applied science - even of applied physia], as
opposed to biological,, science - to happily suggest all of this
area. But there is a broader anthropological sense of
'technology' as, simply, the use of tools r meeting human needs
and achieving human purposes, and in this sense (which is
gaining in currency, I suspect) it makes an appropriate general
title for our area. I shall use it principally in what follows.
The upgrading of technology The traditional contrast was with
'academic subjects', a ragbag that included mathematics, the
sciences, the humanities, languages, and - though somewhat
uneasily - the fine arts. These corresponded with what were
once called 'liberal pursuits', and they made up the core, if not
indeed the whole, of 'the liberal curriculum'. Compared to them,
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the traditional status of techno]ogy was low. But now it is being
upgraded, and there is wide agreement that this is not before
time. In the UK, formerly a particularly low esteemer, it has
recently achieved the rank of one of the eight National
Curriculum 'Foundation Subjects', with an extensive and
demanding set of programmes and objectives that are mandatory
for all maintained school pupils up to the age of 16.
This is the culmination of a process going back a quarter of a
century in which, with hindsight, several stages may be
distinguished. First, the introduction of comprehensive schools
was generally accompanied by a common curriculum for the 11-14
age-group in which everybody studied some technical subject or
subjects. Then, the new awareness of gender issues in the 70s
and 80s challenged the division of the area into 'boy' and 'girl'
subjects. At least in co-educational schools, it became the norm
for boys to take Home Economics and for girls to take Craft,
Design and Technology - though with a strong tendency to
regress to stertype in choosing options at 14. Next, there was
the Government's massive Technical and Vccational EducaiionaZ
Initiative of the '80s. Initil1y viewed by teachers with suspicion
- it seemed an enormous bribe by a government that was
otherwise starving education of funds - TVEI came to be an
accepted part of school-life. Schools came to see it as
reasonably open to an 'educational' interpretation while still
prodding them into new lines of reflection and practice. These
lines inc]nded, in particular, the development of a wide 'problem-
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solving' definition of 'technology', and - associated with that - a
deal of interaction between secondary school departments that
had previously stood aloof from each other. 4
 Both of these are
fully endorsed in the National Curriculum Technology. The
yFfici1 literature for this stresses that the mandatory
programmes will of their nature require the cooperatLve
involvement of a wide range of departments and subject areas.
And the emphasis falls, not on the kinds of material on which
pupils are to work, but on the stages of the technological
process - which are defined as identifying needs and
opportunities, generating a design proposal,, planning and making,
and appraising the result. These are made the basis of the
quartet of overarching attainment targets alluded to already,
which come with an added caution that they are to be
interpreted in an interactive and holistic, rather than a linear,
fashion. This broader and more abstract view of it may be seen
as part and parcel of a reappraisal of the value of technology
education, and also as a device for accommodating a large
increase in its share of total curriculum time by giving almost
everybody some stake in this increase. The increase itself is the
most dramatic expression of upgrading, in particular the two
facts that a quite serious involvement with technology is
henceforth required all through primary school, and that
'academic' and clever children will henceforth be prevented from
dropping this area at 14. Another sign±flcant sign of the times
is that independent schools in Britain, though legally exempt from
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the National Curriculum, have been breaking their necks to add
technology to their curricula.
It is, however, as vital now as ever to reflect on the unreason of
the previous low status of technology, and, positively, on the
real educational values of this area. This is partly to inhibit
backs1iiiing, cx)nsidering the venerability and pervasiveness of
the prejudices involved and all we know about the iiifFir'u]ty of
consolidating curriculum change. 5 It is even more to clarify the
direc±ions in which technology may best develop - in case our
reaction to the former unreason should become another piece of
unreason.
EqI1il*y insiifFfrnt. What then was the case for upgrading?6
As a preliminary, we should note that considerations of equality
provided no shortcut From the principle that all il-iens are
owed an equal respect, the conclusion does not immediately follow
that an equal respect is owed also to their jobs and to the kinds
of activity which constitute those jobs. For equality is formal, in
the sense that it relates to the distrthution among citizens of
goods or activities which are independently evaluated, and does
not itself judge the relative values of those goods or activities.
In the name of equality the Renaissance writer Campane]]a once
proposed, in his City of the Sun, that lowly manual work should
be distributed equally among an, so that every citizen should
have time for the liberal and spiritual pursuits that 'really
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mattered'! That was to reject the p1itit element in the classical
cx)nceptK)n, the idea that the work of the many should support
the elevated contemplation of a privileged few, but to retain the
classical belief that non-manual contemplation was supreme among
human actLvitis8. More philistine spirits, on the other hand,
might take the view that only wage equality counted for much,
and the nature of the paid actLvit'is for 1i1-t-1' or nothing: if the
drudges of industry were paid at the same rate as the captains,
would it matter any longer that they were nothing but drudges?
In this form too, though rait'al like the first, egalitarianism
prescribes no regard for technology as such.
We should note, too, that familiar rhetoric about the 'equal
dignity' of manual work may be used to quite opposite effects.
For example, it can be used to whitewash the assembly-line - or
to cx)ndernn it.. The harsh mindlessness of at least some of its
forms may be glossed over and condoned, or it may be
highlighted and opposed in the name of technology itself - as in
Simone Weil's fierce remark quoted at the head of this chapter.9
But for a conception of technology to function as a critical tool
we must build norms or standards into it, as we have more firmly
done with our concepts of art, science and literature. And we
certainly will not find such dignifying norms for technology, any
more than we found them for those 'liberal' pursuits, in a bare
principle of equality.
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What we can say for equa]ity, however, is that an egalitarian
climate may allow the suppressed values of things to emerge. In
the early cx)mprehensive schools, we have seen, everyone had to
take some technological subject from eleven to fourteen. This
might have been left as a matter of teaching all students to pull
their weight technologically, while oontinuing to see these
subjects as the humble ones. In fact it turned out to be the
first step in an upgrading of the subjects. This was at least
partly because their educational potential became more obvious in
the experience of teaching them across the ability range. But
though equality may faci1itate upgrading in this way, it does not
dictate it logically speaking.
The ]ibera]ity of making What can dictate it then? A much
more promising idea is that we may find in technology those very
values which the liberal tradition had associated exclusively with
its 'academic' and 'humane' pursuits - and, finding them in that
unexpected place, gain a broader view of those values at the
same time.
The values in question were generally held to be encapsulated in
the notion of the pursuit of knowledge 'for its own sake'. Only
that kind of pursuit was thought to have much educational value.
Technical knowledge and enquiry could not qualify, it was
further assumed, because they were by definition a mat±er of
utility. A line of rebuttal suggests itself here. Might we not
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show, first, that technology is in fact pursued for its own sake
as well as for further ends, and, second, that in any case
educational status cannot properly be restricted to activities
pursued for their own sake? Now we shall start out on this line
more or less. As we progress, however, we shall nd the
underlying distinction - between the pursuit of knowledge for its
own sake and its pursuit for some further end - itself beginning
to unravel Each leg of it crnfIM-ps impoftant sub-distinctions
and, more than that, an effect of drawing these out is to blur
the main distinction cxnskerably. At best it is crude and its
service to liberal values doubthL 10
 But all this is to anticipate.
Let us start by asking what motivations were permitted in the
liberal position. What could count as pursuit 'for its own sake'?
Our categorisation of values in section 3.2 suggests four
possibi1iti, of which at least the last three would have gained
approval in the liberal tradition:
- the pursuit of knowledge out of greed or addiction, where
the point of pursuing it is to have it as a possession,
without much thought to using it or living through it;
- the pursuit of knowledge in the spirit of play, where the
paramount cx)nsderalions are the joy of exercise and
mastery, and the experience of full and powerful living in
the cognitive dimension of one's being;
- the pursuit of knowledge in the dogged and scrupulous
spirit of an ethically conceived devotion to truth;
309
- the pursuit of knowledge out of love of the object of which
knowledge is sought, where the value of the object itself is
primary and where it is seen under concepts like 'the
wonderful', 'the dreadful', 'the glorious', 'the beautiful', 'the
good' and 'the Important'.
It is already clear, then, that 'knowledge for its own sake' is an
ambiguous slogan. As a form of words in isolation it is perhaps
most suggestive of the somewhat dubious first motivation, while
as actually used in the traitinn it covered the other three, or
perhaps all four, motivations - this without clarifying what they
had to do with each other or how they should be ordered. Now
we have developed a position on the general ordering of these
values, it will be recalled, but for our immediate purposes it will
be quite siiff9int to show that whichever emphasis is preferred
no downgrading of technical subjects will be entailed. Setting
aside the first motivation, each of the other three can be found
as well in technical as in traditional liberal subjects, as the
following considerations will show.
(1) Vit lil-y: The actual process of making can be a thoroughly
experiential and vital business with its own tribulations and joys
in the meeting of challenges and its frequent experience of
absorbtion and, again, of power. In the longer term it can truly
enter into the drama of personal history, as one's technical skills
develop with practice, perhaps to mastery - or stagnate and
diminish. Add to these features the possibility of a continuing
lived involvement with the producb it may be a lasting occasion
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of pride - or disappointment Now all this can have a thoroughly
intellectual character. One may think of the far-reaching
theoretical enquiries that may be set in motion by a practical
problem, the range of a Freud's speculations about the minds of
the patients he was concerned to heal, 11
 or the excursions into
physics, philosophy and re]iion that might take off from motor-
bike maintenance. 12 This is one side of that dialectic between
theory and technology that is so fruitful for each. But at a
more commonplace level,, and with much less turning aside from
the practical task in hand, activiti such as curing a patient,
repairing a machine, building a house, cooking a mea] or tending
a garden, may require from us, and reward us with, a great deal
in the way of intellectual effort, audrii-y and fulfillment There
is the articulation of a conception, the translation of this into a
design, the constant mutual adjustments of conception to design
and of design to execution, and the growing intimacy of one's
knowledge of the product. Of course, technological activities are
liable to have a physical dimension in addition to the intellectual
But if builiing a house, for example, calls forth physical - as
weU as mental - power, courage, dexterity and communion, that
should only be a reason for wiluinig it the more in terms of
vitality and engagement
(2) Technical activ*is have conscientious requirements, often
severe ones. As we engage in them we can properly regard
ourselves as bound by standards that are analogous to the
demands of truth and related values in theoretical enquiries. To
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truth, cx)nsistency and clarity as inte]]ectual virtues, do
effectiveness, economy and good workmanship not cxrrespond as
virtues of making? These, too, are virtues of reason Le. virtues
with a peculiarly rational content and appeaL And again, the
further fact that much technology imposes a physical discipline
as we]],, that it promotes a controlled fluiiiity of body as well as
a controlled attentiveness of mind, only adds to Its ethical
significance. Furthermore, we must not omit (and we shall return
to it later) the possible ethical significance, in persona],, social
and environmental terms, of the product - the food, the shelter,
the new or repaired machine, the new drug or the healed body -
a significance which may well be present to the worker's
intention and attention.
(3) Love: Through technical activities we may express and
develop an appreciative sympathy and love, not only of the
finished products, but of the 'materials' which we work upon and
work up. We may think here of a carpenter's love of his timber,
his respect for its grain, and of how this has been fostered by
his actually working with it and could not have been developed
to the same pecn1ir degree by his just looking at it attentively.
We could go on to consider the feeling for her land (much more
than simply 'naked proprietorship') that a farmer develops, or of
the artist's relationship to her materials. We might dwell on the
strange mood of sympathetic solicyWude for a machine that a good
mechanic gets into and that is a conclitinn, often, of correct
diagnosis and proper repair. This is distinguished from what the
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machine's user, e.g. the 'easy rider' of a motor-bike, might feel
by its connection with understanding: it seeks an understanding
of the fault against the marshalled background of a general
understanding of the machine's working. But, just the same, it
too is a kind of physiral cx)mmunion with one very individual
machine.
The general truth in such cases can be expressed in Simone
Well's terms: we can only command nature by obeying it, having
first understood it; and we, free beings, can bear to obey
constantly only what we can trust, respect, arid feel some affinity
with. Well would add that it is in work with a hard manual
dimension that we are most viviily, perhaps painfully, made
aware of this. In line with the monastic traditirn of Western
Christianity, she argued that manual work should be an intrinsic
complement of contemplation, this combined physical and mental
involvement with its attendant pain and toil a means by which
the hard 'necessity' and, therefore, the ordered beauty, of the
world might bite into one's soul' 3. The deep Benedictine adage
1aborare est orare' ('to work is to pray') can be understood in
this way - and thereby made available to the non-theist while
still being open to the traditirnal theist interpretation as we]L
Whitehead refers to this adage and 'strips it down' to 'the
essential idea...that work should be transfused with intellectual
and moral vision and thereby turned into a joy, triumphing over
its weariness and its pain'.' 4
 I would want to add an explisit
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reference to the role in this vision of the worker's engagement
with the world.
Once, then, the different values of 'liberal' pursuits emerge from
behind the veil of the 'for its own sake' formula and parade
themselves, we discover more or less the same values in
technology, plus additional physical values, or, as it might be
better to say, we find the same values in a broader register.
These values represent ways in which technical engagement too
can be prized 'for its own sake'. What we have yet to find is
even the hint of a good general reason for the omission of
technical subjects from the liberal curriculum.
Arbitrary exclusions (1) The ultrior mve We may now
consider the other leg of the liberal distinction, the pursuit of
knowledge for me further end. What exactly did this include -
and by the same token seem to exclude from educational status?
Most obviously disdained - ever since Plato railed against the
Sophists for training young men 'to get on in this life', and
much of the Christian West followed Plato in this (ostensibly at
any rate) - was worldliness, that is, such long-term
considerations as wealth, power and status, and such short-term
ones as passing an examination, gaining a teacher's approval and
outscoring a rivaL These are often called 'extrinsic' motives, to
contrast them with the immanent aims that enter into the
deeinition of an activity.
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The thst thing to say here is that excluding such extrinsic
motives does not entail the exclusion of techno]ogy. On the one
hand, those motives are as ulterior to technology's intrinsic or
immanent aims - the me4 the machine, the garment, etc., as they
are to the immanent aims of acknowledged 'liberal' subjects - the
theory, the proof, the poem, etc. On the other hand, they can
just as weU be the real motives, or among the real motives, of
the scientist, artist or scholar, as of the craftsman and
technologist. This latter fact may be eRsiPr for us to perceive
among whom science, art and scholarship are recognized
livelihoods, than for those, like the Greeks, among whom 'liberal'
pursuits were generally the privilege of persons whose livelihood
and social position were independently secured. But even if, as
some argue, the existence of a leisured approach and a leisured
class was a precx)ndtrin of the establishment of liberal pursuits
- necessary to boost them into orbit, so to speak'5
 - it remains
that present engagement with them is consistent with quite high
levels of extrinsic motivation. Furthermore, some technologies
might similarly require, and promote, a disinterested attitude if
they are to get going. Indeed 'alternative', 'intermediate' and
'green' technologies tend precisely to define themselves as
against the forces of a rampant materialism. Whatever we might
think of their feasibility, they make our point nicely that an
opposition to those forces need not translate into an opposition
to technology as such.
315
Second, we should want to know why extrinsic motives are to be
presumed extra-, and even anti-, educationaL It is not just that
we should ask whether a teacher may not jus1-ifihly use them as
a tactic for drawing students into a pursuit, believing that the
internal teLos of the pursuit will then gradually take the
students over. Considered even as permanent elements in a
pupil's motivation, are there not cases and cases? Compare
wealth, power and prestige, on the one hand, with earning a
living and doing a responsible job on the other. The former
connect with the potentially evil human tendency to distort what
are naturally means or enabling cxnditinns into engrossing ends-
in-themselves - at the cost of other people, and peoples, who are
real ends-in-themselves. We can see why education should be
put on its guard against them (and we shall not fool ourselves
that this will be at all easy). But earning a living, doing a
responsible job, and, for that matter, creating wealth, would seem
to be honourable and important aspirations if considered as
conriitirns of the good life and of doing good. They should not
be deemed anti-educational as motives just because they can be
regarded as extrinsic (perhaps only partly extrinsic) to the
educational task in hand. Nor should they be denied all
influence in shaping the curriculum. it is not, then, the
extrinsic/instrumental as such that is the enemy, but certain
kinds of extrinsic motive and thinking.
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(2) Du'1m and the sodafl.y useful object The liberal tradition
was also disdainful of technology's rather more integral stake in
physical objects that served human needs and wants. This
attitude derived from a combination of that dismissal of the
instrumental that we have already noticed and a further
suspicion of matter and the material, and it had several strands
to it. First, both the physica]ity, the 'blood, sweat and tears', of
the processes, and the materiality of the products - artefacts,
systems and created environments as opposed to theories, poems
and proofs - were alike held in some contempt. Thus far,
indeed, even art was tainted insofar as it too was materially
embodied. Second, unlike art, technology did not 'redeem' itself
by investing its materiality with intrinsic meaning: it was not
meaningful in itself but only in relation to some human need
beyond itself. Third, the human needs and wants that
technology serves were seen as paradigmaticafly bodily in
character, and, as such, not of comparable dignity to the
spiritual needs served by other activities.
What are we to make of these ideas? As a preliminary, we might
split some not altogether trivial hairs. Even if a concern for the
social utility of products were foreign to education, it would not
follow that the making of them was foreign to it. The making
need not be, and often is not, motivated by the product's social
usefulness. For that matter, the maker might know a product
was useless or harmful and not care! Making may be engaged in
for fun, as a challenging exercise of wits and skills. The end-
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product still shapes the activity here, but it is the activity itself
that is valued - just as goal-scxririg is the aim in football but
does not constitute its whole enjoyment. Again, the product may
be valued more for its aesthetic than its useful quality.
Presumably this was the view taken of architecture indeed, and
if architecture could be liberal 'despite' its usefulness, then so
can cookery, needlework, carpentry and boathuilding for the
aesthetic qua1iFics of their products.' 6
 Yet again, it may be the
engagement with the materials that really appeals, the feel of the
wool and the knitting needles more than the resnitRnt socks.
Points like these have some force ad hominem. It must be
admitted, though, that they are otherwise limited. For they
suggest a non-engaged kind of relationship with technology in
which it is not qua technology that it is valued. Like all
flirtation, this would miss much of its object's character and
point
We must then challenge the liberal prejudices more directly.
To go for the jugular, the idea that attention to basic human and
social needs is foreign to education was surely a mistake.
Studies and activities that are instrumental to feeding, clothing,
sheltering, transporting and healing ourselves and others - not
to mention those whose products carry our 'software' and serve
our information and communication needs - are, as such, valuable,
and that is already a strong prima fade reason for regarding
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initiation into them as properly educationaL We may be grateful
to the liberal tradition for its insistence that there is more to
life and education than such cxncerns, its underlining of the
truth that man does not live by bread alone. But its exclusion
of them from education was really an abdication, exempting vast
areas of life from serious critique and recx)nstruction - inhibiting
to this day, for instance, the development of a proper cxnsumer
education.
The challenge laid down here is both to the blanket dismissal of
the instrumental and to the suspicion of the materiaL As to the
first, it is to say, again, that the discrimination of
instrumenFR1iti by reference to their destinations, what they
are instrumental to, is essentiaL (Of urse, the ibrm of
instrumentality involved, in particular its place on the mindful-
mindless continuum, is also crucial in the educational ntext, and
we wIll return to it.) As to the secxnd, it is to begin a
reinstatement of the material and physical which we shall now
take further.
What is required fundamentally of us here is the displacement of
iznp1icif and exp1iif forms of dualism by something more holistic.
For disdain of the material is rooted in the doctrines of dualism.
The great classical exposition of these doctrines is in the
dialogues of Plato. There, an all but oomp]ete divorce between
matter and spirit is engineered in a series of dimensions.
Metaphysically, the intelligibility of matter is separated from
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matter itself: what science understands is pure Ideas or Forms,
thought of as inhabiting a heavenly domain while their shadows
alone inhabited the Earth. At the psychological level, body and
soul. were divorced. Only the most tenuous of cx)nnections
between them was acknowledged - and it was lamented! And this
dualist refrain was sustained through Plato's ethics and pnlitirs.
From all this it was no step at all to the view that technical
capability belongs to a low order of achievement inasmuch as its
processes were physical, its expressions hardware, and its
functions intimately related to bodily need.
As it happens, there was an immediate response to Plato.
Aristotle de-radicalized the matter-spirit distinction and worked
up an unsurpassed counter-series of holistic, though internally
complex, perspectives to combat Plato's. He failed to carry this
through, however, to any ringing endorsement of technology. No
doubt his social position in an Athens in which manual work was
left to slaves inhibited him from seeing that far. But in any
case Aristotle was to be less influential than Plato in the
formation of Western consciousness. The bulk of his work was
lost for a crucial half-millenium during which Christianity found
a Platonic form of self-expression - sadly, a form less authentic
to its own Biblical roots in the respects we are considering than
an Aristotelian one would have been.1l
Modern culture is not consistently either dualist or wholist (and
is perhaps more casually reductionist than anything else). In a
320
self-critical mc*xI we are likely to be troubled less by the
bodi]iness, and more by the triviality or artificiality or plain
harmfulness of many of the needs and wants that techno]ogy
serves. And the physicality of technological processes bothers
us less than the enforced mindlessness of much of it. Our
operative criterion in these critical judgements is not the
either/or of dualism, but a catch-all ideal of widely-distributed,
environment-friendly, all-round human fulfillment But dualism
lingers on in what we are reacting against here. As well as the
traditirnal educational bias against technology, we struggle with
the division of mental from manual labour in industry, with a
cxnoept of leisure as heavy consumption, and with the still
faltering state of our green nsdousness. And should anyone
think that Plato's view of science depended on the then
rudimentary state of science, let her examine the nstructivist
theories in ntemporary philosophy of science which also
minimise science's cx)nnection with the real world and also leave
matter itself largely a blank. We might say that the potential of
technology education, in the picture of it that we have been
drawing, requires the ntext of a realist view of knowledge, a
holistic psychology, a green ethic, and a reorganized working-
life, if it is to be fully realized. And each of these has to be
fought for.
Corn Ixining the useful and the agreeahle The role of the aesthetic
in our lives is a further relevant issue. Our basic functions and
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needs are associated with various symbols, rituals, skills and art-
forms, and we may notice two different conceptions of this
association.
One, the dualist conception, is of the aesthetic as extra-functional
ornamenf'tion: the primitive functions and needs are seen partly
as 'occasions' for the ornamental exercise of liberal skIlls and
arts, and partly as crude realities to be softened, socia]ised,
d.vilised, or even concealed, by them. It seems that the
traditional liberal is logically committed to a view like this. He
can claim some support from ordinary language, for in calling
something 'functional' - a table, a garment1 a meal1 etc. - we do
often seem to be distinguishing sharply between this quality and
aesthetic qui1itis.
On the other hand, we have in current architecture, say, an
activity where good functioning is itself seen as an aesthetic
ideal and, even, where the functionally superfluous may be
viewed with artistic suspicion. This suggests another general
conception, namely, one in which the symbols, rituals, skills and
art-forms are seen as internal dimensons of the need or the
function. Instead of being extrinsic adornment, they are in some
cases a natural part or extension of the expression of a basic
need, and in other cases a part of the satisfaction of the need.
This implies broader accounts of the needs and functions
themselves, from the vantage-point of which the narrower
accounts would then seem artifi11y abstract. 'Eating' would be
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a form of oommuning with the world and, often, with other pple
- rather than just an act of physia1 assimilation - and
thankfulness might be an intrinsic element of the pleasure it
gave. The desire to cherish and be cherished would be a part
of sexual desire rather than something supervenient upon it.
And so on. This cxnception, too, can claim support from ordinary
language, for locutions ]ike 'making love', 'making a home', 'going
out to dinner', suggest a view of activities as combining in
natural units what the earlier conception divided. Doubtless, we
need both kinds of conception at different times and for
different contexts. But it remains that by ignoring the useful
the liberal traditicn not only denied its own values what we
earlier saw to be a perfectly appropriate fleldi of operation, but -
perhaps even more seriously - rendered itself unable to exploit
the healing and integrative potential of its own values.18
Conclusion We have been turning up a variety of values in
making actLvities. Apart from 'ulterior' advantages, not all of
which are to be disdained, these are:
- vital values connected with personal fulfillment and
development and a sense of power over the
environment
- quasi-ethical values like workmanship and effectiveness
- serious contemplative potential
- intrumentality to basic individual and social needs, and
finally
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-	 aesthetic and integrative power.
Perhaps we should also be c1r as to what we have not been
doing. We have not made thinking in general subordinate to
making. So, we have not disputed the ]iberal view that the
pursuit of knowledge without regard to technical pay-cf can be
worthwhile, and this not only because an untrainelled basic
research can make a more powerful cxntrthution to technology in
the end. Again, we have not simply identified thinking and
making. The immanent telai of theory and production remain
distinct. Knowledge and understanding, because of their
essential receptive intentionality, cannot be adequately regarded
as just particular kinds of 'product','9, while from another point
of view products are certainly more than just thoughts. 2O We
have argued, indeed, that certain kinds of value are shared by
thinking and making, but we have also referred to differences of
register here and to some values, relating to basic human needs,
as specific to technology. Since our concern was with
technological subjects we have not considered the specific values
of other curriculum areas. Were we to do so, we would again
find the formula 'knowledge for its own sake' an obstruction -
this thne by its insensitivity to the differences among
traditknally acknowledged liberal pursuits, the sciences and the
humanities for instance.21 We might sum up our position in two
conclusions:
- a description of educational values that is broad
enough to apply to the whole range of traditionally
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acknowledged subjects will be found to apply also to
the technical subjects.
a descnption of educational values that is specific
enough in relation to the values of particular
categories of subjects (the sciences, the arts, etc.) to
guide our interpretation of a proper breadth, must be
made to include the specific values of the technical
subjects.
Appendix: Balancing technique and understanding Educationally,
it matters hugely that something is the fruit of the initiative,
thought and labour of an individual or a small group, as opposed
to just rolling off an assembly-line. Understanding, in
particular, is almost non-negotiable for education. But FFr'acy is
also a value. So blending these is a major challenge for
technical education. Its success in this, if experienced by a
sufFi-iently large number of students would, in turn, be the
strongest possible incentive for pursuing the same ideal in the
technical aspects of everyday life and in a reorganized industrial
Jife.22
 Let us consider this challenge for technical education,
while noting, at the same time, its wider curriculum application.
In an interesting passage23
 Simone Well argued that there is one
insuperable obstacle to a completely consummated marriage of
theory and practice, thought and action. It is that the sequence
of steps by which theoretical reflection must proceed does not
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coincide, unless accidentally, with the sequence of movements by
which a practical task is methodically executed. The mind works
on a problem by proceeding from the s:impler to the more
complex, from the dear to the obscure, but the order of a
worker's movements are determined by what must be done first,
whether simple or complex, as a causal coniition of doing the
next thing. Hence it is, she says, that we all experience that if
in the middle of a practical task we are faced with something we
do not understand, we have to strop working to think. More
generally, unless the conception behind a task is very simple or
the task itse]f requires only minimal attention, we cannot hold
the conception in mind at the same time as we work. Rather
than working directly from the conception, we work, as it were,
from an abstract diagram that indicates a sequence of movements
to be carried out - much as if we were following a magic rite. It
is this ultimate distinctness of theory and making that makes
possible the situation where one person thinks and another
executes according to a conception that she need not herself
grasp. Beyond that, it makes possible the assembly-line and the
computer, where mindlessness and 'fFirincy are fantastically
combined.
There is something right and something wrong about this
account What is wrong, I suggest, is its rather stereotyped
view of the thinking process. Even in its purely theoretical
engagements thinking is not as linear and predictib]e as this.
But, more to the point, the account seems to miss out altogether
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on specifically technical int11igence and thinking. This is the
intlligence and thinking that actually gures out what should be
the next movement, or series of movements, in a technical task -
and that may go on then to nstruct assembly lines to help
routinize those movements, or automata and oomputers to mimic
them. This figuring is likely to apply theoretical knowledge,
often in its own thoughtfully eclectic way, and it may even
switch in and out of actual theoretical thinking - bent, still, on a
technical solution more than on any theoretical advance. At such
times it may indeed down tools, fold arms, and stand back from
the task for a while - but even so it wifl remain spiritually
cx)nnected with the task. At other times - as is equally obvious
and equally essential to recall - this figuring proceeds with tools
very much in hand, using them as exploratory probes, trying out
alternative sequences, manipulating materials this way and that,
searching for what works or works best - and at more
sophisticated levels oonstructing full-blown prototypes. By
omitting the essential problem-solving aspect of technology,
Simone Well cxrntrives (though this was not her intention) to
overstate the problem of the mental-manual divorce, even to make
it seem insoluble.
What is right about Well's accunt, however, is that successful
technical thinking does indeed usher in the possibility of a more
or less mindless execution of technical tasks and of separating
execution and executioners from ccnception and oonceivers with
the social inequa1iHcs normally attendant upon that separation.
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But, should we not immediately add that it also ushers in a
different possibility, namely, of using the solution achieved as a
stepping stone to the solution of further, and often more
complex, technical problems? Thus tools are embodied solutions
to technical problems that we then use to solve other technical
problems - first, problems of the everyday kind and, second,
problems in the construction of more sophisticated tools in the
upward spiral of technical advance.
Brute ff9racity, otherwise known as 'producti.vity', is a central
value in industrial life. In the educational context it is not
altogether objectionable inasmuch as the purely routine
pei:formance of technical tasks can still have a perceived ethical
significance in relation to the meeting of human needs and, again,
remain a communion of sorts with the natural world. What
education could not tolerate, however, is a systematic divorce of
efficacy from understanding. And there are perhaps three broad
ways in which it can head this off. One, just alluded to, is by
the use of achieved understanding to tackle further and more
complex problems - as with progression in any other curriculum
area. A second is to engage students in the intlligent
maintenance and - very particularly - the repair, of artefacts
and tools. The third is by the deconstruction in class of
artefacts, including the tools used by students, with a view to
understanding how they work - this to be carried far enough,
and to be repeated for a wide enough range of artefacts and
tools, to leave students with a consolidated sense of themselves
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as masters rather than slaves af the technological world they are
inheriting.
It is illuminating to notice that the challenge to balance PFFk!ipnt
technique and understanding is not confined to technological
education. Thus in aesthetic endeavour there is a broad
distinction to be drawn, and an educational balance to be struck,
between solving technical problems and achieving a manual
technical proFirncy, on the one hand, and using achieved skills
to seek and to express an artistic feeling or vision, on the other
hand. Nor is the issue confined to manual subjects. In the
passage already alluded to, Simone Weil goes on acutely to
observe that something very similar arises in mathematics where
there is a simple distinction between applying a method - of long
division, say, or finding the square root - and understanding
why the method works. In working out a diff9rult division sum
it would scarcely be possible, and it is certainly not normal,, to
have the theory of division siinultirieously present to mind.
Rather, we might ponder over this theory after the event and
think about each step in the sum until we saw why it was
required - though in many more advanced mathematical
operations the effort this involved could be enormous. This
presence of technique in mathematics, as in technology, makes
possible the benrFits and the costs of the division of labour, the
benfit to FFiriricy, the costs to holistic understanding and
thought And, of course, this has implications for science,
considering the degree of its dependence on mathematics - to
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which we should then add considerations, first, of the
contemporary extent of science's own division of labour, and,
second, of the excruciatingly sophisticated nature of the
instruments and hardware on which science now re]ies.24 Thus
mathematics or science teachers might sometimes have to resist
the seduction of magical techniques that pupils might readily
learn to apply, but which they (and perhaps the teachers) cxuld
not understand - just as craft teachers may decide against the
use of a sophisticated tool on the grounds that, in this cx)ntext,
it would be a kind of cheating.
In this appendix to our main argument we have identified the
educational aim of keeping a constantly renewed balance and a
fruitful complicity between cFf9rint technique and understanding,
and we have seen this as a challenge, first, for the techno]ogy
teacher but, second, for teachers in some other curriculum areas
as welL
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.2 LI1EFACV AND INTLLCFLJAL DWR
In 1.2 we noted the centrality of literacy and basic ']et±ers' to
(formal) education as conventionally understood. At the end of
3.1 we remarked how the idea of 'the academic', ie. the literate
and concentrated, is made to carry excessive responsibility for
the unity of our curricula and our intellectual lives. We have
since then rallied the main defau]ters from this responsibility:
overarching educational values (ordered in relation to each
other), and maps which can relate these values to our cu]tural
capital and provide directions for exploring the distinctiveness
and comp]ementarity of different parts of that capitaL It
remains, however, that literacy may have some ]egitim ate unifying
role. In this section we will pursue the line that, properly
handled, it greatly increases mental power (and thereby
far!i1iF.tes values of the 'experiential' category in particular)
across the curriculum and in our lives generally. Another
concern will be to study an instance of the (often camouflaged)
penetration of value questions in general into 'technical'
questions in education, and that will provitle our starting-point.
Choosing a reading-scheme Viewed from a distance, learning to
read and write seem straightforward as conceptions, at any rate
if tied down to some definite context. Up dose, they fairly
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bristle with question marks. We have noticed something of this
as regards writing in 3.1. We shall look at reading here.
Imagine a staff-meeting in a primary school to decide on an
approach to the teaching of reading. Many schemes are avai1h]e
ready-made, or something homemade may be mounted by drawing
eclectically on the ready-mades and leaving some room for a less
structured 'real books' approach. The participants would readily
agree that a good scheme is one that produces good readers in a
relatively speedy and economic way. But someone - probably the
'post-holder' for english - asks 'What is a good reader? Is it
enough to read correctly and fluently and score well on
standardized reading-tests? Mustn't comprehension come into it
as well?'. She gets the reply 'Well of course it must!', and the
di1ngue is off and running.
'Can we really take it for granted like that? Banal materials and
a phonic pedagogy may freeze the pupil's consciousness to the
written words - "things-out-there-in-themselves" - and dislocate
his reading from his centres of pondering, feeling, and
understanding. Maybe he will finish a reasonably accurate and
quick reader - but also an inattentive one who doesn't read and
think at the same time. People can be subliminally responsive to
road-signs and advertisements but need the double-take of
"listening to themselves reading" if they are actually to think
about what they read.'
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¶A11 that means is that we monitor for comprehension as well as
acouracy and fluency and most af these schemes have built-in
cvmprehension tests. They are away ahead of you!'
'Those tests might not catch my inattentive reader; we should
have to consider redesigning them. And, anyway, what is
corn prehension?'
'We recognize it when it's there and spot its absence when it
isn 't. Let's not make a philosophical meal out of it"
'MysLication was not intended. The point is only that the
"quiz-and-preais" type of test (even in its more developed
forms') embodies a pretty limited concept of comprehension when
set against the range of reading materials: stories, poems,
prayers, newspapers, shopping-lists, instruction-manuals, etc.
It's the same issue as arises with speed-reading techniques:
they are advertised as increasing speed without reducing
comprehension, but if one were to 'whip through' Shakespeare or
the Bible isn't it exactly the kind of meaning that makes these
special that one would miss?'
'In the teaching reading context, that limited sort of thing is
just what "comprehension" does mean. It goes without saying
that in other teaching contexts we do take in appreciation,
imaginative response, criticism, understanding the topic itselt,
and so forth.'
'Reiterating the standard usage begs the question, surely.
You're ducking the issue of whether the separate conceiving of
"language" and "literary" skills -"training in literacy" versus
"educating in the uses of literacy" - might not be dangerous for
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many of the most important uses of reading. We can't just
presume it could not be.'
'You might have said that that's what's been bothering you!
Now, what's the research picture on that question?'
'Risking your further irritation - what is to cx)unt as research in
this area? We should certainly have to consult more than the
"hard" end of the scale. We could start by evaluating the forms
of research that lie back of these schemes in front of us?'
'You are being irritating - and not very realistic! Whatever
happened to the division of labour? We can't consider
everything simultanecusly here, and we can't teach everything
simultanecusly in the classzwm. Besides, doesn't your train of
thou ght come, in the end, to the claim that one has "read
properly" only when one has thoroughly grasped everything,
indeed that failures to appreciate or criticise what one reads
should be counted as "reading" failures? That's a massive load
to put on one 7itt7 word - especially when we have all those
other words - 'znterpreting". "understanding". "appreciating',
"criticising", etc - perfectly willing top their own weight!'
'I have claimed only this: that some kinds of reading-habit are
inappropriate for some kinds of text; that that forces us to
reflect from the beginning on which uses of reading we think
important; and that these obvious truths can be concealed behind
uses of "comprehension" and "reading well" that are
educationally too undemanding, whatever their technical precision.
As to the division of labour: it is not in question, though the
particular division we have may be. Getting it right requires
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some kind of overview or philosophy of literacy. As to language-
use: in our ordinary and professional lives we need many uses of
"reading", "comprehension" and similar terms, for our many
purposes - sometimes more open and sometimes more loaded uses
for different contexts, even psychometrically loaded uses for the
odd snitRhle occasion. 2
 What we must not assume is that uses
which can be rendered quantitatively are ipso-facto the most
significant
And why should any of all of this be difficu]t to swallow? Only
because of the notion that imparting reading-skins has become a
kind of autonomous science and technology, so that all the
teacher has to do is "operate" a scheme and consult the
teacher's "manual" when problems anse.'
'We'll never get to the "operating" if we carry on like this! We
really must get down to making our choice.'
'As Wittgenstein said in a similar context: the fly is still going to
buzz in the fly-bottle!'
This diR1rgue follows a pat±ern found also in discussions of, say,
class-contra],, or mixed-ability teaching, and in teachers'
deliberations on their tools and tackle generally. A discussion is
launched as one relating to methods and means, but it reaches an
impasse and cross-purposes are suspected. The presumption of a
shared understanding of the ends and values in question begins
to yield, as ambiguities emerge in the meaning of such
expressions as 'an orderly class', 'a proper learning
337
environment', 'a good reader'. The uncertainty may spread to
the meaning of 'education' itself - and therefore probably further
since education is a matter (more like love than the jam jar) on
which views tend to vary with variations of view on many other
matters. On the other hand, this broadening of the debate is
resisted by some participants, not only for reasons of time4 but,
more fundamentally, because they doubt the real relevance of the
broader questions. This is particularly likely when, as with
reading, the issue has been the subject: of a great volume of
empirical research, much of it of the 'hard' variety. Then an
insistence on bringing philosophy to bear can seem posithrely
'medieval'.
In fact, however, as our staff-room philosopher was implying, in
education questions of value, of a medium to broad range, are
properly prior to, and also closely involved in, technical research
and development So, in the first place, they determine what the
technical questions are and what priority they deserve - or, as
we could put it, what they must be if they are to be important
It is no real objection to this that, in practice, professional and
technical enquiries often proceed happily without the intrusion of
matters like the true meaning of education. In a particular
group there may be agreement over the relevant deeper issues -
a fu]], or a snfFirint5, or a 'working' 6, agreement But, also,
deeper issues may not arise only because none of the
participants perceives their relevance, with the consequence that
any of them may unknowingly work against her own values. As
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Simone Weil observes somewhere, we and our world are so
constructed that we can seldom pursue our goals without
becx)ming more or less distracted from them by the demands that
the choice and the execution af means make on our powers of
concentration. As simple a task as the search for a spanner
that ths can interrupt our attention to what we need it for. And
as tools require their own attention, so they acquire their own
disciplines and institutions, with their own prestige and their
own momentum - the 'technological imperatives'. A general
impression is created of a degree of autonomy that, rationally
speaking, the technical quite lacks.
Second, it is actually owed less autonomy in education than in
most other areas of life. Technology, as a human practice, as
'our's', should always operate within a parameter of goals and
constraints derived from human values. But this may still allow
it an internal life of its own in, say, farming or engineering, with
some issues and tasks being 'purely' technical in the sense that
philosophy and values, having contributed to the setting of
purposes and restraints, should then keep a respectful distance.
But the specifically mental nature of educational 'techniques'
changes this picture. Here the deep values need to interact
continuously with the thchnica1 enquiries and the technical
deployments. That is one of the things we shall be arguing for
in the particular case of literacy!
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Two Concepts of Literacy: Bereiter vs Freire Carl Bereiter, in
his work with disadvantaged children, cxntributed to the
development of a 'mastery-method' of teaching reading for which
he made the following claims. First, it was remarkably effective:
it enabied virtually all children, whatever their backgrounds, to
read well by between six and nine years of age. Secondly,
though high-pressuredly behaviouristic, it was humane - indeed,
children found it fun. Thirdly, and crucially for Bereiter (whose
suspicion of 'education' we met earlier in 3.1), precisely because
of its behaviouristic orientation it 'left kids alone' save in the
one respect of providing them with this skilL It did not, of
itself, alter their beliefs, al±itudes, character, did not 'make them
over' into something other than what they started as. For
instance, it did not make them more (or less?) amenable to
classroom discipline, nor give them a taste for any particular
kind of reading materiaL
Lower-class black kids remain lower-class black kids, only they become
literate. We dont try to condition them in the process to some ideal of
middle-class childhood or to some romanticized form of black culture.7
This is to conceive reading as pure instrument or ski]],, taking
its value from its empowerment of the individual in relation to
the options which it opens up, but does not condition towards.
That is not without intuitive appeaL Let us suppose, as regards
Bereiter's mastery-method, that all his claims for it stood up and
caine to be generally accepted. Suppose, too, that training in
what different educationists might variously take to be the
proper uses of reading did not have to be deferred until the
'basics' had been acquired, but could proceed pan passu, where
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it is thought desirable to lose no thue with them. Would we not
now have a tool that was uncontroversially useful, one that held
its value through the spectrum of general views on education
and the uses of literacy? And such matters as improving it and
evaluating the relative merits of its variants would then seem
authentically technical.8
None of this could come happen, however, if Paulo Freire is to be
believed. For him, training in literacy had been fundamentally
mishandled if it had not produced an explosion of a highly active
kind of awareness of oneself and of one's general environment,
what he called 'cx)nscientization'. So what Bereiter insisted on
separating, Freire insisted on binding together.
One must not think, however, that learning to read and write precedes
conscientizatlon or vice-versa. Conscientization occurs simultaneously
with the literacy and post-literacy process. It must be so!9
Freire is, of course, aware that something ordinarily called the
ability to read and write may exist without any such dramatic
expansion. So we understand this as a particular normative
conception of literacy (and post-literacy), a claim that what
deserves to be worked for under this title will include
consaientization as an intrinsic part, as indeed the heart of the
matter. It stands diametrically opposed to Bereiter's
instrumenF1ist conception lO Reading and writing do not derive
their main value from extrinsically-conceived ends - which might,
or might not, include conscientization. Rather they are to be
conscientizing, or enhancing, in themselves. They are not just
skins that become unconscious with prcif9ncy. For Freire they
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are special modes of the e penence of oneself in the world (thus
far, indeed, a claim that might also be made for such an
apparantly instrumental skill as riding a bicycle), more
specifically, special modes of making	 of the world and
oneself in it. Put another way, reading and writing should bring
a greatly heightened awareness of the intentional possibilitis of
language. Thus these bilil-ips are precisely not to be pursued
as merely technical achievements - by contrast, perhaps, with
learning to read in a second script or learning to type when one
can already write longhand. 11 On this analysis, then, to build
'consciousness-raising' into literacy-training is no mere piece of
educational opportunism.
Nor, further, is it the political opportunism it might seem to build
into the training a critique of the prevailing social and polil-ical
orders - or not, at any rate, in regard to some societies and
teaching contexts. For oppressive polit ical structures are seen
as fostering in the people what Freire calls 'a culture of silence'.
And this is incompatth]e with the full flowering of these new
modes of consciousness and self-consciousness, manifesting itself
as a mental blockage in regard to them. Furthermore, this, of its
'intentional' nature, can be overcome only if the student is
himself brought reflexively to focus his attention on it and its
poli1-ical causes. Hence, for the oppressed at least, political
consciousness-raising is to be seen as an integral aspect of the
more general conscientization that belongs with literacy.
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Bereiter's pnlii-ical views actually concur with Freire's in some
relevant respects. Both criticize oonventional education,
including much literacy-training, for being 'domesticating', and
both are emphatic that ]iteracy-ski]is can be valuable
augmentations of the individual's power to run her own life and
find her own way in society. That they still come up with flatly
opposed approaches would seem to be mainly because of the
presence in Freire's reflections on literacy and freedom, and the
absence in Bereiter's, of a phenomenological dimension. Put
crudely, the one is sensifive, while the other is not, to what goes
on 'in the head', to the mental concxmitants of literacy. 12 We
need now to give these our full attention. I think our intuition
(unless perhaps we are language-specialists) is not quite
comfortab]e with the heavy loading in Freire's conception. We
are tempted, like the staff-room interlocutor earlier, to recast it
as a thesis about the uses of literacy, since large claims under
that rubric no longer surprise us. But this would miss Freire's
point He means to challenge, not of course a simple distinction
between the possession and the exercise of a set of skills, but
our habit of conceiving training in literacy and education in the
uses of literacy as separate tasks, and the attendant assumption
that there are processes called 'reading' and 'writing' which
remain univocally the same through all their various exercises,
regardless, for instance, of the spiEc qu1itis of the texts
with which they engage. Now really to threaten that habit and
that assumption will call for some determined argument
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Literacy and mental deve]opment Freire writes:
'Learning to read and write ought to be an opportunity for men and women to
know what speak7ng the word really means: a human act implying reflection
and action ......Speaking the word is not a true act If it Is not at the
same time associated with the right of self-expression and world-
expression, of creating and recreating, of deciding and choosing and
ultimately participating In society's historical process. • 13
We are accustomed to attaching this c]iniacteric significance to
the child's acquici1n of speech, to viewing that as an
appropriation by the child of herself and the worid. Thus we
quickly dismiss the suggestion that oracy is a matter only of
techniques for more Ff9tintly trading in ideas that are in
principle independent of language. But now we are asked to
approach literacy as a new and more reflexive phase in the
development of oracy and all that 'Lakes off' with oracy. Why
should we regard it as a watershed of this kind and importance?
Our argument will fall into two main stages.'4
(1) The written word, by cx)mparison with the spoken word,
involves us in a new relationship with language, specifically in a
more ncentrated Rf+cntion on language itself.
In the first place, the text generally requires a more exclusive
attention to language. The utterance is typically an embodied,
and otherwise embedded, thing, in the sense that part of its
meaning either is logically to be determined, or is at any rate
determinable, from non-verbal cues in the immediate cntext.
This may be true even if it refers to the past or the future.
Hence it typically assumes, invites, or allows, an attention that is
in Dart directed away from itself as a form of words. 'Do as
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you're told, please!' 'Which of you broke this window?' 'The dog
seems pleased to see us." The text, by contrast, is typically
disembedded in that its whole meaning is to be discovered in
itself, that is, in language. A particular sentence or paragraph
is, of course, likely to take its sense in part from preceding and
succeeding ones, but that context is itself linguistic. Again, the
meaning of the text will certainly presume, more or less remotely,
on lived experience, but on the reader's previous experience the
links with which still have to be forged exclusively in the text
itself, that is, in words. It does not typically depend on the
reader's immediate non-verbal experience - which has the
character, indeed, of a potential distraction. Illustrated stories
and instruction manuals are among the exceptions, of varying
degrees, to this rule of the disembodied, disembedded text. The
book provides the rule.
Second, the text fi1*M a more controlled and concentrated
attention to language. Some of its advantage here is shared with
the audio-record up to a point Both text and record exist
quasi-permanently and independently of their producers, which
put them at the disposal of their users in ways that the primary
utterance cannot match (though, needless to say, it has
advantages of its own). But even this probably shades towards
a crucial advantage of text over both live and recorded
utterance. A particular paragraph is generally ejisir to recall to
perception than a particular snatch of recorded utterance, and
this edge may be founded on this more general and intrinsic
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advantage of the visual over the aural so that it would not yield
to improvements in 'playback' technology. In any case, there is
such an intrinsic general advantage of the visual the aurally
intelligible is necessarily transient and (pret±y well) one-paced,
the visually intelligible is generally mulfi-paced when it is
transient, and it is not necessarily transient Utterances,
recx)rded or not, do not admit of being perceptually 'held'. But
texts permit an attention that is continuous, or nearly so.
Sentences and groups of sentences can be isolated, scrutinized
and rescrutinized. They approximate the picture in their
cx)ntemp]atve accessibility. On the other hand, texts can also be
raced through at a speed at which utterances would be
gibberish. The pacing possibi1itis in reading are wide and in
the reader's controL (Thus, much the most convincing candidate
for the 'successor to the book' is the interactive video, and this
because it continues to incorporate all the advantages of the
16)
In sum, then, the typical text as against the typical non-recorded
utterance requires, and as against utterances in general
faci1iFtes, an attitude to language-use that is more controlled
and more concentrated. it is these features of texts that are
developmentally cruciaL The text-as-process is the thing, it is
tempting to say, rather than the access it provides to vocabulary
and ideas outside the reader's oral environment But this special
process, we shall see, makes possib]e special language and ideas,
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from which the developmental significance of the process is not
to be divorced in the end.
(2) Why, now, should a concentration on language be
developmentally more important than a cx)ncentration on any
number of other things? This question is revealingly mislding
in form. It would have us think of language as just another
feature of our environment, something else to be learnt about in
a world that has much else to compete for our attention. There
is evidence of a tendency, especially among pre-literate people,
to think of it in just this naturalistic way, in particular to see
the names of objects as among their objective properties. Thus
the Russian psychologist, Vygotsky, tells of a peasant who was
less surprised that it had been possible to discover the size of
certain stars than that it had been possible to discover their
names! 17
 In some cultures this linguistic naturalism combines
with an animistic view of the world 18 yield another well-
attested phenomenon, believing that words have magical
properties, that objects will 'respond' to their name-callers
provided the names used are the 'true' ones. A proper literacy
may involve some weaning from these tendencies. Quite apart
from the text's more reflexive relationship to words, the very
realization that the same words can be rendered visually as well
as orally, that is in altogether different perceptual forms, would
suggest a view of them as conventional signs rather than natural
properties. 19	Furthermore, this 'unsticking' of words from the
r1i1-ip.s they represent, as the anthropologist Robin Horton
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refers to it - correlatively an awakening to the acLi.vism of the
human mind - may prepare the way for the idea of new or
alternative theories and belief-systems - and so contribute to the
'unsticking', also, of ideas from reality.20
But we can be more direct in our argument We can say flatly
that language is not just another feature of the wor]d 'out-
there'. Rather it is a possession of minds, an intentional reality,
and indeed an embodiment and a tool of thought about all
features of the world. Simply, a use of language that is more
refIe,d.ve, control]ed and concentrated means thought that is more
refled.ve, controlled and concentrated. The growth will be in two
interdependent directions, noetic i.e. in relation to the thinking
subject, and noematic i.e. in relation to the content of thought
Noeticaily, writing is particularly significant - and reading as it
provokes to rewriting one's own text or to written comment on
another's. The objectification (more or less) of one's thought
process, in a form that is at once stable and moiifihle, has a
quality of open-ended self_revelation. 21 It heightens awareness
of one's thinking and oneself and, inter-relatedly, allows a more
deliberate control of one's thinking and oneself.
Noem t-ir'illy, the text embodies a greatly heightened ability to
transcend the immediate, the concrete and the commonsensicaL
This can be observed, first, in the dependence on texts of the
more sophisticated forms of enquiry. How far into mathematics
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oould the school-learner get without written calculations, or into
science without these and r&x)rd-keeping? Could history have
beoome a critical discipline, such that even at school-level the
learner can be asked to oonsider different interpretations and
theories, without it having ceased to be a purely oral tradiflnn?
And so on. Even literature, which has had its rich oral
masterpieces22, is at the very least freed from mnemonic
encumbrances by writing. The precise ways in which the text
enters into the development of a discipline, and into the pupil's
development in a discipline, varies from case to case and oould,
no doubt1 be analysed for the length of a book in each case.
But the general dependence is obvious. It is obvious, too, that
texts are more than external oonveniences, more than 'banks' of
knowledge opened by the 'key' of literacy. Rather they oondition
and enter the thought-processes that characterize these
disciplines. Thus, famously, a diagram in the sand and Socratic
questioning 'draws out' a geometric theorem from a non-literate
slave-boy, but1 as Plato observes, his understanding remains
'dream-like' and 'untethered' unless it advances from the stage
of foBowing Socrates through each individual step, to the
autonomy-oonferring realization of the overall strategy. 23
 What
Plato does not remark is that this probably needs a form of
demonstration that can be perused at leisure arid as a whole, and
the (definitely non-innate) capacity to peruse it. That is to say,
it needs a text and literacy.
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A critical understanding of social and po1itiral systems also
requires the kind of cxntrolled and concentrated thinking that
may originally have to be acquired from working with texts -
perhaps actually pn1itfral texts. For these systems are not
immediate to experience (rather, their effects - or the effects of
their effects - are), and their understanding requires piece-by-
piece assembly. Again, their critique is bound up with the
envisaging of alternative systems or parts of systems, a degree
still further removed from immediate experience. Again, they are
not only abstract and cxmplex, like geometric systems. They are
also ieo1ogical, more or less. Understanding them involves
'catching oneself on', 'waking up', 'seeing through them' - in
general a 'denaturalising' of them and the beginnings of a shift
from a passive to an active stance towards them. And it may be
that the new relationship to language that literacy brings is, as
Freire believes, also crucial to this, its essential prototype so to
spealc.24
The effect of a rightly designed literacy on our powers of
thinking is more pervasive stifl. Just because the text is not
merely an external auxiliary to memory, that which was originally
accessible only on paper thereafter becomes the personal
possession of mind and may be entertained in the absence of
texts. It can inform the educated eye, hand and heart in
relation to the ordinary and immediate environment. It can also
be discussed and developed in new forms of oral transaction.
Hence the di1tical relationship between chalk and classroom
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talk and between books and the disembedded oracy of the
seminar, and hence also, perhaps, the 'elaborated codes' of quite
unacademic conversatk)ns in some circles.25
There are two caveats to append to this general picture of a
literacy-based mental expanson. The first is that it is one thing
to represent it as pervasively significant, but it would be
something quite different (and no part of my argument) to c]ai.m
that it was constitutive of 'rationality' itself and of everything
properly to be called 'civilization. This needs saying because of
a tendency to hyperbole in some of the ]iterature. 26
 Secxnd, we
must go on remembering that the kind of mental expansion we
have been describing here is no inevitable accompaniment of
literacy - everything depends on the way literacy is conceived
for teaching purposes, is taught, and is then used. (Thus
Scribner and Cole researched the cognitive effects on members of
the Vai people of north-western Liberia of each of three forms of
literacy found in their society, and found different specific
effects for the three forms.27)
Teaching literacy In an influential paper of the seventies28,
Michael Young once characterized usual education as biased
towards the literate, the individualistic, the abstract and the
remote from ordinary experience. Our argument tends to confirm
his intuitive association of the final three of these traits with the
first. But Young seemed to doubt at that time that there was a
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reason intrinsic to knowledge and education, as opposed to one
based on the interests of certain social classes, for thus heavily
involving the curriculum with literacy and its attendants. Our
argument wou]i:1 seem to meet this challenge: the deve]opment of
thoughtful, critical and seif-cri±ical modes of thought in various
spheres of ]earning, including the political, is at the least greatly
fac!ilitRted by the proper uses of reading and writing. On the
other hand, we have he]d no brief for average current
cx)nceptons of the balance between literacy and oracy, or of the
relationship between literacy and oracy, or of the re]ationship
between both these things and action. What we have done is to
defend a conception of literacy on which the importance of all
these practical issues is advanced. (Thus it is important that
there may be potential losses to guard against, as well as gains
to be anticipated, in an education for literacy, e.g. some loss of
spontaneity and sensitivity in our face to face dealings, and a
weakening of the 'primitive synoptic unity' referred to in 3.3 -
the views taken of our literate modernity by remaining non-
literate societies can be suggestive in this regard!29)
On this conception, too, learning to read and write are not over
and done with in the early years of schooling. The significance
of early achievements is not denied - the moment when the
apprentice-reader first reads a line without her prompters, her
joyful discovery that she can read books other than her school-
readers, and so on. But we are invited to see many
developments in later schooling, or indeed in adult life, as
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continuous with early literacy-training and its achievements, as
we are invited to define the tasks of early literacy-training with
these later developments in mind - and they might not then be
as much later!
As to usage, we certainly need those general or open uses of
'read' and 'text' that allow us to observe that readers may be
thoughtless and uncritical,, and texts as vacant as the Sun
newspaper. But when it comes to setting objectives, it is the
thoughtful and critical reader or writer who is the 'true' reader
or writer that we ought all along to have in mind.
What, finally, of a behaviouristic method like Bereiter's? Could
we not still use his techniques as part of a larger package?
This needs a nuanced answer. It is not necessary (though the
idea dies hard) that techniques for imparting 'the basics' that
are highly effective on one conception of literacy must remain
useful on another, but, at most, that techniques in me respects
similar to them must be useful Doubtless, there are
considerations, whether specific to one language or referring to
languages in general,, that must be taken into account in any
programme, for instance, that materials should be sequenced with
an eye to their degrees of phonetic difficulty. Freire does not
pretend magica]ly to avoid such considerations. In particular, he
explcit deliberately and largely the syllabic-code structure of
the Portugese language. As much as Bereiter's, and surely in
partly similar ways, his methods would require considerable
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adjustment before being usable in relation to a language that was
very different in structure, Chinese for example. 3° But such
cx)mmonly binding considerations do not imply the common
usefulness, without modification, of any single technique. For
techniques are not usually, and certainly need not be, responses
to only one kind of cxnskleration at a time. They can be, for
instance, responses simultaneously to graphaphonic, syntactical,
semantic and aesthetic cxnsiderations. And, even where we have
what looks like the adoption of a whole technique by one
programme from another, it is likely to be a nice question
whether or not, set in its new context, amid different companion
techniques and different overall purposes, it will remain what we
should really count as 'the same' technique as before. But, all
that said, it is not that a Freire could learn nothing from a
Bereiter. It is rather that what he may coherently adopt or
adapt from him would be a matter for an investigation of the
techniques in question that, as befits his own paradigm, is more
phenomenological than psychometric in character. On the one
hand, it is right that the rationale rule the pedagogy, on the
other hand, it should exeraise its nile 'non-ideologically1.
Concluding summary We caught an issue on the rise in an
imaginary staff meeting: the vulnerability of an apparently top-
heavy educational conception of literacy to a more
corn monsensical,, and at the same time technically sophisticated,
instrumental conception. (In political terms, this corresponds
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roughly to the vulnerability of the specialist english
establishment to the critical interest in this subject of the
general public, generalist primary teachers, and educational
psycho]ogists.) Having extended the discussion into a ntrast
between Bereiter's emphasis on humane FFiincy and Freire's on
conscientization, we then sketched a defense of the educational
conception in two stages. First, literacy requires, and to a
unique degree fai1itites, a direct attention to ianguage. Second,
in principle such an attention enables more reflexive, controlled
and cx)ncentrated kinds of thinking, and the subjective and
objective consequences of such thinking. This has consequences
for the importance, the duration, arid the terminology of literacy
education, and for the evaluation and the adaptation of technical
aids relating to it.
NOTES
More developed forms include any or all of Multiple Choice questions, the Reading
'Workshop or Laboratory, and the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Cooprehension Skills.
See the excellent critique In Moy and Raleigh Conprehenslon: Bringing It Back Alive
in Mercer (1988) vol.2.
2 Note that ordinary language sanctions uses of 'read properly which do inply good
understanding, or appreciation, or criticism - as well as less loaded ones. Many
uses for many contexts, contexts which in turn help to determine how the uses are to
be interpreted! The trick is not to mismatch use and context. Thus 'reading without
understanding is a useful phrase for diagnosis but not for naming an educational
objective. Its legitimacy In one context does not entail that reading a text and
understanding It are quite separate processes that may be separately taught for. It
helps us resist this particular tenptation to note that 'reading without
understanding' itself can describe a range of situations, from somebody reeding a
text in a foreign language he does not understand (though a listener might be
following it), through a large nuiiber of intermediate cases, to an unbeliever reading
the Koran. Neither what is affirmed (reading ) mr what Is denied (understanding)
is precisely the same for each situation.
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3 See de Castell (1981) for, emong other things, a comparison of this technocratic
model of literacy - now dominant, she argues - with the, previously dominant,
progressive and classical models.
4 It will be appreciated that philosophical construction and conversion are not usually
the work of an afternoon. Or, it may be believed (and nowadays this belief can have
the taken-for granted quality of conin-sense) that value disputes are interminable
because in principle undecidable. In the meantime some decision is, or seems,
necessary. Even the clarification of differences that a true conpromi se would need
is likely to be fought shy of. For experience suggests that, in matters like this,
clarification itself can take quite some time, and is not guaranteed even with time.
(Besides, clarified dissent may rot altogether appeal as a working atmosphere!)
5 Sufficient, that is, for a joint conception and conduct of the enquiry - for
agreement on its formulation and on what is to count as evidence in it. This may co-
exist with different kinds and degrees of interest in it.
6 e.g. the official philosophy of a school or of a discipline. Such working
agreements are coninonly needed in cooperative ventures precisely in order to restrict
debate to manageable proportions.
7	 C. Bereiter (1973). See especially pp.64-i.
8 Bereiter flirts with the idea that much of what we currently regard as social,
emotional and aesthetic education could also be replaced by a training in skills
(sensitivity skills, body-awareness skills, honesty skills, skills of discrimination,
etc.), that would avoid making pupils over' in the process. Ibid. pp 36-7
9	 P. Freire, (1972) p.42. The Brazilian educator is directly concerned with adult
students.	 But his view of how children should be brought to literacy would
undoubtedly be closely analogous (if throttled back).
10 Also, of course, normative, for what is seen as only lntrumentally valuable - or,
perhaps, as most valuable when conceived only as an instrument - is still seen as
valuable.
11 The trouble with Bereiter's position from Freire's point of view, it might be said,
is just that he does conceive primary literacy skills on the models of such secondary
and parasitic ones.
12 The pheriomeriology in Freire's main works remains embryonic rather than developed and
systematic. It is, nonetheless, an essential element in his general approach. It
comes out, for instance, in his use of such student-cocmients on the significance for
themselves of learning to read and write as 'Before, letters seemed like puppets.
Today they say something to me, and I can make them talk! Ibid. p.44.
13	 ibid. p.30. Hence the prominence in Freires teaching-methods of consultations with,
and anong, students.
14 Freire is himself strangely inexplicit at this point, but we can attempt the sketch
of an answer that would follow the Implicit grain of his position. In places it
leans heavily on H. Donaldson (1978).
I formulated the argument that follows before reading more widely in the
literature. Later I found I had been anticipated by Olson (1977) - who draws on
still earlier work by Havelock (1963) and Goody and Watt (1968). Perhaps
independence of discovery says something about the worth of an argument! Olson's
presentation is, however, more historically based and less purely philosophical than
mine. (I sin indebted to my colleague Margaret Meek for guiding my late reading in
this area.)]
15 The tendency of young children in interpreting utterances, including those of the
logically self-sufficient kind favoured by some psychological workers, to help
themselves 1 i beral 1 y to non-verbal clues in the env I rorinent, and to make mi stakes in
the absence of such clues, is well-documented in Donaldson. ibid.
16	 See Clarke (1984).
17	 cited in Donaldson ibid.
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that an object a nane Is originally the sound it utters, its self-revelatory noise.
Think of our spontaneous uses of expressions ii ke bow-wow and noo-cow • in very
early language training!
19 In this respect, presumably, learning a second language would be similarly
subversive, at any rate where the learning was indirect I.e. involved the
experience of translation.
20	 R. Horton African Traditional Thought and Western Science', in B R WI 1 son (ed.)
(1970).
21 . .they can write down Ideas in order to reflect on then and refornul ate them; they
can elaborate complex argtanents which require written support..' The Co.,c Report 3. 14,
from its list of the developmental benefits of writing.
22 However, vm,st of the originally oral masterpieces we possess are not simply
transcriptions of oral traditions, but literary redactions of them - in some cases
(eg. in many Biblical books) redactions of redactions.
23	 Plato, Neno, 85c and 97d-98a.
24 So that a proper literacy would condition political awakening, as well as (at least
for the oppressed) being conditioned by it. This idea has achieved a high degree of
respectable currency. Thus the Kingnan Report - in a passage then quoted In the Cox
Report - is not far from the argunent of this paragraph:
People need expertise In language to be able to participate effectively In a
denocracy. . .A denocratic society needs people who have the linguistic
abilities which will enable them to discuss, evaluate and make sense of what
they are told, as well as to take effective action on the basis of their
understanding... Otherwise there can be no genuine participation, but only the
imposition of the ideas of those who are linguistically capable. Klngnan
Report ch.2, para.2
25	 B. Bernstein, Social Class, Language and Socialization, reprinted in Bernstein
(1971).	 Scollon and Scollon (1981) remark that to the Alaskan Athabaskans the
English speaker talks like a book'.
26	 e.g. Greenfield (1972) and, to an extent, in Olson (1977) See the critique by Street
in Mercer (1988) vol.1
27	 'Umpackaging Literacy' in P4ercer (1988) vol.1
28	 M.F.D. Young, 'An Approach to the Study of Curricula as Socially Organized
Knowledge , in Young (ed) (1971).
29	 See especially Scollon and Scollon (1981)
30	 On the other hand, 'structure' here should not be interpreted behaviouristically.
Differences in language-structure are, in the end, differences in thinking.
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HISFOflV AND IIrV
It is common to distinguish two principal motives for the study
of history. The love of the past, or 'history for its own sake', is
one. The other is the desire to understand the human present
in the light of its past or, more fully, the desire to understand,
assess and direct the human present - and thus shape the
human future. Let us focus on the relationship between these
two motives, an organic relationship as it will transpire. I
propose that in this relationship the frst kind of motive should
be interpreted in its strongest sense and then be given priority
over the secx)nd. Put provocatively, history should be
approached primarily as an extension of ancestor-communing
('worship' may be down to anthropological overexcitement), while
taking a wide view of who our ancestors are. This swims against
the mainstream of recent philosophy in this area. Pragmatic
thecries of truth and value put the main stress on the more or
less concealed 'function' of historical enquiry, the hidden needs
it answers to, and the undeclared interests that it promotes, in
the contemporary life of a community. I do not doubt that this
kind of scrutiny can be illuminating - in reference to academic
as well as more popular history. But I shall not accept that all
historical interest and study must be motivated primarily in this
self-regarding way, that, as the slogan would have it, all history
is contemporary history. Nor, indeed, shall I accept that history
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is best: approached in this way. On the other hand, I shall be as
much at pains to distinguish my position from the purist view -
popular among academic historians until quite recently - that
history should be altogether divorced from contemporary causes
and ancerns.
The meaning of ]ove of the past One way in which 'love of the
past' sily gets shunted into a subordinate position is by
interpreting it as just intellectual curiosity about the past, more
a love of enquiry into the past than a love of the past.' (The
'history' in 'history for its own sake' is the study of the past
rather than the past itself.) What lent itself to this was the
rigid detachment advocated and practised in some academic
circles, espilly the refusal of an ethical encounter with the
past in which historians might both judge and allow themselves
to be judged. If the historian is not to engage humanly and
ethically with her subjects what backward-looking motive is left
but the enjoyment of the play of intelligence and imagination in
reconstructing a piece of history. But the way is then 1r for
making 'love of the past' a mere auxiliary to contemporary
relevance as a motive for study - if not for the individual
historian at least for history as an institution and as a school
subject. For we could not otherwise account for the importance
we feel history to possess. If it were only, or mainly, a matter
of curiosity and the enjoyment of puzz]es then it would have the
essentially idle character of a hobby like chess or the detective
noveL Like them it might indeed contribute to the development
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of intellectual skills and agility, but this would not be by its
virtue of its being history specifically.
'History for its own sake' can be interpreted rather more
substantially in terms of history being not just another means by
which we may achieve our present ends, but something which
expands our whole picture of the world and of human beings,
and, therefore, of what ends are possible for us. 2 But this risks
seeing history still as a means, even if a means to the 'seand-
order' end of recxrnsidering our ends in life. (The 'history' that
is 'for its own sake' is still the study of history.) More
fundamentally, it raises the question of whether it is a ct'ndilion
of history opening up new ends for us that we approach the
people of the past, not just as :important learning resources, but
as 'ends-in-themselves'. Is it a matter only of the objectivity
that respects evidence and the limits of evidence, seeks to get
the acx)unt right1 and resists capture in advance by particular
practical ends and interests in the present? Or is it a matter of
a deeper objectivity that seeks also to 'do justice' to the past?
In fact, 'love of the human past' has a plainer and yet more
substantial sense. It can mean quite simply brherly and
sisterly love directed to the human beings and the human worlds
that are dead and gone, or at any rate to some of them - 'piety'
in its old meaning. Now the 'history' that is valued for its own
sake is the (significant) past itself.
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Shouldn't it be readily admitted that love of the dead for their
own sakes is perfectly possible, and indeed often owed to them?
Need there be anything the least bit necrophilic in owning up to
obligations to the human past which parallel those we have to the
human present? Doesn't the past, too, engage our attention,
respect, admiration, compassion, indignation, sense of justice and
so forth? It is obvious that we do in fact adopt such attitudes
to past figures, deeds, institutions and movements. When
challenged as to their appropriateness in particular cases, we
justify them by essentialLy the same considerations that we use
in regard to our contemporary world. Of course the process of
coming to the relevant factual judgements is, in significant ways,
different in the two cases. In regard to the past it is in some
ways easier (the historian can know what contemporaries did not
know, can achieve a more rounded view etc.), and in some ways
more iifFiult (he has to think himself into the thnes he is
studying etc.). But once the judgements are in, they
spontansously evoke or command the same range of feelings,
values and attitudes in both cases. And what good reason could
we have for blocking these when they relate to the past, unless
it be the kind of reason that could also be relevant in regard to
the present - that they are in this or that particular case
inappropriate, hasty, partial,, unjust, and so forth? All this
seems really very obvious. And it remains obvious even though
the contemporary 'now' has, other things being equ4 a dramatic
and ethical edge over the historical 'then'.
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Yet explicit acknowledgements of this level of involvement with
history are extremely hard to find. Consider, for example, the
Final Report of the National Curriculum History Group. It
suggests no fewer than nine purposes of school history: to help
understand the present in the context of the past; to arouse
interest in the past; to help to give pupils a sense of identity; to
help to give pupils an understanding of their own cultural roots
and shared inheritances; to contribute to pupils' knowledge and
understanding of other countries and other cultures in the
modern world; to train the mind by means of disciplined study;
to introduce pupils to the distinctive methodology of historians;
to enrich other areas of the curriculum; and to prepare pupils
for adult iife. In this otherwise admirably inclusive list, only
the second item, 'to arouse interest in the past', even gestures
at 'piety'. Considering the obligations of such a Group to
consult the way historians actually work, we may safely assume
that 'pietas' is not a prominent part of the self-image of history
as a discipline.
No doubt1 this too may be related to the general influence of
positivism in the human sciences - the tendency we criticized in
it to depersonalize the scientist/subject relationship. But we
must consider a more particular objection to a 'human'
involvement with the subjects of research when those subjects
are dead and gone. This is that since we cannot reciprocally
relate to the past and cannot shape and influence it, we cannot
therefore take responsibility for it in any real sense. Let. us
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cx)mment in two stages. First, the obvious kernel of truth in it
does not render love of the past inappropriate (and throw us
back immediately upon 'relevance' and 'usefulness' as the
mainsprings of historical enquiry). Many of our responses to
present human beings and their ways do not require the setting
of a reciprocal relationship, nor do they all seek a practical
expression in actions performed in or around the person
responded to. Admiration, for instance, can be anonymous, and
is not immediately practicaL But even in the case of responses
like compassion or indignation that do carry a fairly immediate
complement of appropriate actions, practical helplessness is
frustrating without making the compassion or indignation itself
inappropriate. The helpless victim of torture still has the right
to her indignation. So does the helpless observer of it. So, too,
will the future historian of it. Even non-reciprocal relationships
can be 'personal', then, and helplessness would not of itself stop
us relating to past pecple and events in very human ways.
But, in the second place, we are not entirely helpless in regard
to the past. There are at least two sorts of thing we can
undertake in its regard, each requiring an ethically creative and
critical effort of reconstruction. The first is to set the record
straight posthumously, to reinstate the stoned prophets and so
on. Certainly this is far more difficult, and far less completely
accxmpiished, than we like to think - except where thne itself has
already yielded the oppressed their revenge in the form of
ultimate victory or emancipation. Much history is based on the
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depositions of murderers about their victims, if for no other
reason because the conquerors tend to bury the cultural remains
of their victhns with their victims themselves. Simone Weil, my
source for this reminder, wrote in 1939 that if the Nazis were to
win the coming war the historians of two thousand years hence
might still be lauding the 'Pax Germanica'! Yet she thought it
possible, and a sacred duty, to begin to reconstruct and
vindicate civilizations like the Trojan, Carthaginian, Celtic, Inca
and American Indian - by a huge effort of attention and
imagination in regard to such scraps of them as have survived -
and herself contributed to such an effort in regard to the 11th
century civilization of Languedoc.6
We can also aflow the light of the past to inform the way we live
our lives. This is much more than 'conserving the legacy of the
past', there being a few quick distinctions to remind ourselves of
between the mummification and the use of the past, between the
less and the more conscious use of the past, and between
tradition as a dead weight and tradition as a source of strength
and inspiration. 7 We should also distinguish the more general
light that history is admitted, perhaps even by academic
historians, to cast on the human predicament (e.g. the tendency
for victorious might to assume the mantle of right or the
frequency with which men propose but chance, mistake, and God
dispose), from the more specific lessons and inspirations that we
can take from particular bits of history, such as a greater
devotion to democratic institutions, scientific freedom, the cause
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of feminism, a particular trade-union, a church, etc. Now when
we cx)nscJously and critically take aboard some specific lesson
from a part of history, when our awareness and devotion relating
to some cause or value are intensifi by a study of the labour,
pain and hope that have gone into it, then another mode of
'piety' is at work. We are, and we see ourselves to be, in
fraternal and sororal cxoperation with some individuals and
groups of the past - and in opposition to others.
Someone will insist that 'partnership' with the past remains a
fiction in the last analysis, since, for all our creative and critical
ooncern for it and all our efforts to live by the best of it, we
still cannot change a jot of it. But that objection overlooks
something: though nothing can now change it, the past would
have been very different if its individuals and peoples had never
worked with an eye to a future beyond themselves, never
participated in designs which they knew would not be realised in
their lifetimes in the faith that others would carry the venture
forward, and never been sustained in affliction or restrained in
power by the reDection that history would judge them (it is even
said that we owed Ronald Reagan's mIlitary 'restraint' to his
wife's desire that he be remembered as a peacemaker) •8
'Partnership with the past' must have precisely the same v1iity,
indeed, as 'partnership with the future'. These are indeed
aspects of the same ongoing process, so that 'why worry about
the past since we can do nothing for it?' is from the same
cynical stable as 'what has posterity ever done for me?'
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The primacy of ]ove of the past So far we have been working
on the substantial sense and vaThiity of 'love of the human past'.
Let us turn now to its primacy in relation to the other main
motive for doing history. The idea to ponder here is that only
those who love the past for itself can be trusted to mediate it to
the present, to draw the right lessons from it and indicate its
proper relevance - and they are precisely those who will not
regard such lessons and relevance as the ground-motive of their
cxncern with the past.
In effect, this idea draws an analogy from our relationships in
the present. We distinguish personal relationships from those
that are simply cxoperative or cx)ntractuaL In authentic
friendship,love, or even cx.Beagueship, we value the other for
himself or herself. The mmon ventures, exchanges of benfits,
and lessons learnt are 'spin-off', and they have a value as
expressions, symbols and nourishments of the relationship as well
as their own utility. Note, however, that their utility is not
generally less significant for being indirect. Indeed, the paradox
is that there are highly important kinds of 'pay-off' - for
instance, in the area of self-knowledge and self-valuation - which
can only be acquired in relationships in which they are not the
primary focus of attention. If somsone conducts a personal
relationship for the primary purpose of learning from it, perhaps
to gain 'experience' in such relationships, we say he is 'using'
the other person - but, more to the point, we suspect such a
relationship defeats its own purpose and yields a lower dividend
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in terms of learning and experience. Does a similar logic obtain
in historical study?
Bearing in mind what we have said about the range of our
responses and ncerns towards the past and the measure of
reciproty, even, between past and present, it seems reasonable
to claim that we have relationships with historical individuals
that belong more to the personal than the useful category, and
that we have relationships of a quasi-personal kind also with
whole societies, cu]tures, institutions, and movements of the past
(as of the present). It would follow that among the ben pfit
 and
lessons which the past has for us we may expect some important
ones to be ours only if we both enter into such quasi-persona].
relationships with it, and are authentic about this e. do not
have the benf91-s and lessons as our direct and primary object.
And surely this is in fact so. No doubt we can, without thus
involving ourselves, 'strip-mine' the past quite effectively for
many of its deposits. We have the beginnings of an idea in
philosophy, for instance, and we search the works of past
thinkers on the subject for helpful developments of it. We can
also keep this 'using' within moral bounds by observing the
minimal cxnventions of respect, acknowledging our sources,
avoi1irig misrepresentation, and so on. But we uld not mine in
this way more precious things that the past can offer us: some
steady insight into human heads and hearts, an abiding sense of
the fragility of a certain value, a new vitality in some important
project - in genera],, the cxntribution of history to wisdom and
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care. For that an altogether more serious cxmmitment seems
necessary.
Pre-critical and critical history It will be objected that this
position returns history to its 'precri±ical' phase since 'piety' is
exactly what was characteristic of pre-critical history. Now I
doubt if there is any wholly agreed account of the distinction
between critical and pre-critical history. But let us work with
the following fairly typical set of contrasts. Prectitical history
is a) ethnocentric, b) practical and c) ethical; whereas critical
history is a) universal, b) explanatory and c) non-judgementa]1
even valne-free. 9 Considering these three contrasts in turn in
relation to our support for 'piety' wIll also help us clarify that
notion further (and, we might add, rescue it more completely
from the Right).
a) Precritical history is largely confined, it is said, to the
history of one's own community or society, and where it reaches
out to other societies it considers them only in their relevance to
one's own. Critical history is universal in its intended scope,
and when it addresses itself to other societies it endeavours to
do so on their own terms. It may even prefer to work on
societies and times that are particularly remote from the
historian's own.
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This ntrast forces us to a vital clarification: there is no need
to conceive 'piety' as a duty only to one's own forbears - that
would be no more than moral chillishness. In fact, the logic of
piety replicates the logic of charity. There is an important sense
in which each is to be universal - but as 'openness' to all rather
than (impossible) realization. On the other hand, piety and
charity 'begin at home', both in the sense that they must rst
be learnt there, and in the sense that unless one goes on loving
one's own that is near at hand one's protestations regarding
what is distant and not one's own become suspect. In addition
to kinship, there are certain other grounds on which actual
charity becxmes obligatory or spilly desirable, and to each of
them also there is an analogue for piety. In both there are the
special claims upon us of the afflicted and oppressed, of our own
urgent needs - in particular as viewed morally and spiritually, of
those we have already engaged and become friendly with, and of
those that circumstances have just now put squarely in our way.
Thus an historian or a student might, in piety, work on a period
or society because it had been neglected by other historians -
especially if its people had been oppressed and destroyed, or
because it possessed virtues that she believed she and her times
stood in special need of, or because she was an authority on it
and therefore responsible for it, or because she felt a
spontaneous affinity with it, or because a school or university
syllabus is forcing it on her. Piety, then, does not require a
return to the jingoism of precritical history. On the other hand,
neither does it accord with the flat and a priori neutrality of the
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first proposed canon of critical history. For it does have
criteria for judging and assigning priorities, though ones that
are broad and generous.
b) Pre-critical history, like the folk-memory from which it
evolves, has a practical function, namely, to promote the society's
sense of its own identity and its devotion to its own survival
and development It tc11s the stories of the society's existing
institutions (or perhaps of revolutionary ones being struggled
for), contrasts them favourably with those of other societies,
refutes the 'calumnies' of neighbours regarding them, and
legitimates the power-structure embodied in them. Its
effectiveness for these ends sometimes requires of it a
consummate artistry. Critical history, however, is (or was) said
to have no practical function, and to regard polit-ial and
apologetic aims as fatal to the achievement of its task. That task
is simply to discover what was really going forward at a
particular place and time, and why, and to set this forth in a
significant narratLve, preferably in plain prose. So, its
explanatory drive is directed not at the present, but at the past
itself and it proceeds by a greater and greater concentration on
the detail of the past, and an ever more thorough discarding of
the historian's contemporary reflexes and presuppositions in
favour of an imaginative assumption of those of the times he is
studying.'°
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How does piety stand in relation to this purported cxntrast?
Three points may be made. First, and again like charity, piety
has critical as well as appreciative modes it may express itself
very well1 for instance, in a bitFcr ndemnation of things done
by one's oDuntry. Sex)nd, this accxunt of pre-cr.itical history
generalizes unjustly. Folk-history has been known to beat its
breast rather than justify itself at all sts, to acknowledge some
of the people's past crimes rather than glorify them. The Old
Testament occasionally achieved this moral objectivity, and the
Iliad's sorrowful evocation of the tyranny of war over both
victor and vanquished is a remarkable example of it". Third, the
polarization in the stated oontrast between practical relevance on
the one hand, and the past for its own sake on the other hand,
is extreme. Our argument has been that these are organically
related: if (and only if) the past is explored for its own sake, its
more profound relevance will be realised. (Similarly, the
'functional' analysis of ancestor-oommurdon is disrespectfully
reductionist. When I meditate at the graves of my parents and
more remote forbears my direct ooncern is to remember and
honour them. I may oome away with a stronger sense of my
roots and identity or with a new inspiration for some project.
But this would be a spin-off from the self-transcending movement
of piety.)
c) Finally, it is said, pre-critical history is ethicaL As well as
narrating, it apportions praise and blame. it is a tribunal before
which people and deeds of the past pass in review to be
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condemned, or excused, or commended. This follows on from its
practical function and, so, its ethical criteria tend to be chosen
in the interests of contemporary survival and development But
the critical historian prcifesses to eschew ethical judgement and
he is severe on those historians who indulge in it. Thus
Butterfield condemned Lord Acton and those he called generally
'whig historians' in a classic essay. In part this was for the
arrogance implicit in their wholesale judgements of others. But
in additinn ButterFi1d, and criticRl historians generally, believed
that the intrusion of moral judgement in historical enquiry, Like
the intrusion of poliFia1 and apologetic purposes of which it was
generally an aspect, led to a loss of objectivity in the work.
It Is not clear that moral Indignation Is not a dispersion of one's
energies to the great confusion of one's judgement. 12
It tended, if not quite to a f1ifiration of the historical details,
at any rate to premature and artificial synopses of broad
historical developments, based on a simplistic division of
historical agents and ideas into 'good' and 'bad', 'progressive'
and 'reactionary', or - in other hands - 'loyal' and 'subversive'.
This issue seems the most critical for our recommendation of
piety.
We shall start with some preliminary points. First, piety, yet
again like charity, is not all ethical encounter. it is also
fascination with the past, enjoyment of it, aesthetic delight at it,
polite tolerance of occasional boredom with it, and so on. (This
observation lines up with our plaring of ethical values generally
inside the much larger whole of love of the world in 3.3.)
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Secx)nd, insofar as it is ethical, piety is essentially independent
both of an a priori belief in historical progress (such as was
held by the 'Whig' historians) and of the romanticization of the
past. It implies no case, not even a prima facile one, for placing
the present (and its historians) on a moral eminence in relation
to the past - or the reverse. In an ethical enunter with the
past that was properly open and critical the a priori probability-
values should be equal of the historian and the present being
put in question, and of the past to be studied being put in
question. This is indeed to expect impartiality from the
historian, but an impartiality that differs from, and strikes
deeper than, ethical neutrality. Third, the refusal of an ethical
encxunter with the past is a denial of spontaneous expectations,
a methodical exclusion of a range of responses that naturally
seem appropriate. As such it is it that requires justification.
The one offered is that these responses impede objectivity. Now
it is obvious that certain kinds of moral fervour would distort an
historical acaunt. But the claim that moral interest necessarily
distorts depends on the assumption that a self-critical moral
objectivity is an impossil)]e, maybe incx)herent, ideaL If it is
only very diiEcult then one uld, perhaps, cxnvict academic
history of a failure of nerve: history is made sir at the price
of making it ]ess significant
It might be replied that, at any rate in an age of moral pluralism
like ours, history as a cxoperative venture requires a
methodologicaL exclusion of valne-judgements. And, after all, if
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professional historians can only get the bald narrative together
the readers or audience can sti]]1 if they wish, use it towards
their own personal ethical encounters with the past. Indeed, we
might conceive of a systematic comparative ethics (to be called
'dialectics' perhaps), distinct from history proper but for which
history would provide most of the data.' 3
 There is something in
these suggestions. In pluralist societies history-writing will be
better for taking account of the pluralism of contemporary
values, laying special emphasis on the values that are shared,
being explicit about relevant more 'personal' values, and so forth
- in other words, for adopting the manners and procedures of
everyday ethical discourse in this kind of society. Again, there
is surely some useful distinction to be drawn between the actual
conduct of historical enquiry, to which the (rough) Weberian
adage 'value-relevant but value-free' would apply, and our wider
and more general relationship with the fruits of that enquiry. In
effect, this is to apply to this area the earlier distinction
between what we called 'scientific' and 'utopian' discourses, and
there may also be something to be said for the idea of a
systematic version of the utopian discourse in this context. But
these concessions affect only the formulation of the main point
We simply say, now, that a proper historical involvement and a
proper historical education have to include both the scientific
and the normative.
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The non-neutrality of perspective But they should also include a
sense of the corre]ativity, as well as the distinctiveness, of these
disx)urses. For the question raised by these exchanges is of the
very possibility of a complete ethical neutrality in an historical
narrative retaining at least some human significance. (Thus we
have an opportunity, right at the end of this thesis, to look
again at the scientific-utopian link, this thne in one specific
cxntext.)
This is the moment to acknowledge that the account of critical
history we have been working with is one that would have
appealed more a generation ago. To-day's historian is more
likely to be sceptical about the possibility of value-free history.
In particular, the overall organization or perspective of a work is
now commonly seen as influenced (at least) by factors which the
historian has brought to her enquiry from outside history.
Perspectives can differ without conflicting, as would the histories
of the science and the art of the same period, or they may
conflict, as would socialist and non-socialist accounts of the
industrial revolution. The sheer bulk and diverbity of the
materials of history guarantee an endless supply of perspectives
in the first sense. Now even this point presents some difficulty
for the old-style critical faith that, in Bury's words, 'a complete
assemblage of the sm11ect facts of human history will tell in the
end'.' It does not seem reconi1Rhle with the atomism of that
ideal, suggesting, rather, that 'facts' are only intelligible, and
only noticed, in some degree of relationship to perspectives
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formed or being formed. But the difficulty is clearer in oonflicts
of perspective. Here the governing differences (that are not, or
not in all respects, to be resolved by further historical research
and disoovery) are not just matters of the historian's personal
interests, but of her metaphysical and moral beliefs. The crucial
point is that these beliefs and attitudes participate inevitably in
the shaping of an historical enquiry.
We may broadly distinguish two respects in which they do. First
the historian's views of what is possible, whether in nature as it
impinges on people or for human nature itself - vi]]. be more or
less remote operators of the interpretation she puts on historical
data. They inevitably affect her attitude to testimonies and
other sources, limit the hypotheses she is prepared to entertain,
and so on. One may say that if these views are right it is
perfectly proper that they should do these things. But the
question of their rightness is not an historical question, not at
any rate an exclusively historical question. The point is at least
as old as Hume's reflections on the historian's ati-il-ude to
miracles.' 5 One should be careful,, however, not to overstate it.
There is no good reason for assuming that historical study itself
makes no oontribution to our views on what is possible. On the
oontrary, this might well be thought one of its more important
valnes. But though the historical evidence may suggest
reappraisal of our views of the possible, it will not by itself
determine them.
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Secxnd, there is the inevitable influence of the historian's broad
moral outlook - that is, of her view of what is humanly
important. We can see this through a distinction between the
intrinsic and the instrumental importance of an historical event
Instrumentally, an event's importance is measured by the extent
of its causal influence on other events (the loss of a horse-shoe
nail may bring the kingdom down). Intrinsically, its importance
is independent of anything that happens afterwards. If one
claimed the French Revolution was the most important event in
modern history, one might well have both kinds of importance in
mind. Again, if history has shifted its focus from the doings of
kings and queens to the oommon man, it is ]ikely that this
reflects both a post-Marx perception of eoonomic and associated
social movements as more influential than the actions of
monarachs, and our ethical beliefs about the rights of peple and
the value of democracy. So, history may be structured by moral
values even if it eschews overt moral judgement' 6
 But we can
surely go further and claim that it must be so structured. For
instrumental importance must itself depend on intrinsic
importance. Every event has, perhaps, an infinitude of ripples.
So the significance, as well as the quantity, of actual
oonsequences must be involved in judging instrumental
importance, and that means that intrinsic importance, and the
broader kind of value, are always involved in historical selection
and oonstruction.17
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We have found reason to doubt some standard cx)ntrasts between
precritical and ctitical history. In the end it may be that the
only real differences between them are that a properly
conceived cdtical history is more cxncerned cxnstantly to expand
the story of the past, more cxncerned with getting the story
right, and is methodologically better equipped to achieve that
expansion and that fidelity. And those differences, though this
is not how it is usually put, cxuld themselves be xnceived as
developments in piety, expressions of a greater piety!
NOTES
1	 An Influential arid wellknown work that does this is W. H. Walsh (1967. 3rd revIsed
edition).
2	 See my colleague Peter Lee (1991) pp.42-3
3 Note that we are not here addressing the question of the relative Importance of (and
the relationship between) solidarity with the past and solidarity with the present.
That Is certainly a distinct question.
4	 National Curriculum History Working Report 1990, paragraph 1.7.
5	 'The Great Beast. Some reflections on the origins of Hitlerism' in Weil/R. Rees 1962.
6	 'A medieval epic poem' arid 'The Romenesque Renaissance in Ibid.
7	 See Nietzsche's classic essay on The Use and Abuse of History.
B	 I believe I have borrowed some of these purple phrases from Lonergan s works, bot I
cannot trace the reference.
9	 These points of contrast are borrowed from B. Lonergan (1972), pp.185ff. Chs.6-10 of
this distinguished theological study offer an extremely useful survey aNi analysis of
issues relating to the study of history. Note that theology, becise of the
contination of historical with philosophical arid experiential claims that an
historical religion involves, has been to the forefront In considering these matters.
10	 Lonergan ibid.
11	 See Si ncne Well 's brilliant essay The Iliad, Poem of Force' In Mayer (ed.)
12	 Herbert Butterfield (1950)
13	 As Lonergan recoirinends, op.cit. - in this, I think, echoing Schllermacher In the 19th
century.
14	 J.B.Bury (1927) 'The Science of History', reprinted in Bury (1927)
iS But suppose, that all the historians who treat of England, should agree,
that, on the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died, that Lxith before and
after her death she was seen by her physicians arid the whole court, as is
usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and
proclaimed by the pan lament; and that, after being Interred a nonth, she
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nust confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd
ci rcianstances, but should not have the least Inclination to bell eve so
ml raculous an event.' Essay Concerning Ha'nan Understanding
The Christian apologist will see this as bringing out the inçortance of context: in
Christ s case, his religious mission ar his life as a whole. Note that this
observation would itself be historical, but not exclusively so.
16	 I have borrowed both this distinction and these exaaples from W. H. Walsh supra cit.
Apperdix A. The Limits of Scientific History (3rd revised edition only).
17	 This is just to apply to history what we have seen Weber (tr.1949, p.76) say of
cultural sciences in general. See p.114 atx,ve.
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COCLT7 IQt
THE CONCEPT OF EDUCATION
'(Formal) education' and 'education (in the widest sense)'
are corre]ative usages inasmuch as the first requires the
admissibility of the second and the second is only likely to
emerge granted the 'high profile' of formal education. This
cxrre]ath,ity underwrites the connection of the concept of
education with the ideal of a coherent view of life.
2 Normative and descriptive uses of 'education' are correlative
inasmuch as descriptive uses would have no application
without the kinds of activity of which normative uses are an
integral part, and, on the other hand, the ]ogic of those
activities requires descriptive uses as welL This
correlativity underwrites the dialectic between normative
and descriptive discourses in educational theory and debate.
3 Uses of 'education' to the extent they are loaded are
correlative to other uses that are (more) open. This
correlativity is the principal linguistic condithn both of
theoretical novelty and of inter-contestant intelligibility in
educational theory and debate. it is the basis of a dialectic
in agreement and disagreement the general features of
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which include: shared acceptance of the linguistic ]egithnacy
of loading; shared open uses of 'education'; an historically
con1i1ned *ilnpnntingf
 of rival views on each other; and
the shared intention of truth and rightness.
4 The correlativiries of 1-3 together constitute the 'geometry'
of the concept of education and are what allow us to think
of that concept as genuinely unitary despite being too
complex to be deinitionally unitary.
THE THEORY OF EDUCATION AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE
RELATIONSHIP
5 The theory that is already emergent in good educational
practice is, by virtue of the breadth and coherence to
which that practice is committed, properly called
'philosophical'.
6 Educational theory is a choir of four voices, a symbiotically
inter-related 'cluster' of the following 'discourses': utopian,
deliberative, evaluative and scientific.
7 The inclusion of the scientific in the cluster presupposes
that it too is inthiiately value-conditioned - which is a
reasonable assumption considering the basis of human
science generally in direct or indirect communication
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between researchers and researched - as weU as being, to a
unique degree among forms of interhuman discourse,
sustainedly detached.
8 The ideal of a tough objectivity in all forms of educational
enquiry can stand inasmuch as it accxmmodates the
inte.1]ectual and ethical values of sensitivity to the local and
circumstantial, a large freedom in the pursuit of inteBectual
interests, a decent humility considering our fallibility, an
acknowledgement of the integral roles of inthitinn and vision
in theory construction and the discernment of
incommensurable theories, and an acknowledgement of the
inevitability of disagreement over fundamental values
arising, especially, from the broad facts of human freedom
and human perversity.
TOWARDS A SUBSTANTIVE EDUCATIONAL VISION
9 Behind the explicit 'deschoo]er' objections to education there
lurks the deeper ifFfrulty that our culture does not
support the ideal of a non-artificial curriculum coherence
nor, therefore, support the idea of education itself. The
sum of the cross-curricular connections that we are inclined
to pursue falls short of such coherence.
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10 Though literacy and the related idea of 'the academic' are
not adequate to the role - which by default is thrust upon
them - of providing unity to our intellectual ]ives, it
remains that the 'educational' cx)nception of ]iteracy as a
generally 'conscientizing' form of mental development is to
be preferred to much more ]imited (though often technically
sophisticated) instrumentalist conceptions.
11 Educational values can be c]assifid as possessive,
experiential,, ethical and 'ecstatic' (love of the world). The
last-named, though the most neglected in current literature
because it embodies a strongly 'realist' epistemology, is
actually presupposed by the other three categories and is
the root of order and coherence among educational values.
12 This c]assification of values can be used to illnminate and
help to defend the new status of techno]ogy education, to
set some directions for this education, and to expose the
crudity in that context of the traditional distinction between
knowledge pursued for its own sake and knowledge pursued
for ends beyond itself.
13 As love of the world is fundamental to educational values in
general, so (a generously conceived) 'piety' is fundamental
to the proper approach to historical enquiry and historical
education.
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14 In analysing cx)gnitive and cultural 'capital' for purposes of
educational selection the three 'elementary' divisions of
knowledge by cognitive aim, level of reality engaged with,
and aspects of the expressive personality most involved -
which relate in vanous ways to the categories of value
distinguished earlier - are each valki, each educationally
significant, and generally complementary to each other. The
'plural' approach to cultural analysis which together they
constitute is to be preferred to more ambitious attempts - of
which Hirst's is the most sophisticated in philosophical terms
- to project all distinctions of significance on to a single
'map'.
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